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I Framework of the dissertation 
This dissertation deals with the topic of “accounting and innovation” and provides evidence 
for the area of innovation from two accounting perspectives, i.e., the external disclosure per-
spective and the internal management control system perspective. The present section intro-
duces the dissertation by providing the main definitions, drawing a brief state of the art of the 
research areas, and summarizing the three papers that build the main part of this cumulative 
dissertation. The first chapter of this introduction provides the basic definitions from the area 
of innovation research and clarifies the macro- and microeconomic importance of innova-
tions. The second chapter addresses the accounting perspectives on the topic of innovation 
and summarizes the papers of this dissertation.  
1 Innovation 
About sixty years ago, Schumpeter (1943) provided the basis for today’s macro- and microe-
conomic interest in innovations. He described the business process of the substitution of old 
products and processes with new ones as “creative destruction”. Furthermore, he argued that 
this process, carried out by creative entrepreneurs, is the basis for economic growth. Innova-
tions allow firms to gain competitive advantage and thus temporal monopolistic returns 
(Schumpeter, 1943). Until today, researchers (e.g. Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990; Griliches, 
1981; Hall & Mairesse, 1995) and institutions (e.g. OECD, 2010b) agreed on the positive ef-
fect of innovations for the performance and growth of firms and economies. Politicians and 
economists praise innovations for their positive effects on employment and quality of life. 
Firms seek diversification from their competitors through innovations. This is the reason why 
issues such as the enhancement, measurement, and disclosure of innovations are still a topic 
of concern for research, institutions, and firms (e.g. Balachandra & Friar, 1997; Damanpour, 
1991; Henard & Szymanski, 2001; Montoya-Weiss & Calantone, 1994; OECD, 2010a).  
The increasing importance of innovations is reflected in numerous statistics. For ex-
ample, the share of governmental expenditures on research and development (R&D) relative 
to total governmental expenditures increased between 2006 and 2010 (1.51% to 1.56% on 
average in all the 17 countries in the Euro-region, 1.68% to 1.90% in Germany, 1.33% to 
1.61% in Austria). The percentage of R&D expenditures from business firms relative to GDP 
also experienced a rapid growth between 2006 and 2010 (1.19% to 1.27% on average in all 
the 17 countries in the Euro-region, 1.78% to 1.90% in Germany, 1.72% to 1.88% in Austria). 
In the same timeframe, the number of employees engaged in research in both the private and 
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public sectors increased (from 933,491 to 1,086,772 in all the 17 countries of the Euro-region, 
from 279,822 to 327,500 in Germany, from 291,999 to 354,942 in Austria) (Eurostat, 2011). 
However, the overall increased input into innovation processes does not always lead to in-
creased innovation performance, making the issue of the management of these processes one 
of the key interests of firms. For example, the percentage of total turnover generated by inno-
vations decreased between 2006 and 2008 (from 13.4% to 13.3% on average in all the 27 Eu-
ropean Union countries, from 19.2% to 17.4% in Germany, from 13.6% to 11.2% in Austria; 
data for 2010 not yet available) (Eurostat, 2011).    
The longstanding interest in the topic of innovation reached accounting research about 
one decade ago (see the survey of the literature presented in tables I - 1 and I - 3). This disser-
tation works at the crossroads of these two areas of research by considering the topic of inno-
vation from different accounting perspectives: the external disclosure perspective and the in-
ternal management control system perspective (see section 2). Before describing these per-
spectives, this section clarifies the definitions about innovation and related terms that will 
become relevant in the course of the dissertation.  
According to the OECD (2005) definition, an “[…] innovation is the implementation 
of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing 
method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or ex-
ternal relations” (OECD, 2005, p. 46). The distinction made within this definition can be 
found largely in Schumpeter’s work when he argues that there are five types of innovations, 
i.e., the introduction of new products, the introduction of new production methods, the open-
ing of new markets, the development of new sources of supply for materials, and the reorgan-
ization of the market structure within an industry (Schumpeter, 1943). Similarly, the above 
OECD definition discriminates among product, process, marketing, and organizational inno-
vation (OECD, 2005).  
“A product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or 
significantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses. 
This includes significant improvements in technical specifications, compo-
nents and materials, incorporated software, user friendliness or other func-
tional characteristics” (OECD, 2005, p. 48).  
In contrast, when a “[…] new or significantly improved production or delivery meth-
od” (OECD, 2005, p. 49) is generated, then a process innovation is put in place. A marketing 
innovation requires “[…] the implementation of a new marketing method involving signifi-
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cant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, product promotion or pric-
ing” (OECD, 2005, p. 49), while “[…] the implementation of a new organisational method in 
the firm’s business practices, workplace organization or external relations” (OECD, 2005, p. 
51) identifies organizational innovations. 
In particular, product innovations are generated through R&D (OECD, 2005). Indeed, 
according to the OECD,  
“research and experimental development […] comprise creative work un-
dertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, 
including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock 
of knowledge to devise new applications” (OECD, 2002, p. 30).  
While basic research is not intended for the generation of new products and processes, 
applied research and development activities are aimed at producing new products or at im-
proving those that are already produced substantially. While applied research draws on inves-
tigations to achieve new knowledge, development relies on knowledge already available in 
the firm (OECD, 2002).   
In accounting research, one additional, innovation-related term emerged with the ad-
vent of intellectual capital research: innovation capital. Innovation capital describes the re-
newal abilities of a firm and related results in the form of intellectual property rights and other 
tangible, intangible, and financial assets (Edvinsson & Malone (1997)). This definition thus 
encompasses innovations in terms of the OECD definition, i.e., the result of the renewal pro-
cess that leads to new products, processes, marketing, or organizational methods. However, it 
also requires the investigation of the procedures needed to obtain these results, e.g., in terms 
of employees and the training they received (human capital), the involvement of the custom-
ers (customer capital), and the corporate culture and managerial processes required (structural 
capital). 
The first paper in this cumulative dissertation (see section 2.1.2) addresses innovation 
capital and its disclosure, while the second and third papers (see section 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) are 
focused on product innovations and on the systematic work required for their creation and 
based on knowledge already available in the firm, i.e., product development. 
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2 Accounting 
The discipline of accounting can be categorized into two sub-dimensions: external disclosure 
on the one hand and management accounting and control on the other hand (Johnson & 
Kaplan, 1987). While external disclosure investigates the mandatory and voluntary reporting 
of performance information needed to reduce the information asymmetry between managers 
and stakeholders, management accounting and control deals with the formal processes taken 
by management in order to direct the behavior of organizational members toward the 
achievement of organizational goals (Chenhall, 2007). This cumulative dissertation aims at 
answering multifaceted research questions, from both perspectives, on the area of innovation. 
Innovation is relevant both for external disclosure and for internal management ac-
counting and control. Section 2.1 discusses the degree of external disclosure (both mandatory 
and voluntary) as well as antecedents and consequences of disclosure, while the design of 
management accounting and control systems for innovation efforts and its performance ef-
fects is addressed in section 2.2.  
2.1 External disclosure 
The last decades have experienced a dramatic increase in market-to-book ratios for some 
firms (Lev, 2001). One of the defensible justifications for the huge gap between market and 
book values is the existence of intellectual capital, which cannot be reflected in book values 
owing to restrictive financial standards regulations (Stewart, 1997). According to Lev, 2001, 
the terms “intellectual capital”, “intangibles”, and knowledge assets” can be used inter-
changeably to describe “[…] a non-physical claim to future benefits […]” (Lev, 2001, p. 5). 
Edvinsson (1997) categorizes intellectual capital in three dimensions: human (e.g., employee 
knowledge or the training of the workforce), internal (i.e., structural, e.g., the corporate cul-
ture or the management processes), and external (i.e., relational, e.g., the firm’s customers and 
reputation) capital.  
This change in market-to-book ratios reflects the shift from an industrial to a 
knowledge-based structure of our Western economies. In turn, this implies changes in the 
information required for decision-making by participants in economic life. For example, fi-
nancial analysts and other stakeholders consider information on the innovation capital of a 
firm among the major information when making investment decisions (Eccles, Phillips, & 
Herz, 2001; Lev, 2001; Tasker, 1998). These changed requirements may exercise pressure on 
both standard setters and firms to adapt the mandatory and voluntary disclosure provided. 
Section 2.1.1 describes the state of the art of mandatory rules for financial statements and of 
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voluntary disclosure channels, while section 2.1.2 summarizes the results of the previous sec-
tion by identifying the research questions on voluntary disclosure of innovation efforts ad-
dressed in paper 1. 
2.1.1 Mandatory and voluntary disclosure of innovation efforts 
Corporate mandatory and voluntary disclosure have been the focus of research since the 
1960s (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999). Since then, researchers have analyzed the level of disclosure 
and its antecedents (e.g. Ahmed & Courtis, 1999) as well as its consequences (e.g. Leuz & 
Wysocki, 2008). Within voluntary disclosure there is a great degree of variability of the level 
of disclosure that is provided owing to the lack of obligation by law, while however mandato-
ry disclosure often also leaves space for managerial discretion and thus for meaningful be-
tween-firm differences. As a result, researchers try to explain the antecedents and conse-
quences of this variability. 
The level of disclosure provided is dependent on a comparison of costs and benefits of 
disclosure (Depoers, 2000; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). Costs of disclosure are classified into 
direct costs, i.e., preparation, certification, and dissemination costs, and indirect costs, i.e., 
opportunity costs and proprietary costs arising from the risk that disclosed information may be 
used by competitors to the firm`s disadvantage (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). Benefits from dis-
closure arise in terms of reduced information asymmetries between managers and investors 
and thus lower costs of capital (see the arguments in agency theory, e.g. Botosan, 1997; Healy 
& Palepu, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Leuz & Wysocki, 2008), in terms of an improved 
reputation as a “good corporate citizen” (see the arguments in legitimacy theory, e.g. Dowling 
& Pfeffer, 1975; Parsons, 1960; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Weber, 1978), and in terms of be-
nevolent behavior by stakeholders such as employees or banks (see the arguments by stake-
holder theory, e.g. Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984). 
This general reasoning can be transferred to the area of disclosure about innovation ef-
forts for both completely voluntary disclosure and for disclosure where managerial discretion 
is induced by legal regulations. Direct costs of disclosure of innovation efforts arise from the 
need to collect data which are probably not yet available in the required form in the firm, such 
as the distinction of expenses for each R&D project, the development and gathering of key 
performance indicators for the entire innovation portfolio of the firm, etc. Indirect costs may 
arise, for example, when disclosure on innovation suggests that a firm becomes active in cer-
tain new markets and this is imitated by competitors, thus diminishing the monopolistic re-
turns that the firm can gain as a pioneer in this market. Besides these costs, a number of bene-
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fits may arise from innovation disclosure. According to agency theory, innovation efforts car-
ry high risks that increase the information asymmetry between managers and investors 
(Aboody & Lev, 2000). Thus, voluntary disclosure on innovation activities may contribute to 
a reduction in the insecurity of investors and, therefore, reduce the cost of capital and facili-
tate the provision of financial support for innovation projects. According to legitimacy theory, 
innovative actions are considered socially desirable as they can be expected to bring progress 
to society (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). Therefore, firms will benefit in terms of the inflow 
of capital, labor, and customers when informing the public about innovation efforts. Similarly, 
the stakeholder approach addresses the benefits arising from satisfying the manifold infor-
mation interest by a number of stakeholders, who in turn affect the performance of the inno-
vation positively or negatively, e.g., by purchasing the innovation or by providing funds for 
R&D projects.  
Firms will increase their disclosure level to the point where the benefits from disclo-
sure equal the costs. When the costs surpass the benefits, no (additional) disclosure is provid-
ed, unless some legal regulation (without room for discretionary decisions) is set up (Leuz & 
Wysocki, 2008). The following section (2.1.1.1) sketches the disclosure required by law for 
innovation capital according to IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards), U.S. 
GAAP (United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), and German GAAP. In 
contrast, section 2.1.1.2 presents the media used to disclose innovation capital voluntarily, as 
well as related research. 
2.1.1.1 Mandatory disclosure of innovation efforts 
Mandatory disclosure in financial statements has been criticized widely for its inability to 
deliver adequate, value-relevant information about innovations (e.g. Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; 
Lev & Zarowin, 1999). Innovations and related efforts represent the basis for future value 
creation (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996). Like assets such as machines used in the production pro-
cess, innovations generate returns over many years, and thus it seems sensible to capitalize 
related expenses in the balance sheet and amortize them over their useful lifetime (Lev & 
Sougiannis, 1996), instead of expensing them immediately in the profit and loss statement.  
Depending on the financial reporting regime applied in the firm, different but interna-
tionally converging regulations (Schipper, 2005) delineate the boundaries for the treatment of 
innovation expenses in the mandatory financial statements. 
The consideration of innovations in mandatory disclosure is restricted mostly to the 
discussion on R&D expenses. Until 2009, the German GAAP required full expensing of R&D 
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expenses, thus forbidding the recognition and subsequent amortization of these investments in 
the firm. In 2009, in the course of efforts for convergence between national and international 
financial reporting standards, the German GAAP created opportunities for the partial recogni-
tion of R&D expenses in the balance sheet, as already allowed by the IFRS. Thus, the chance 
to show investments in intangibles in the financial statement was no longer restricted to large 
capital market oriented firms.  
The recognition of all types of intangible assets following IFRS is regulated in the IAS 
38 (International Accounting Standard 38). It distinguishes the treatment of intangible assets 
mainly on the basis of the way in which the intangible asset is obtained by the firm, i.e., if is 
generated internally, acquired separately, or acquired in a business combination. Overall, the 
recognition of an intangible asset (and thus of innovation capital assets) requires the demon-
stration of (1) the fulfillment of the criteria for the definition of an intangible asset; and (2) the 
fulfillment of the criteria for recognition in the balance sheet (IAS 38.18). (1) requires the 
identifiability of the asset, firm control over the resource, and future economic benefits from 
the asset (IAS 38.10). (2) requires that the expected future economic benefits will probably 
flow to the firm and that the costs incurred for the acquisition or generation of the asset (the 
basis for initial valuation) can be measured reliably (IAS 38.21 and 38.24). Thus, in terms of 
innovation capital, acquired patents or licenses can be recognized based on the aforemen-
tioned criteria at the purchase price (IAS 38.27). Furthermore, for internally generated intan-
gible assets, the IFRS requires a distinction between research expenses and development ex-
penses, dictating that the former cannot be recognized, while the latter can be recognized if 
the firm can demonstrate (1) the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset; (2) its 
intention to complete the intangible asset; (3) its ability to use or sell the intangible asset; (4) 
how the intangible asset is intended to generate future economic benefits; (5) the availability 
of adequate resources to complete the development of the intangible asset; and (6) its ability 
to measure reliably the expenditures attributable to the intangible asset during its development 
(IAS 38.54-38.57). The costs of internally generated development expenses also encompass 
the fees to register a legal right, e.g., a patent (IAS 38.66).  
In order to be able to attribute the correct amount of costs to a specific intangible asset 
created in the firm for recognition in the balance sheet, there is a clear demand for a manage-
ment accounting and control system which allows the verification of the fulfillment of the 
criteria mentioned above (see section 2.2 for the discussion of management accounting and 
control systems for product development). For example, management accounting should 
make sure that each development project is assigned all direct costs such as materials, sala-
16
 
ries, and wages, but also those indirect costs such as the rent for the product development 
building that can be attributed reliably to the project. Thus, for this area, firms seem to experi-
ence a convergence of financial and management accounting.  
Finally, the costs of intangible assets acquired during a business combination have to 
be recognized based on the fair value of these assets (IAS 38.33).  
It must be noted that the opportunity to recognize expenses for intangible assets in 
general, as well as innovation capital, is used to very different degrees by firms from different 
as well as the same industries (Hitz, 2007). This reflects the managerial discretion behind this 
regulation and also related earnings management potential.  
European firms that aim to enter the U.S.-American capital market are required to pre-
pare financial statements according to the U.S. GAAP. For innovation capital, the U.S. GAAP 
prescribes in SFAS2 (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 2) the immediate expense 
of internally generated research as well as development costs related to a specific innovation 
project when incurred. In turn, intangible assets (e.g., patents or licenses) that are acquired 
individually or with other assets are recognized in the balance sheet based at their fair value 
(SFAS 142).  
In summary, financial accounting standards only allow a very restricted view to firms’ 
innovation efforts. Even if, given certain prerequisites, a part of R&D expenses can be recog-
nized in the balance sheet according to IFRS and German GAAP, investors and other stake-
holders may miss information about the entire product pipeline, applications for patents, the 
innovation culture put in place in the firm, etc. (Eccles, et al., 2001; Lev, 2001; Tasker, 1998). 
Furthermore, the managerial discretion behind the IFRS and local GAAP regulations reduces 
further the information content of both expensed and recognized development costs. 
However, this information regarding potential future economic benefits of the firm, 
and thus the value creation process, can be presented by the media of voluntary disclosure, 
which are addressed in the next section.   
2.1.1.2 Voluntary disclosure of innovation efforts 
Disclosure about innovation is investigated in the broader research area of intellectual capital 
disclosure. Innovation capital occupies one particular position within the different types of 
intangibles. In addition to the macro- and micro-economic importance of innovations de-
scribed in section 1, innovation capital is the result of the efforts given to the main intellectual 
capital categories (i.e., human, internal, and external capital) (Lev, 2001; Mouritsen, Bukh, & 
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Bang, 2008). At the same time, innovation capital is the basis for the increase in future bene-
fits through the enhancement of the main intellectual capital categories (Lev, 2001). For ex-
ample, good customer relations allow the firm to obtain new impetus with regard to customer 
needs and expectations (i.e., external capital) and, thus, the fundament for new products and 
services. At the same time, innovative products may lead to an increase in the number of cus-
tomers or to better customer retention. Similarly, highly qualified and motivated employees 
(i.e., human capital) will increase the innovativeness of the firm. At the same time, the result-
ing commitment to innovation will attract properly qualified and motivated workforce. Final-
ly, an innovative culture (i.e., internal capital) will encourage the innovativeness of the firm. 
This innovativeness will simultaneously create the chance to revise the processes in the firm 
regularly and adapt them to new requirements.   
Given this interwoven relation of innovation capital on the one hand and human, inter-
nal, and external capital on the other hand, it is reasonable to start the analysis of the volun-
tary disclosure of innovation capital by an investigation of the research on voluntary intellec-
tual capital disclosure. Table I - 1 summarizes the most prominent studies dealing with the 
disclosure of different forms of intangible assets, i.e., studies that are published in the English 
language in academic double-blind review journals. The studies in table I - 1 use the method 
of content analysis to collect data about the disclosure on intellectual capital (or parts of it) in 
different media. Content analysis is a methodology which codifies text into categories and, in 
the case of a quantitative approach, quantifies the frequency of occurrences within each cate-
gory (Krippendorff, 2004).  
 
 
 
18
 
 
T
ab
le
 I
 -
 1
: 
P
re
v
io
u
s 
st
u
d
ie
s 
o
n
 i
n
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 (
in
 c
h
ro
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 o
rd
er
) 
S
tu
d
y
 
n
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
M
ed
ia
 u
se
d
 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
st
u
d
y
 
In
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
 
S
u
b
b
ar
ao
 &
 Z
e
g
h
a
l 
(1
9
9
7
) 
1
2
0
 
U
.S
.A
. 
(2
0
),
 C
an
ad
a 
(2
0
),
 G
er
m
an
y
 (
2
0
),
 
U
.K
. 
(2
0
),
 J
ap
an
 (
2
0
),
 S
o
u
th
 K
o
re
a 
(2
0
) 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
H
u
m
an
 c
ap
it
al
 
E
n
tw
is
tl
e 
(1
9
9
9
) 
1
1
3
 
C
an
ad
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
R
&
D
 
G
u
th
ri
e 
&
 P
et
ty
 (
2
0
0
0
) 
2
0
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
B
re
n
n
an
 (
2
0
0
1
) 
1
1
 
Ir
el
an
d
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
O
ls
so
n
 (
2
0
0
1
) 
1
8
 
S
w
ed
en
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
H
u
m
an
 c
ap
it
al
 
W
il
li
a
m
s 
(2
0
0
1
) 
3
1
 
U
.K
. 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
an
d
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
--
- 
M
o
u
ri
ts
e
n
, 
L
ar
se
n
, 
&
 
B
u
k
h
 (
2
0
0
1
a)
 
1
 
S
w
ed
en
 
In
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
t 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
al
it
at
iv
e)
 
H
u
m
an
 c
ap
it
al
 a
n
d
 
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
ca
p
it
al
 
M
o
u
ri
ts
e
n
, 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
1
b
) 
1
7
 
D
en
m
ar
k
 
In
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
t 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
al
it
at
iv
e)
 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s,
 c
u
st
o
m
-
er
s 
an
d
 p
u
b
li
cs
, 
p
ro
-
ce
ss
, 
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
y
 
O
rd
ó
ñ
ez
 d
e 
P
ab
lo
s 
(2
0
0
2
) 
1
3
 
A
u
st
ri
a 
(1
),
 D
en
m
ar
k
 (
3
),
 I
n
d
ia
 (
1
),
 I
sr
ae
l 
(2
),
 S
p
ai
n
 (
5
),
 S
w
ed
en
 (
1
) 
In
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
t 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
al
it
at
iv
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
A
p
ri
l,
 B
o
sm
a,
 &
 D
eg
lo
n
 
(2
0
0
3
) 
2
0
 
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
B
o
n
ti
s 
(2
0
0
3
) 
1
0
,0
0
0
 
C
an
ad
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
--
- 
B
o
zz
o
la
n
, 
F
av
o
tt
o
, 
&
 
R
ic
ce
ri
 (
2
0
0
3
) 
3
0
 
It
al
y
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
 
  
19
 
 
T
ab
le
 I
 -
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
):
 P
re
v
io
u
s 
st
u
d
ie
s 
o
n
 i
n
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 (
in
 c
h
ro
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 o
rd
er
) 
S
tu
d
y
 
n
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
M
ed
ia
 u
se
d
 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
st
u
d
y
 
In
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
 
O
rd
ó
ñ
ez
 d
e 
P
ab
lo
s 
(2
0
0
3
) 
5
 
S
p
ai
n
 
In
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
t 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
al
it
at
iv
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
A
b
e
y
se
k
er
a 
&
 G
u
th
ri
e 
(2
0
0
4
a)
 
3
0
 
S
ri
 L
a
n
k
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
A
b
e
y
se
k
er
a 
&
 G
u
th
ri
e 
(2
0
0
4
b
) 
3
0
 
S
ri
 L
a
n
k
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
  
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
H
u
m
an
 c
ap
it
al
 
G
o
h
 &
 L
im
 (
2
0
0
4
) 
2
0
 
M
al
a
y
si
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
O
li
v
er
as
 &
 K
as
p
er
sk
a
y
a 
(2
0
0
4
) 
1
3
 
S
p
ai
n
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
S
el
ei
m
, 
A
sh
o
u
r,
 &
 B
o
n
-
ti
s 
(2
0
0
4
) 
3
8
 
E
g
y
p
t 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
A
b
d
o
lm
o
h
a
m
m
ad
i 
(2
0
0
5
) 
5
8
 
U
.S
.A
. 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
an
d
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
B
ra
n
d
, 
co
m
p
e-
te
n
ce
, 
cu
lt
u
re
, 
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
 I
T
, 
in
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 p
ro
p
er
-
ty
, 
p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
, 
p
er
so
n
n
el
, 
p
ro
p
ri
e-
ta
ry
 p
ro
ce
ss
, 
R
&
D
 
A
b
e
y
se
k
er
a 
&
 G
u
th
ri
e 
(2
0
0
5
) 
3
0
 
S
ri
 L
a
n
k
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
B
u
k
h
, 
N
ie
ls
en
, 
G
o
rm
-
se
n
, 
&
 M
o
u
ri
ts
e
n
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
6
8
 
D
en
m
ar
k
 
IP
O
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s 
D
ri
v
er
s 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s,
 c
u
s-
to
m
er
s,
 I
T
, 
p
ro
-
ce
ss
es
, 
R
&
D
, 
st
ra
te
g
ic
 s
ta
te
-
m
en
ts
 
  
20
 
 
T
ab
le
 I
 -
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
):
 P
re
v
io
u
s 
st
u
d
ie
s 
o
n
 i
n
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 (
in
 c
h
ro
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 o
rd
er
) 
S
tu
d
y
 
n
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
M
ed
ia
 u
se
d
 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
st
u
d
y
 
S
u
m
m
ar
y
 o
f 
re
-
su
lt
s 
G
ar
cí
a-
M
ec
a,
 P
ar
ra
, 
L
ar
rá
n
, 
&
 M
ar
tí
n
ez
 
(2
0
0
5
) 
2
5
7
 
S
p
ai
n
 
R
ep
o
rt
 t
o
 a
n
al
y
st
s 
D
ri
v
er
s 
S
tr
at
eg
y
, 
p
ro
ce
ss
-
es
, 
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
 
te
ch
n
o
lo
g
y
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 
ca
p
it
al
, 
R
&
D
 a
n
d
 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
 
O
rd
ó
ñ
ez
 d
e 
P
ab
lo
s 
(2
0
0
5
) 
3
 
In
d
ia
 
In
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
al
it
at
iv
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
V
an
d
er
m
ae
le
, 
V
er
-
g
au
w
en
, 
&
 S
m
it
s 
(2
0
0
5
) 
6
0
 
T
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
(2
0
),
 S
w
ed
en
 (
2
0
),
 U
.K
. 
(2
0
) 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
V
er
g
au
w
e
n
 &
 v
a
n
 A
le
m
 
(2
0
0
5
) 
8
9
 
F
ra
n
ce
 (
3
7
),
 G
er
m
a
n
y
 (
2
8
),
 T
h
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
(2
4
) 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
--
- 
G
u
th
ri
e,
 P
et
ty
, 
&
 R
ic
ce
ri
 
(2
0
0
6
) 
1
5
0
 
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
 (
1
0
0
),
 A
u
st
ra
li
a 
(5
0
) 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
B
o
zz
o
la
n
, 
O
`R
ea
g
an
, 
&
 
R
ic
ce
ri
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
6
0
 
 
It
al
y
 (
3
0
),
 U
.K
. 
(3
0
) 
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
C
o
rd
az
zo
 (
2
0
0
7
) 
8
6
 
It
al
y
 
IP
O
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s 
D
ri
v
er
s 
 
Jo
n
es
 (
2
0
0
7
) 
1
1
9
 
U
.S
.A
. 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
an
d
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
R
&
D
 
L
ee
, 
N
ei
ls
o
n
, 
T
o
w
er
, 
&
 
V
an
 d
er
 Z
ah
n
 (
2
0
0
7
) 
1
2
8
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a
 
W
eb
si
te
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
H
u
m
an
 r
es
o
u
rc
es
, 
p
at
ie
n
t,
 I
T
, 
p
ro
-
ce
ss
, 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
, 
st
ra
te
g
ic
 c
ap
it
al
 
S
in
g
h
 &
 V
a
n
 d
er
 Z
a
h
n
 
(2
0
0
7
) 
3
3
4
 
S
in
g
ap
o
re
 
IP
O
 p
ro
sp
ec
tu
s 
E
ff
ec
ts
 
--
- 
V
er
g
au
w
e
n
, 
B
o
ll
en
, 
&
 
O
ir
b
an
s 
(2
0
0
7
) 
6
0
 
S
w
ed
en
 (
2
0
),
 U
.K
. 
(2
0
),
 D
en
m
ar
k
 (
2
0
) 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
 
21
 
 
T
ab
le
 I
 -
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
):
 P
re
v
io
u
s 
st
u
d
ie
s 
o
n
 i
n
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 (
in
 c
h
ro
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 o
rd
er
) 
S
tu
d
y
 
n
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
M
ed
ia
 u
se
d
 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
st
u
d
y
 
S
u
m
m
ar
y
 o
f 
re
-
su
lt
s 
W
h
it
e,
 L
ee
, 
&
 T
o
w
er
 
(2
0
0
7
) 
9
6
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s,
 c
u
s-
to
m
er
s,
 I
T
, 
p
ro
-
ce
ss
es
, 
R
&
D
, 
st
ra
te
g
ic
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
Z
e
g
h
al
, 
M
o
u
e
lh
i,
 &
 
L
o
u
at
i 
(2
0
0
7
) 
1
5
0
 
C
an
ad
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
R
&
D
 
A
b
e
y
se
k
er
a 
(2
0
0
8
) 
2
0
 
S
ri
 L
a
n
k
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
o
f 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
G
er
p
o
tt
, 
T
h
o
m
a
s,
 &
 
H
o
ff
m
a
n
n
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
2
9
 
(i
n
te
rn
at
io
n
al
) 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 a
n
d
 w
eb
si
te
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
an
d
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
H
u
m
an
, 
c
u
st
o
m
er
, 
su
p
p
li
er
, 
in
v
es
to
r,
 
p
ro
ce
ss
, 
lo
ca
ti
o
n
, 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
K
a
m
at
h
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
3
0
 
In
d
ia
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
--
- 
M
o
u
ri
ts
e
n
, 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
1
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
al
it
at
iv
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
re
la
te
d
 t
o
 i
n
n
o
v
a
-
ti
o
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
O
li
v
er
as
, 
K
a
sp
er
sk
a
y
a,
 
&
 F
ar
g
a
s 
(2
0
0
8
) 
1
2
 
S
p
ai
n
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
S
ch
n
ei
d
er
 &
 S
a
m
k
in
 
(2
0
0
8
) 
8
2
 
N
e
w
 Z
ea
la
n
d
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
S
o
n
n
ie
r,
 C
ar
so
n
, 
&
 C
ar
-
so
n
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
1
4
1
  
U
.S
.A
. 
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
ri
v
er
s 
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
   
22
 
 
T
ab
le
 I
 -
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
):
 P
re
v
io
u
s 
st
u
d
ie
s 
o
n
 i
n
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 c
ap
it
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 (
in
 c
h
ro
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 o
rd
er
) 
S
tu
d
y
 
n
 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
M
ed
ia
 u
se
d
 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
st
u
d
y
 
S
u
m
m
ar
y
 
o
f 
re
-
su
lt
s 
S
tr
iu
k
o
v
a,
 U
n
er
m
a
n
, 
&
 
G
u
th
ri
e 
(2
0
0
8
) 
1
5
 
U
.K
. 
W
eb
si
te
, 
an
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
, 
an
n
u
a
l 
re
v
ie
w
, 
in
te
ri
m
 r
ep
o
rt
, 
re
p
o
rt
 t
o
 
an
al
y
st
s,
 p
re
li
m
in
ar
y
 r
ep
o
rt
, 
co
rp
o
ra
te
 s
o
ci
al
 r
es
p
o
n
si
b
il
it
y
 
re
p
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
W
h
it
in
g
 &
 M
il
le
r 
(2
0
0
8
) 
7
0
 
N
e
w
 Z
ea
la
n
d
 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
E
ff
ec
ts
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
C
a
m
p
b
el
l 
&
 A
b
d
u
l 
R
ah
m
a
n
 (
2
0
1
0
) 
1
  
U
.K
. 
A
n
n
u
al
 r
ep
o
rt
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
(q
u
a
n
ti
ta
ti
v
e)
 
In
te
rn
al
, 
ex
te
rn
al
, 
h
u
m
a
n
 c
ap
it
al
 
23
 
 
 
I identified 44 studies, the majority of which deal with voluntary disclosure in the an-
nual reports. Indeed, annual reports not only provide financial data, but also a number of vol-
untary narratives, such as the introductory remarks, the chairman’s statement, the chief execu-
tive’s statement, any operating and financial review content, the directors’ report, and some 
social/environmental content (Campbell & Abdul Rahman, 2010). Other disclosure instru-
ments encompass the IPO (initial public offering) prospectus, websites, or intellectual capital 
statements (ICS). ICS are documents issued on a voluntary basis, enabling companies to pre-
sent their intangible assets – and thus their innovation efforts – in a narrative, visual, and nu-
meric form (Mouritsen, et al., 2001b). 
The focus of intellectual capital disclosure research on publicly available annual re-
ports restricts the analyses mostly to large firms, since small firms whose financial statement 
values fall below certain thresholds do not have to publish a detailed annual report. In con-
trast, ICS have been shown to be a disclosure instrument which is of particular interest for 
small and medium firms (Mouritsen, et al., 2001b).  
Most of the studies restrict their focus of analysis to one country, not allowing the in-
spection of nation-based differences in the disclosure behavior. While half of the studies con-
fine their analyses to a mere quantitative or qualitative description of the disclosure, the re-
maining half investigates its drivers and/or its effects.  
Of these 44 studies dealing with intellectual capital disclosure, only three investigate 
some disclosure that is directly related to innovation capital (see Entwistle, 1999; Jones, 2007; 
Zeghal, et al., 2007). The remaining studies either consider only one category type of intellec-
tual capital (mostly human capital), or analyze the entire intellectual capital disclosure, thus 
missing a detailed picture of how the renewal abilities of a firm are generated and what are the 
related results, in the form of intellectual property rights and other tangible and intangible 
assets. For example, disclosure of the financial impact of new products, customers gained 
through innovations, changes in firm reputation as a result of innovations, or the innovation 
culture, is not investigated. Entwistle (1999), Jones (2007), and Zeghal, et al. (2007) analyze 
R&D disclosure, but miss to collect data on disclosure on, e.g., process and marketing innova-
tions as well as the process required for the their achievement. Therefore, to the best of my 
knowledge, I did not find any study dealing explicitly with innovation capital in the depth and 
breadth required by the definition of innovation capital, its micro- and macroeconomic im-
portance, and the prominent role within the different categories of intellectual capital.  
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Interestingly, concerning the disclosure media used, on the one hand ICS are the dis-
closure media that, based on their scope and definition, seem to be the ones that should pro-
vide the most space for disclosure about intangible assets. However, on the other hand, the 
research on these disclosure media is very limited, restricted to a small number of countries, 
and entirely qualitative. Table I - 2 provides an overview of different European guidelines 
suggesting areas of disclosure. The differences are confined mostly to the way in which the 
disclosure to be addressed is classified, rather than to the content to be disclosed. 
This research on disclosure about intellectual capital and in particular about innovation 
capital leads to the first bundle of research questions of this cumulative dissertation, which are 
addressed in the first paper. This paper is outlined in the next section.  
2.1.2 Drivers of innovation capital disclosure in intellectual capital statements: Evi-
dence from Europe 
Section 1 of the framework of this dissertation discussed the micro- and macroeconomic im-
portance of innovations. Thus, there is great interest from the public, investors, and other 
stakeholders in information about the innovation efforts of firms. Section 2.1.1.1 showed the 
potentials, but also the limits of mandatory disclosure, therefore addressing the need for vol-
untary disclosure on innovation efforts to supplement mandatory disclosure. Voluntary disclo-
sure for overall intellectual capital is found, for example, in annual reports, websites, IPO 
prospectuses, and ICS, as investigated by numerous researchers (see section 2.1.1.2). Howev-
er, is remarkable that previous research does not address innovation capital disclosure in 
depth. Therefore, the paper entitled “Drivers of innovation capital disclosure in intellectual 
capital statements: Evidence from Europe” aims to close this gap. The disclosure media con-
sidered are ICS, since they are specifically designed to disclose on innovations (as well as on 
others intellectual capital areas) (European Commission, 2006). The research questions this 
paper answers are: (1) What kind, i.e., quantity and quality, of information is provided about 
innovation capital in ICS?; and (2) Are certain firm characteristics able to explain differences 
in the quantity and quality of innovation capital disclosure in ICS?  
Data collection is carried out by manual content analysis of the ICS. The collection of 
ICS is based on an investigation of the ICS guidelines reported in table I - 2 for participating 
firms. The final sample of ICS available in English or German consists of 51 documents.  
The disclosed innovation capital items are allocated to three categories: human, inter-
nal, and external capital. This allows the presentation on the one hand of the intersection be-
tween the main categories of intellectual capital and the efforts carried out to renew a firm, 
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and on the other hand the related results in terms of financial, tangible, and intangible capital. 
The quantity and quality of the innovation capital disclosure is measured according to indexes 
previously used and validated in the literature. Quantity addresses the frequency with which 
an innovation capital item is addressed in the ICS, while quality refers to the type of infor-
mation conveyed in this disclosure (quantitative vs. qualitative, financial and non-financial, 
historical vs. forward-looking).  
While the first research question is answered descriptively, analyses of variance and t-
tests are used to address the second research question. 
The analysis reveals a heterogeneous picture of the disclosure behavior across the 51 
firms. With the intent to explain these differences, firm characteristics (size, industry, region 
of domicile, and disclosure guidelines adopted) were investigated. These four variables are 
found to be drivers of difference in the quantity of innovation capital disclosure, while differ-
ences in quality are only driven by the industry to which the firm belongs. Thus, there is a 
homogeneous disclosure quality for innovation capital for firms of different size, from differ-
ent regions, and for firms adopting different disclosure guidelines.  
This result is of particular interest for practitioners, since it shows, e.g., that small and 
medium firms also have the opportunity to disclose about innovation with the same degree of 
quality as large firms. Furthermore, guideline-setters and policy-makers can use these results 
to direct the disclosure in directions that are more fruitful for information-seekers, e.g., toward 
higher quality disclosure. The paper contributes to the research on intellectual capital disclo-
sure by showing that ICS are used for innovation capital disclosure, thus inviting future re-
search on that type of disclosure to investigate ICS as disclosure media. Furthermore, I find 
that information about innovation is more or less distributed equally throughout the human 
capital, internal capital, and the external capital categories. The paper shows that innovation 
can be fostered by accurately mixed investments in the different forms of intellectual capital 
and thus sheds some light on the interwoven relation between different intellectual capital 
categories.  
The conceptual development of the paper, the data collection and the data analysis, as 
well as the interpretation of results and the formulation of the paper are based on the individu-
al work by Lucia Bellora, the author of this cumulative dissertation. I am grateful for the sup-
port of my co-author Thomas W. Günther in providing feedback on the concept and formula-
tion of the paper.  
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In order to participate in the research discourse on voluntary disclosure, earlier ver-
sions of this paper were at the following conferences: 3
rd
 EIASM (European Institute for Ad-
vanced Studies in Management) Workshop on Visualising, Measuring, and Managing Intan-
gibles and Intellectual Capital (Ferrara, Italy, October 2007), 15
th
 International Product De-
velopment Management Conference (Hamburg, Germany, June 2008), 4
th
 EIASM Workshop 
on Visualising, Measuring, and Managing Intangibles and Intellectual Capital (Hasselt, Bel-
gium, October 2008). For a previous version of this paper, in 2007, I was awarded the Euro-
pean Investment Bank Prize for the Best Contribution on Performance Measurement and Val-
uation of Intellectual Capital. The paper was submitted to The British Accounting Review and 
is currently under revision for resubmission to this journal.  
2.2 Internal management control systems 
In section 2.1 on external disclosure of innovation data I addressed the issue of convergence 
between financial and management accounting. External reporting requires data that can only 
be obtained by a properly designed management accounting system. For example, detailed, 
project-based cost data for product development have to be provided by the management ac-
counting system. Management accounting is embedded in the broader concept of management 
control systems (MCS). Their scope goes far beyond the mere provision of reliable data for 
management purposes and as input data for the financial statement. Per definition, MCS refer 
to all formal actions or activities taken by management in order to direct the behavior of or-
ganizational members toward the achievement of organizational goals (Anthony & 
Govindarajan, 1998; Flamholtz, 1983; Otley, 1994; Simons, 1995). MCS encompass also 
management accounting systems. Management accounting “[…] refers to a collection of prac-
tices such as budgeting or product costing” (Chenhall, 2007, p. 164), but also includes topics 
such as planning and performance measures (Luft & Shields, 2007).  
The following section discusses the research on the relationship between MCS and in-
novation performance. 
2.2.1 Management control systems and innovation 
The traditional concept of MCS describes a system of “command-and-control”, based on de-
viation analyses and aimed at reducing the unexpected to a minimum (e.g. Flamholtz, Das, & 
Tsui, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). Thus, the common assumption was that MCS are at odds with the 
nature of innovations, which are nurtured from the unexpected, from uncertainties, from devi-
ations from traditional paths, and from exploration (Davila, Foster, & Oyon, 2009). This as-
sumption was supported by numerous researchers on formal routines and innovation (e.g. 
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Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996), and Damanpour (1991) showed the detri-
mental effect of formalization in his meta-analysis of innovation determinants.  
However, in the last few decades, new paradigms of MCS and organizational structure 
have emerged, allowing a reconciliation of formalization and innovation (see Davila, et al., 
2009 for an overview). Simons (1995) provides one of the first proposals of how MCS can 
enhance innovation. He suggests that there are four levers of control (an interactive and diag-
nostic control system, and a beliefs and boundary system) that operate simultaneously, but in 
different ways. In particular, with the interactive control system, Simons (1995) proposes a 
lever that is specially designed to deal with uncertainties. Adler & Borys (1996) contrast ena-
bling and coercive bureaucracies, and design enabling bureaucracies to support the adaption 
to uncertain environments. Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld (1999) theorize the need for adaptive 
organizational forms in order to avoid inertia. Zollo & Winter (2002) identify dynamic capa-
bilities, i.e., formal routines that provide structure for learning and change processes. The 
roots of the research on formal structures useful to innovation can be seen in Burns & Stalker 
(1961) with their organic organizational forms, which include a network structure of control, 
knowledge-sharing, and a consultation relationship between individuals at different hierar-
chical levels instead of a command-and-control relationship. 
All these frameworks reflect formal structures that are related positively to innova-
tions. In the MCS literature, the levers of control framework was afforded particular attention. 
I revised the literature dealing empirically with the direct relationship between the design of 
MCS and product development performance, R&D performance, or innovation performance, 
and found a frequent consideration of the levers of control framework, as shown in table I - 3.  
In the levers of control framework, the diagnostic control system stands for the adher-
ence to standards or goals, while the interactive control system postulates the use of measures 
and instruments from management accounting (such as performance measures) in a manner 
that allows the emergence of innovations and change (Simons, 1995).  
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With the beliefs and boundary system, Simons (1995) introduced values and norms in 
his framework, i.e., formalized corporate culture, which are likely to foster innovation activi-
ties by communicating the relevance and the boundaries of innovativeness. All four levers of 
control are combined in firms in order to increase performance (Malmi & Brown, 2008; 
Simons, 1995). Especially owing to the introduction of the interactive control system, the lev-
ers of control framework has become a well-accepted framework to analyze MCS in innova-
tive settings (e.g. Bisbe & Malagueno, 2009; Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Bonner, et al., 2002).  
However, the levers of control framework has not yet been considered in its entirety. 
Most of the studies analyzed only one or two of the four levers. This contradicts the general 
agreement on the fact that MCS operate as a package and that MCS components should be 
considered jointly in order to avoid spurious findings owing to model underspecification 
(Chenhall, 2007; Fisher, 1998; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Otley, 1980). 
Thus, the somewhat contradictory results of previous studies, as displayed in table I - 3 
(e.g., interactive control systems impact innovation significantly positive in the study by 
Henri, 2006, but significantly negative in a sub-sample by Bisbe & Otley, 2004, and partially 
non-significantly in the study by Bonner, et al., 2002), may arise from the negligence of com-
ponents of the levers of control framework. Indeed, it is reasonable that all four levers are 
implemented at the same time in firms, thus neglecting some of them in the models consid-
ered may lead to the negligence of the interplay of the different MCS components and there-
fore distort results (Chenhall, 2007; Davila, et al., 2009). 
Most of the studies in table I - 3 consider product development performance as a de-
pendent variable. In firms, this is an area where innovation and change play a major role 
(Davila, 2000) and is a representative example of innovation that is empirically well manage-
able (Davila, et al., 2009). Since the levers of control framework is particularly applicable at 
the top management level (Simons, 1995), a frequent level of analysis is the firm. 
Given this research on MCS and innovation, the following two sections outline arising 
research questions, which are addressed in the second and third papers of this cumulative dis-
sertation. While the second paper (section 2.2.2) addresses how firms in general design the 
interplay of the levers of control in product development, the third paper (section 2.2.3) iden-
tifies clusters of firms that combine the levers of control in different ways, depending on 
strategy and environment variables. 
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2.2.2 The interplay of the levers of control in product development 
Given the importance of innovation for a firm’s competitive advantage (see section 1), prod-
uct development is one of the possible ways to enhance the innovation performance of a firm. 
Thus, management has to make sure that product development activities are carried out effec-
tively and efficiently with reference to the organizational goals. To achieve this, one suitable 
approach is the design of a proper MCS (Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998). However, product 
development requires MCS that allow and encourage opportunity-seeking, uncertainty, and 
exploration. The levers of control framework by Simons (1995) offers this opportunity. As 
described in section 2.2.1, this framework has been used frequently in research on the rela-
tionship between MCS and innovation, since it describes clearly the management control ef-
forts of firms operating in uncertain environments. However, table I - 3 shows (1) contradicto-
ry results about the effect of the levers on innovation; and (2) the negligence of the beliefs and 
boundary system in previous investigations. Furthermore, the existing literature is contradic-
tory in its description of how the levers of control operate together in firms (mere coexistence, 
mutual association, reciprocally conditional levers). Thus, the paper “The interplay of the lev-
ers of control in product development” answers the following research questions: (1) How do 
the different levers of control influence product development performance and organizational 
performance directly and indirectly?; and (2) What type of interplay of the levers of control 
best describes the way in which firms operate?  
To answer these questions, I collected data from manufacturing firms in German-
speaking countries using a structured written questionnaire. The questionnaire items are taken 
from already validated scales and were adapted slightly to the context of this paper. I obtained 
a response rate of 34% and used 468 responses from members of the top management for the 
investigation of these research questions.  
Data analysis was carried out by structural equation modeling. This method is appro-
priate for the available data, since variables such as the emphasis of the interactive or diagnos-
tic control systems are latent constructs that require multiple indicators to be described. Fur-
thermore, measurement and endogenous latent variable residuals are estimated explicitly. Da-
ta are fitted to the model by maximum likelihood estimation with bootstrapping. I adopted the 
alternative model approach by Jöreskog (1993), which allows me tom compare multiple plau-
sible and competing models of the interplay of the levers of control (mere coexistence, mutual 
association, reciprocally conditional levers). The fit of the data to the model was evaluated 
33
 
 
 
based on chi-square tests and common goodness-of-fit indexes, while I compared the compet-
ing models based on chi-square-difference tests and other fit indexes.  
Results show that the model that best explains how the interplay of the levers of con-
trol in product development works in manufacturing firms is the one of mutual association 
between the levers. An increase in the emphasis placed to one of the levers leads to an in-
crease in the other levers, and vice versa. Thus, the levers of control seem to operate in a con-
certed way, i.e., there is an alignment of the different levers. While the beliefs and diagnostic 
control systems produce the largest positive direct effect on product development perfor-
mance, the boundary and the interactive control systems have a positive indirect effect on 
performance that is mediated by the beliefs and diagnostic systems.  
This paper contributes to research on MCS since it is the first paper that analyses what 
happens in the so-called “control package”, using a quantitative approach. First, the paper is 
able to show the superiority of models acknowledging the interplay of the levers against a 
model neglecting any kind of interplay. Second, there is evidence of the fact that the mutual 
association of the levers of control better describes the interplay of the levers in firms, rather 
than does, e.g., a conditional relationship between the levers. Both aspects are of interest for 
researchers, since they drive their attention on the careful specification of MCS models. At 
the same time, practitioners can learn how the different control activities are interwoven and 
thus affect each other. Furthermore, this paper contributes to the discussion on MCS and in-
novation outlined in section 2.2.1, since it provides a broader insight into the relation between 
all the four levers and product development on the one hand, and organizational performance 
on the other hand. While research can gain additional insights into the functioning of Simons’ 
framework, practitioners can profit from the findings by identifying the levers that are best 
suited to enhance performance.  
The conceptual development of the paper, the data collection and the data analysis, as 
well as the interpretation of results and the formulation of the paper are based on the individu-
al work by Lucia Bellora, the author of this cumulative dissertation. I am grateful for the sup-
port of my co-author Thomas W. Günther in providing feedback on the concept and formula-
tion of the paper. 
In order to participate to the research discussion on the package of MCS and on the re-
lation between MCS and innovation, earlier versions of this paper were presented at the fol-
lowing conferences: 5
th
 EIASM Workshop on Visualising, Measuring, and Managing Intangi-
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bles and Intellectual Capital (Dresden, Germany, October 2009), 1
st
 Empirical Research in 
Management Accounting & Control Conference (Vienna, Austria, June 2011), 6
th
 Conference 
on Performance Measurement and Management Control (Nice, France, September 2011). I 
was invited to present this paper at the Département Comptabilité et Contrôle Accounting 
Research Seminar (Lausanne, Switzerland, October 2011). The paper is currently in the final 
stage of preparation for the submission to Accounting, Organisations, and Society. Results 
from a descriptive analysis and from multiple regression and moderated regression analysis 
based on the data for this paper have already been published with the title “Laissez-faire oder 
strenge Kontrolle? Produktentwicklung im Spannungsfeld verschiedener Steuerungsmecha-
nismen” in the working paper collection Dresdner Beiträge zur Betriebswirtschaftslehre (to-
gether with Thomas W. Günther).  
2.2.3 Combinations of the levers of control in product development 
The paper presented in the previous section deals with the way in which the levers of control 
operate together in a product development setting. While it allows a broad impression of all 
the firms in the sample, it remains unclear how different firms in different environments with-
in this sample combine the levers of control, i.e., how much emphasis they place simultane-
ously to the different levers. As already addressed in section 2.2.1, while there is agreement 
among researchers that firms may implement numerous MCS at the same time (e.g., Fisher, 
1998; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Otley, 1980), exactly which levers are combined with what 
emphasis and in which conditions remains unclear (Chenhall, 2007; Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
The paper “Combinations of the levers of control in product development” addresses this gap 
by answering the following research questions: (1) Which different levers of control operate 
in combination in different strategic and environmental backgrounds?; and (2) Are these 
combinations equifinal in terms of product development and organizational performance?  
The contingency tradition (e.g. Donaldson, 2001; Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985) re-
quires the structure of the organization (here the levers of control) to fit the strategy (here the 
type of strategy formation, i.e., emergent or intended) and the environment (here the innova-
tiveness of the firm, as a proxy for the uncertainty perceived by the firm). Thus, I hypothesize 
the existence of two different firm clusters that both represent situations of fit. Firms outside 
these two different firm clusters will not be in fit and will thus experience a lower perfor-
mance. To answer these research questions, the 468 responses from the survey mentioned in 
the previous section are used. 
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I analyzed the data by means of cluster analysis. This is the method of choice when 
seeking to classify objects (here firms) into groups that are characterized by internal homoge-
neity and external heterogeneity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 2010; Milligan, 1980). 
As suggested by Ketchen Jr. & Shook (1996), I used a two-step approach applying Ward’s 
hierarchical clustering method to define the appropriate number of clusters in the data, and, 
based on this number, I defined the allocation of the firms to clusters based on the non-
hierarchical K-means approach.  
This procedure leads to the identification of three clusters that are labeled “Values and 
Norms Control”, “Limited Control”, and “Performance Measures Control”. While the Limited 
Control cluster is characterized by a mostly low emphasis on the four levers of control, a low 
degree of innovativeness, and a predominantly emergent strategy, the other two clusters are 
different in the type of controls that are emphasized. In the Values and Norms Control cluster, 
control is performed by a particular emphasis on the beliefs and boundary system. This hap-
pens in firms where strategies are partially emergent and partially intended, and the degree of 
innovativeness is high. In turn, the Performance Measures Control cluster focuses on the in-
teractive and diagnostic use of performance measures to implement a predominantly intended 
strategy and cope with mediocre innovativeness. The Value and Norms Control cluster and 
the Performance Measures Control cluster are equifinal, i.e., there are no meaningful differ-
ences in the product development performance and organizational performance. Both clusters 
outperform the Limited Control cluster, as predicted.  
With these findings, the paper contributes to research on MCS by offering evidence of how 
the levers of control are combined in certain strategic and environmental conditions. This al-
lows researchers to differentiate between different types of firms when doing further research 
on the combination of MCS, while practitioners can compare different approaches to control 
their product development activities. In addition, previous research on the MCS-strategy rela-
tion has focused on the use of MCS to implement intended strategies. For an area where mere-
ly intended strategies are difficult to find because of the changing nature of tasks, findings 
show how partially emergent strategies can be controlled successfully. The findings thus en-
courage researchers to give more attention to how MCS can contribute to the emergence and 
success of emergent strategies, while practitioners can identify the best combination of levers 
of control for areas where strategies are not merely intended. Finally, the paper contributes to 
the research on the relation between MCS and performance by identifying alternative combi-
nations of levers of control that lead to an equally high performance. Thus, firms can identify 
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which levers of control need to be emphasized, given the status of their environment and 
strategy.    
The conceptual development of the paper, the data collection and the data analysis, as 
well as the interpretation of results and the formulation of the paper are based on the individu-
al work by Lucia Bellora, the author of this cumulative dissertation. 
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II Drivers of innovation capital disclosure in intellectual capital statements:  
Evidence from Europe 
 
Abstract 
Innovations are one of the major determinants of competitive success. As a result, there is a 
demand for information on the innovation efforts of firms among investors, other stakehold-
ers, and the relevant public. Using content analysis, this paper examines the innovation capi-
tal disclosure (INCD) characteristics, i.e., disclosure quantity and quality, in intellectual capi-
tal statements (ICS) of 51 European for-profit firms. Additionally, the relationship between 
INCD characteristics and industry, firm size, region of domicile, and disclosure guidelines 
adopted are analysed. Our content analysis detects an average of 29.16 items on innovation 
capital (INC) per ICS. These are mainly qualitative, non-financial, and historical-oriented. 
Furthermore, as expected, industry, firm size, region, and disclosure guideline drive the quan-
tity of disclosure. Prior empirical studies on voluntary disclosure also suggested a relation-
ship between firm size and disclosure quality. Interestingly, our results for INCD in ICS do 
not support this relationship. This provides tentative evidence of the good applicability of ICS 
for firms of any size. Furthermore, our findings show mostly homogeneous disclosure pat-
terns across regions in Europe and between disclosure guidelines adopted, suggesting that the 
multi-national efforts toward fostering INCD made the ICS phenomenon more a European 
than a local phenomenon.  
 
 
Keywords: innovation capital, disclosure, content analysis, intellectual capital statements 
JEL Classifications: C29, C82, M41, O30 
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paper. The authors would also like to acknowledge the useful comments of Jan Mouritsen and of participants in 
the 2008 Workshop on Visualising, Measuring and Managing Intangibles and Intellectual Capital in Hasselt 
(Belgium) on a first draft of this paper. 
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1 Introduction 
Innovation capital (INC) describes the generation and use of renewal abilities of a firm and 
related results in terms of intellectual property rights and other tangible, intangible, and fi-
nancial assets (Edvinsson & Malone, 1997) and is part of intellectual capital (IC). The trans-
formation of western economies from an industrial to a knowledge-based structure increases 
the relevance of INC. On a macro-economic level, innovation has become a major driver of 
economic growth, while the traditional growth enhancers like investments in physical assets 
are declining in importance (OECD, 2010). On a micro-economic level, innovations are rec-
ognized as means of gaining competitive advantage and higher returns (e.g. Griliches, 1981; 
Hall & Mairesse, 1995).  
In the light of this macro- and micro-economic relevance of innovation efforts, related 
disclosure is of high interest for both individuals and organizations. However, mandatory 
disclosure according to IFRS or local GAAP is generally restrictive, as usually only data on 
research and development (R&D) expenses has to be reported (e.g. IAS 38). Thus, voluntary 
disclosure can provide additional information (e.g. European Commission, 2006). While 
there are a number of studies dealing with voluntary disclosure of IC in general or human 
capital disclosure in particular, we did not find studies dealing with voluntary innovation cap-
ital disclosure (INCD) (see section 2). In our paper we close this gap by analysing the INCD 
behaviours of a sample of European firms.  
Disclosure behaviour can be explained using a cost-benefit-approach. Potential bene-
fits are described in various theories. According to legitimacy theory (Parsons, 1960 and 
Weber, 1978), firms voluntarily report information to the relevant public in order to improve 
their reputation (and thus the necessary inflow of capital, labour, and customers) by demon-
strating that socially desirable actions are being taken (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Innovative actions are considered socially desirable actions as they are ex-
pected, on the one hand, to foster growth and employment and, on the other hand, to improve 
living standards (OECD, 2010). Closely linked, the stakeholder approach (Freeman, 1984) 
suggests the necessity of providing individuals and organisations affecting, or being affected 
by, the firm’s actions with information (Clarkson, 1995). According to agency theory, volun-
tary disclosure allows closing the information gap between managers (agents) and investors 
(principals) (Healy & Palepu, 2001). As a consequence, investors’ uncertainty about the ex-
pected returns or the cost of capital decrease (e.g. Botosan, 1997). Besides these benefits, 
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diverse costs arise through INCD. Apart from the direct costs of preparation and dissemina-
tion, indirect costs such as opportunity and proprietary costs play a major role in firms’ dis-
closure decisions. Hence, firms will decide to voluntarily disclose information on INC up to 
the point where the benefits of disclosure equal the costs of disclosure (Depoers, 2000; Leuz 
& Wysocki, 2008). This cost-benefit-approach explains differences in disclosure levels be-
tween firms. Since empirical research cannot directly measure these costs and benefits, it 
enquires differences in disclosure levels due to different firm characteristics (i.e., drivers), 
allowing for some tentative inferences on the cost-benefit-relationship within certain firm 
groups (Depoers, 2000). In our paper, we address industry, size, region of domicile, and the 
disclosure guidelines adopted as potential drivers. 
Costs and benefits from disclosure can vary not only on the basis of how much about a 
topic is disclosed by a firm (i.e., disclosure quantity), but also on the basis of how something 
is disclosed (i.e., disclosure quality) (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
Therefore, in our paper we address both disclosure quantity on the basis of frequency counts, 
and disclosure quality on the basis of different types of disclosure (financial vs. non-financial, 
historical vs. forward-looking, etc.). 
Among the different disclosure instruments where INCD might be found, we focus on 
intellectual capital statements (ICS). These are documents issued on a voluntary basis, ena-
bling companies to present their intangible assets – and therewith their innovation efforts – in 
a narrative, visual, and numeric form (Mouritsen, Larsen, & Bukh, 2001b). There are various 
reasons for focusing on ICS. (1) ICS are exclusively aimed at presenting firms’ intangible 
assets, including INC (Mouritsen, et al., 2001b). A survey revealed that one of the major mo-
tives in working with ICS is to show the firm’s innovation efforts (Mouritsen, et al., 2001b). 
(2) The space and time restrictions of other disclosure instruments such as annual reports or 
presentations to analysts do generally not allow for a disclosure of innovation efforts con-
ducted and of prospective outcomes, which requires extensive narratives (Striukova, 
Unerman, & Guthrie, 2008). ICS do not underlie restrictions about the amount of information 
conveyed and seem thus to be more appropriate when researching voluntary disclosure on 
INC than other disclosure documents. (3) ICS disclosure are accessible and affordable to 
firms of any size (e.g., no printing costs since ICS are mostly made available only online; no 
codification and therefore lower data requirements; etc.) (Mouritsen, et al., 2001b), thus al-
lowing analysis of the disclosure of large as well as small firms.  
40
 
 
 
Based on these considerations, the purpose of our paper is to answer these research 
questions: (1) What kind, i.e., quantity and quality, of information is provided on INC in 
ICS?, and (2) Are certain firm characteristics related to the quantity and quality of INCD in 
ICS?  
Informed by these questions, our paper aims to contribute to research in a number of 
ways. (1) We carry out a quantitative content analysis of ICS. Content analysis is a method-
ology which codifies text into categories and quantifies the frequency of occurrences within 
each category (Krippendorff, 2004). As described in the literature review section, research 
does provide few studies on the themes addressed by ICS from which we can gain a valuable 
overall picture on what is reported in ICS. Our quantitative content analysis adds evidence to 
these studies since it enquires the frequency of what is reported and the quality level with 
which the reporting is provided. Thus, our study contributes to research by allowing for the 
first time some inferences about what themes are important for firms in the area of INCD. 
Thus, our paper contributes to the research on ICS by looking at the use of ICS and adds to 
the existing research that describes the disclosed topics. Furthermore, policy-makers and 
practice will be able to use our results in order to expand the quality of disclosure. (2) Previ-
ous literature on voluntary disclosure mainly focused on IC as a whole. While this allows a 
broad understanding of IC disclosure, first studies started to claim for a more in-depth ap-
proach, thus concentrating their attention on one sub-category of IC, i.e., on human capital 
(e.g. Abeysekera & Guthrie, 2004a). At the same time, research on other IC category, i.e., 
disclosure on INC, remains scarce. This stands in contrast to the fact that innovations play a 
prominent role in the enhancement of firm’s value creation (e.g. Lev, 2001). Successful inno-
vations ascertain customer retention, attraction of new customers, increase in firm reputation, 
and therewith long-term performance increase. Furthermore, innovations play a peculiar role 
in IC. Following Lev, 2001, “[…] innovation is achieved primarily by investments in intangi-
bles” (Lev, 2001, p. 17). For example, in the network of IC, patents (internal capital) become 
relevant for firm value if they are used by employees (human capital) for the development of 
innovative products. Employee training (human capital) is required for the development of 
successful innovations. The establishment of a network of cooperation and  experience ex-
change with other firms (external capital) is a prerequisite for the achievement of knowledge 
necessary for development of innovations (e.g. Mouritsen, Bukh, & Bang, 2008). In other 
words, INC can be considered the result of the emphasis placed on different types of IC. This 
focal role of INC in IC and thus for value creation supports deeper investigation of disclosure 
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on INC. This study aims at closing this gap and offers a basis for future research on the role 
of other forms of IC in the IC network. Our results offers for practitioners the opportunity to 
gain insights into the possible causes and effects within the IC network, as described and ex-
perienced by firms. (3) Our study does not only rely on the quantification of disclosure on 
INC in ICS, but rather searches for possible explanations of differences between firms con-
cerning disclosure quantity and quality. Thanks to our sample of 51 ICS from different Nor-
dic, German-speaking, and Southern European countries, encompassing ICS from various 
industries and sizes, and employing diverse disclosure frameworks, we can make inferences 
about different cost-benefits relationships governing different types of firms. While drivers of 
IC disclosure have already been considered in several prior studies (e.g. Vergauwen, Bollen, 
& Oirbans, 2007), our analysis first offers evidence of drivers of INCD in ICS and allows for 
comparison of results with previous studies. Policy-makers and disclosure guideline setters 
can use our results to evaluate their efforts in directing INCD toward high quality data and to 
harmonise the use of ICS across countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Comparable studies on voluntary 
IC disclosure are reviewed in the next section; afterwards, the hypotheses are discussed; 
while the “Research design” section describes the content analysis carried out; the empirical 
evidence is then presented in the “Results” section; while the last section in the paper pro-
vides results discussion and conclusion.  
2 Literature review  
This section summarises the characteristics of previous content analyses of IC disclosure by 
for-profit firms. Campbell & Abdul Rahman (2010) and Striukova, et al. (2008) already de-
liver useful overviews. As can be drawn from their reviews, a first research stream deals with 
the disclosure of IC in annual reports, without focusing on a particular IC category, and in-
cludes a huge number of studies since 1999. The category system employed is informed by 
the work by Guthrie, Petty, Ferrier, & Wells (1999). Overall, these studies focus either on a 
mere quantification of disclosure or additionally identify potential drivers of disclosure. In 
most cases, the sample encompasses large firms from a single country.  
A second stream has favoured addressing in depth the disclosure of one particular 
type of IC in annual reports. This research focused on human capital in annual reports 
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(Abeysekera & Guthrie, 2004b; Olsson, 2001; Subbarao & Zeghal, 1997). We did not find 
evidence of studies addressing other types of IC, such as, for example, INC.  
Recent findings demonstrate a strong limitation in the two streams of research men-
tioned above, since they both focus on annual reports only. Striukova, et al. (2008) show that 
the disclosure of IC in annual reports is not a good proxy for the overall disclosure of IC in 
different types of corporate reports (e.g., web pages, interim reports, etc.). This limitation 
could be partially addressed by a third stream of research, which considers the IC disclosure 
in ICS instead of in annual reports (table II - 1).  
 
Table II - 1: Previous studies on IC disclosure in ICS (list in chronological order) 
Study n Country Type of 
study 
Overall results INC considered 
Mouritsen, 
Larsen, & 
Bukh 
(2001a) 
1 Sweden Qualitative  Description of content and goals 
of the IC supplements at Skandia 
Indicators in the renewal and 
development focus, such as 
investment in product devel-
opment or in process improve-
ment  
Mouritsen, 
et al. 
(2001b) 
17 Denmark Qualitative  Description of the “story telling” 
in ICS 
Innovation efforts as part of 
ICS “story telling” as an in-
strument for achievement of 
organization goals 
Ordóñez 
de Pablos 
(2002) 
13 Austria, 
Denmark, 
India, 
Israel, 
Spain, 
Sweden 
Qualitative  Description of the archetypal 
role of Scandinavian firms for 
firms worldwide when setting up 
an ICS 
Investment in product and pro-
cess development, number of 
new service/products, etc. 
Ordóñez 
de Pablos 
(2003) 
5 Spain Qualitative  Describes the archetypal role of 
the Skandia Navigator for ICS in 
Spain 
As in Ordóñez de Pablos (2002) 
Ordóñez 
de Pablos 
(2005) 
3 India Qualitative  Describes the predominance of 
the narrative form in Indian ICS 
and the negligence of indicators 
No specific information provid-
ed on INC 
Mouritsen, 
et al. 
(2008) 
1 Denmark Qualitative  Description of content of ICS by 
Maxon Telecom and the rela-
tionship between different 
knowledge resources and the 
organizational goal to develop 
innovation 
Innovation is an organizational 
goal described by a network of 
knowledge narrative, manage-
ment challenges, initiatives, and 
related indicators 
 
Remarkably, this stream includes a limited number of studies analysing the content of 
ICS (compared with the numerous studies dealing with annual report disclosure), despite the 
clear focus of ICS on IC disclosure. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of the use of quan-
titative content analyses and of the investigation of drivers of disclosure in this third stream 
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of research. Which firms are particularly likely to disclose what type of information? These 
question remains unanswered in previous research. Instead, the studies focus on in-depth 
qualitative descriptions of structure and content of ICS. These studies provide first evidence 
of the use of ICS to disclose about INC, even if they do not perform a quantitative analysis. 
Our study can enrich the qualitative ICS content analyses of the third stream of IC research in 
that it uses a systematic approach for both data collection and inferences drawn 
(Krippendorff, 2004) and can support the second research stream on IC by drawing its atten-
tion to a particular type of IC. 
3 Development of hypotheses 
Our paper aims to answer the questions of (1) the quantity and quality of information provid-
ed on INC in ICS, and (2) the relationship between firm characteristics and these disclosure 
characteristics. For the second research question, we suppose a relationship between disclo-
sure on the one hand and industry, size, region of domicile of the firm, and disclosure guide-
lines adopted by the firm on the other hand. The rationale for these hypotheses is outlined in 
the following.  
According to legitimacy theory, firms in high R&D intensity industries need to be “li-
censed” to be a part of this industry from the environment in which they operate (European 
Commission, 2006), what may drive them to provide more INCD data and of a higher quality 
than firms that do not need this “license” due to their membership in a low R&D intensity 
industry (Patten, 1991). This relationship is also supported by the stakeholder approach, 
which suggests that firms in high R&D intensity industries should communicate their poten-
tial by disclosing their innovation efforts in order to attract resources from stakeholders. Fur-
thermore, as the potential of R&D activities of a firms is better known to managers than to 
investors, the information asymmetry between agents and principals is more pronounced in 
high R&D intensity firms than in low R&D intensity firms. Therefore, high R&D intensity 
firms should reduce their industry-inherent information asymmetry by providing detailed 
disclosure on INC. In summary, we expect that for firms in high R&D intensity industries 
these benefits from disclosure exceed the costs of disclosure and lead to a higher level of dis-
closure on INC. Previous IC disclosure research also found an association between disclosure 
and industry (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Bozzolan, Favotto, & Ricceri, 2003). This leads to: 
H1(a): The quantity of INCD in ICS is higher for firms in high R&D intensity indus-
tries than for firms in low R&D intensity industries. 
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H1(b): The quality of INCD in ICS is higher for firms in high R&D intensity industries 
than for firms in low R&D intensity industries. 
Moreover, we suggest that firm size is associated with INCD. From legitimacy theory 
we infer that the actions taken by larger firms have a higher overall impact on the society in 
which they operate, which leads to a higher legitimisation and therewith higher disclosure 
pressure on larger firms than on smaller firms. Similarly, it can be claimed that larger firms 
usually address a larger number of stakeholders and stakeholder groups, which forces larger 
firms to comply with higher disclosure standards than smaller firms. Agency theory is ambiv-
alent about the association between disclosure and size. On the one hand, statistics (European 
Commission, 2008a) identify a higher percentage of R&D expenses and innovation output 
with larger firms – implying higher innovation-related information asymmetry, and therefore 
higher information expectations from investors. On the other hand, smaller firms might be 
interested in a higher disclosure level as a means to overcome information asymmetry de-
rived from the fact that they are relatively unknown to investors (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). 
Concerning the costs of disclosure, these may be higher with smaller firms as they have to 
bear fixed disclosure costs without the possibility of profiting from economies of scale avail-
able to larger firms (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). Prior IC disclosure researchers have noted an 
association between disclosure and firm size (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Bozzolan, et al., 
2003). In the light of this ambiguous theoretical background, two non-directional hypotheses 
can be formulated: 
H2(a): The quantity of INCD in ICS is related to the size of the firm.  
H2(b): The quality of INCD in ICS is related to the size of the firm.  
Despite the efforts of several governmental and non-governmental institutions toward 
increasing the use of ICS for disclosure of INC, the implementation between different Euro-
pean regions remains of a heterogeneous nature (European Commission, 2006). The diverse 
disclosure practices are influenced by regional cultures (Chaminade & Johanson, 2003). In 
line with legitimacy theory and stakeholder approach, the relevant public and stakeholders in 
countries which have a stronger IC tradition, like the Nordic countries, will be more sensitive 
as to the importance of disclosure on INC and will therefore expect higher levels of disclo-
sure. As such, firms in IC-sensitive regions will be forced to provide higher quantities and 
quality of disclosure on INC. Following agency theory, countries where IC thinking has deep 
roots impel a high expectation on INCD amongst investors. Apart from benefits that may 
have their foundation in regional differences, (perceived) divergent costs of disclosure on 
INC also seem plausible. For example, Chaminade & Johanson (2003) suggest that Southern 
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European countries have a stronger fear of competitive disadvantages when disclosing infor-
mation on IC than Nordic countries. Previous IC disclosure studies support the relationship 
between disclosure and the region of domicile of a firm (Bozzolan, O`Reagan, & Ricceri, 
2006; Guthrie, Petty, & Ricceri, 2006; Vandermaele, Vergauwen, & Smits, 2005; Vergauwen 
& van Alem, 2005). Therefore, we formulate: 
H3(a): The quantity of INCD in ICS is related to the region of domicile of the firm.  
H3(b): The quality of INCD in ICS is related to the region of domicile of the firm. 
ICS usually follow the suggestions by disclosure guideline issued by various govern-
mental and non-governmental institutions, as well as by researchers (appendix II - 1 lists 
common European ICS disclosure guidelines). We assume that the disclosure guideline 
adopted is related to the quantity and quality of INCD. Given differences in the extent to 
which each guideline addresses the topic of INC (e.g., by providing examples on adequate 
key figures), we formulate: 
H4(a): The quantity of INCD in ICS is related to the disclosure guidelines adopted. 
H4(b): The quality of INCD in ICS is related to the disclosure guidelines adopted. 
4 Research design 
4.1 Identification and measurement of INCD  
To allow for comparability of this study with previous IC research, the category system em-
ployed to allocate the disclosures of the ICS is informed by the system by Guthrie, et al. 
(1999), which has been adopted by numerous studies, including recent ones by Campbell & 
Abdul Rahman (2010) and Striukova, et al. (2008). This category systems distinguishes be-
tween internal, external, and human capital, and allows therefore to well reflect the previous-
ly sketched role of different types of IC in the economic process of innovation generation 
(Lev, 2001). Conform to the definition of INC, we capture those disclosures that relate to the 
entire innovation process, including, e.g., disclosure on the involvement of customers in the 
development of innovations, the training for employees to imparting skills needed to success-
fully generate and implement new product ideas, the shape of the product development pro-
cesses, and the results in terms of successful new products developed with cooperation part-
ners, customers, or in the firm. The definitions of the categories were based on those provided 
by previous studies and adjusted to fit the context of INCD (for similar adjustments see 
Bozzolan, et al., 2003 or Striukova, et al., 2008). This adjustment resulted from a discursive 
process between one of the authors and two other experienced content analysts. This proce-
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dure is essential to generate consistent coding rules across coders and time (Beattie & 
Thomson, 2007). We summarise categories and sub-categories, as well as related definitions 
in appendix II - 2.  
The ICS have been analysed manually. In this regard, we are consistent with Beattie 
& Thomson (2007), Krippendorff (2004), and Weber (1990), as we rely on the superior abil-
ity of humans to interpret and translate text (we deal with ICS in German and English lan-
guage), to identify firm-specific terms, and to negotiate synonyms and multiple meanings.  
 Our hypotheses address the quantity and quality of INCD. The quantity of disclosure 
was measured in previous content analyses by using as measurement units either the volume 
of space devoted to an item (in terms of words, sentences, or paragraphs) (e.g. Bozzolan, et 
al., 2003; Guthrie & Petty, 2000) or the instances of disclosure independent of its length (e.g. 
Beattie & Thomson, 2007; Striukova, et al., 2008). In the present study the method of count-
ing the instances of disclosure is applied, with each disclosure item on INC counted inde-
pendently of its length. This means that “sometimes long, complex sentences must be broken 
down into shorter thematic units or segments” (Weber, 1990, p. 22). There are various ration-
ales behind this decision: (1) we analyse ICS both in German and English language and fol-
low Campbell, Beck, & Shrives (2005), who found that a quantification of disclosure based 
on the amount of space would lead to invalid inferences due the different etymological struc-
tures in the two languages; (2) a disclosure volume consideration is hardly applicable for ICS, 
whose length vary considerably from report to report and where the marginal cost of addi-
tional space is negligible (Striukova, et al., 2008); (3) counting instances of disclosures 
acknowledges the possibility that multiple INC items are disclosed within one sentence, par-
agraph, or page (Beattie & Thomson, 2007).  
The quantity of disclosure is determined by the number of times an INC item is re-
ported per ICS. Therefore, multiple disclosures and duplicates are explicitly recorded (Beattie 
& Thomson, 2007). Similar to Botosan (1997), we formulate a quantity index for INCD 
(INCDQUANT) for a firm j over the i=1;2;3 categories (internal, external, and human capi-
tal) as follows: 
            ∑           
 
   
 
where                                                                      
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INCDQUANTij = instances of disclosure on INC in category i for firm j. 
 
Additionally, disclosure researchers have noted the importance of differentiating the 
types of information provided by an item (e.g. Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008 ). We use a previ-
ously validated index, as constructed by Boesso & Kumar (2007). The quality index for 
INCD (INCDQUAL) for firm j considers type, nature, and time-reference (see also Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2008) of the INCD items, as well as the disclosure density (by dividing the 
weighted number of items per ICS by the number of pages per ICS): 
          
∑       
  
   
      
 
∑         
  
   
      
 
∑          
  
   
      
 
  where      
Kj = number of total text units of the ICS of firm j; 
typek j = 0 if the text unit k does not provide any item on INC; 1 if the text 
unit provides a qualitative item; 2 if the text unit provides a quanti-
tative item; 
naturek j = 0 if the text unit k does not provide any item on INC; 1 if the text 
unit provides a financial item; 2 if the text unit provides a non-
financial item; 
outlookk j = 0 if the text unit k does not provide any item on INC; 1 if the text 
unit provides an historical item; 2 if the text units provides a for-
ward-looking item; 
pagesj = number of pages of the ICS of firm j. 
 
Consistent with Boesso & Kumar (2007), INCDQUAL thus assigns a higher 
weighting to INCD done in a quantitative manner, where firms make efforts to translate nar-
ratives into more “accountable” enumerators of INC. Furthermore, non-financial disclosures 
are awarded a higher score as financial information is already widely available in mandatory 
reporting. In addition, we assign a higher weighting to forward-looking disclosure, as this 
kind of information can give insights into the firm’s future ability to create value through its 
INC (AICPA, 1994; IASB, 2007; ICAEW, 2005; Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Hooks, Coy, & 
Davey, 2002; Mouritsen, et al., 2001a). Finally, INCDQUAL divides these weighted INCD 
items by the number of pages. This standardisation accounts for the density with which the 
INC information is disclosed. While INCDQUANT refers to the mere disclosure itself, irre-
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spective of the way in which information is conveyed, INCDQUAL focuses on the manner 
with which INC is described (i.e., with financial or non-financial items, within a succinct 
number of pages or spread across a long ICS, etc.).  
4.2 Reliability and validity 
Since each content analysis involves a degree of subjectivity, reliability and validity issues 
should be considered in depth. We follow the assessment criteria outlined by Krippendorff 
(2004) and describe in table II - 2 which procedures have been employed in order to safe-
guard reliability and validity requirements needed to lend credibility to our inferences. The 
table shows that our content analysis is highly reliable in terms of stability, reproducibility, 
and accuracy. Furthermore, even if validity per se can be evaluated only tentatively, the table 
nevertheless provides positive signals for the plausibility of our results and inferences. 
4.3 Sample 
Following Striukova, et al. (2008), we consider voluntary disclosure in documents besides 
annual reports, and focus in particular on ICS. Because the main interest in the present paper 
is the information disclosed to external addressees, the collection of the ICS was based on the 
criterion of public availability. To fulfil this criterion, two requirements must be satisfied: (1) 
the guideline on which the ICS is based must provide online a list of participants. Therefore, 
we survey common IC disclosure guidelines (appendix II - 1) and found lists of participants 
for the following guidelines: the Austrian Research Centres Model; Danish ICS Guidelines; 
the framework by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology; the Spanish 
Modelo Intelect; and the framework “Nordic Harmonised Knowledge Indicators – Putting IC 
into practice”; (2) the firm mentioned in the participant list must provide the ICS on the 
firms’ web page.
1
   
The data collection was carried out between December 2008 and January 2009. Ac-
cording to participant lists, nearly 260 identifiable ICS should be available. Because of the 
linguistic capacities of the researchers, ICS not in the English or German language were ex-
cluded from the sample. After reviewing for public availability and language, the data collec-
tion led to the detection of 126 ICS. In the next step, research institutes, universities, or other 
academic entities, as well as non-profit organizations were excluded.  
                                                 
1
 Additionally, we searched the internet for additional ICS not provided in participant lists to guidelines, but 
this did not lead to an increase in available ICS. 
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The reason for this exclusion is twofold: (1) the economic process of innovation of a 
for-profit firm is hardly comparable with the innovation process of a non-profit firm or of a 
research institute; (2) universities and other academic entities are often obliged by law to dis-
close ICS according to a clearly predefined structure and predetermined content (see e.g. 
Austrian Ministry of Science and Research, 2002), thus not facilitating the analysis of genu-
inely voluntary disclosure – which comprises the focus of our analysis. This selection proce-
dure leads to a final sample of 51 ICS from 51 different for-profit firms.
2
 This sample size 
can be considered as satisfactory compared with other content analyses of ICS (see table II -
 1) and maintaining awareness of the voluntary nature of the ICS use as a disclosure instru-
ment.  
 
Table II - 3: Sample description 
Size Industries  Disclosure guidelines 
 A B C D E F  a b c d e 
Large  3 4 4 2 -- 3  1 4 7 2 2 
Medium-
sized 
4 8 2 1 2 -- 
 
-- 1 11 -- 5 
Small  -- 11 3 1 -- --  -- -- 6 -- 9 
Micro  1 1 1 -- -- --  -- -- 1 -- 2 
 8 24 10 4 2 3  1 5 25 2 18 
Note: Industries: A=Manufacturing; B=Information and communication; C=Professional, technical, and health 
service; D=Electricity and construction; E=Financial and insurance activities; F=Wholesale, retail, and other ser-
vices. Disclosure guidelines: a=Austrian Research Centers; b=Danish ICS Guidelines; c=German Federal Ministry 
of Economics and Technology; d=Modelo Intelect; e=Nordic Harmonised Knowledge Indicators. 
The industry nomenclature is oriented on the NACE Rev. 2 classification (European Commission, 2008b). Manu-
facturing, information and communication, as well as professional, technical, and health services are considered 
high R&D intensity industries, based on the results by the Community Innovation Survey (European Commission, 
2008a). Firm size is measured based on employees counts (headcounts) following the thresholds proposed by 
European Commission (2005): large≥250 empl., medium-sized<250 empl., small<50 empl, micro<10 empl. The 
median of headcounts across all 51 sample firms is 89 employees. 
 
 For each firm, we consider the latest ICS published, assuming that because of 
a learning effect the last published ICS gives the most realistic picture of the information that 
firms are able and willing to disclose about INC. Furthermore, random sample analyses of 
ICS by one firm over a number of years suggests that their content and structure remains rela-
tively constant over time, consistent with similar findings for annual reports (Lang & 
                                                 
2
 The data collection led to 52 ICS. The analysis of the INCDQUANT led to the exclusion of an outlier dis-
closing more than 8,000 INC items. Its inclusion would have distorted our results.  
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Lundholm, 1993). Eight European countries were included in the sample: Germany (n=24), 
Denmark (n=10), Iceland (n=5), Sweden (n=4), Finland (n=3), Austria (n=2), Spain (n=2) 
and Norway (n=1).
3
 Only five of the firms in the sample are listed on the stock market, sup-
porting the expectations suggested by legitimacy theory and stakeholder approach, which 
expect all firms – and not only listed firms – to provide the relevant public with information 
about their activities and their performance. Sample description is summarised in table II - 3. 
5 Results 
5.1 Innovation capital disclosure: Descriptive results on quantity and quality of 
disclosure 
Table II - 4 displays the descriptive results of our study. We found a total of 1,487 items deal-
ing with INC in the 51 ICS analysed. On average, each ICS discloses 29.16 items on INC. 
The highest portion of these items relates to the human capital category, closely followed by 
internal and external capital. 
We find a clear predominance of qualitative, non-financial disclosure, historical-
oriented disclosure. Data on the type of disclosure flow into the calculation of INCDQUAL. 
INCDQUANT and INCDQUAL indexes for our sample are summarised in table II - 5. These 
data provide first insights into heterogeneous INCD behaviours in ICS. INCDQUANT ranges 
from a minimum of one to a maximum of 109 INC items per ICS, while INCDQUANT rang-
es from a minimum of 0.31 to a maximum of 22.50. Potential drivers of differences in 
INCDQUANT and INCDQUAL are tested in the following section. 
5.2 Innovation capital disclosure: Univariate results on potential drivers 
In a previous section we developed hypotheses about potential drivers of INCD in 
ICS. The conjectured relationships are examined using t-tests or ANOVA.
4
  
                                                 
3 Our sample identification is validated by the RICARDIS report (European Commission, 2006), which found 
no evidence for the current availability of ICS from Italy, France, The Netherlands, and Eastern European 
countries (European Commission, 2006). Furthermore, despite the attention drawn by several institutions to 
intangible assets and their disclosure (ACCA, 2006; ICAEW, 2005), we have found no evidence of the use 
of ICS disclosure among British firms (see also the findings by Striukova, et al., 2008).  
4
 T-Test and ANOVA require a normal distribution of the dependent variables. The one-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-test showed that both INCDQUANT and INCDQUAL follow a normal distribution. 
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For the independent variables we build groups as follows. For the industry variable, 
we distinguish between firms in high R&D intensity industries and firms in low R&D intensi-
ty industries on the basis of the results of the Community Innovation Survey by the European 
Commission (2008a).
5
 For the firm size variable, we distinguish smaller firms from larger 
ones on the basis of a median split by size in terms of employees headcount in the disclosure 
year.
6
 For the region of domicile of the firm, we follow Chaminade & Johanson (2003) and 
distinguish between firms from German-speaking countries, Nordic countries, and Southern 
European countries. Finally, in analysing potential differences in INCD arising from the 
adoption of different disclosure guidelines, we distinguish between the group of firms adopt-
ing the German framework (German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2008), 
the group adopting the “Putting IC into Practice” guidelines (Thorleifsdottir & Claessen, 
2006) and, for reasons of sufficient group size, the group adopting guidelines other than the-
se.  
Univariate results are displayed in table II - 6. Consistent with H1(a) and H1(b), we 
find that the level of R&D intensity of the industry is significantly related to INCDQUANT 
and INCDQUAL (p<0.1 and p<0.05, respectively), meaning that firms in high R&D intensity 
industries disclose significantly more INC items and on a higher qualitative level than firms 
in low R&D intensity industries. We find a significant difference (p<0.1) in the quantity of 
disclosure between smaller and larger firms, which is consistent with our conjecture in H2(a). 
Our sample provides evidence of more disclosure by larger firms than by smaller ones. This 
cannot be confirmed for the quality of INCD, as we find, in contradiction to our hypothesis 
H2(b), no significant differences between smaller and larger firms in INCDQUAL. This 
might indicate that a high level of quality in disclosure of ICS is not exclusive to larger firms, 
but can equally be achieved by smaller firms with reasonable efforts.  
                                                 
5
 Since firms in our sample have very different underlying reporting standards, e.g., due to different require-
ments from diverse local GAAP or different requirements for listed and non-listed firms, this hampers ac-
counting data-availability, and firm-specific R&D expenses and thus R&D intensity could not be measured. 
Therefore, we used the industry-specific R&D intensity as a proxy for firm-specific R&D intensity. The in-
dustry-specific R&D-intensity is taken from the Community Innovation Survey 2006 (European 
Commission, 2008a) and is measured as total innovation expenditures as a percentage of total turnover. 
Firms in industries with an R&D intensity higher than the average over all industries are considered as hav-
ing a high R&D intensity, while firms in industries with a lower R&D intensity are considered having a low 
R&D intensity.  
6
 Again, significant differences in reporting standards of the firms in our sample hampers data-availability for 
alternative measures, such as total assets or total sales. The number of employees headcount was reported in 
each ICS in the sample.  
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Interestingly, we find significant (p<0.1) regional differences in the quantity (H3(a)), 
but not in the quality (H3(b)) of innovation related disclose in ICS. While German-speaking 
countries and Southern European countries seem to disclosure more innovation-related items, 
the non-significant difference in INCD quality provides tentative evidence of the fact that the 
understanding of the type of disclosure conveyed in ICS is virtually homogeneous across 
European regions. Higher disclosure quantity does not translate into higher disclosure quality.  
Finally, we identify a significant relationship (p<0.05) between the disclosure guide-
lines adopted by a firm and the amount of items disclosed on INC in the ICS. This is con-
sistent with our H4(a) and indicates that disclosure following the Guidelines by the German 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (2008) as well as “others” disclosure guide-
lines leads to a higher quantity of INC items displayed in the ICS than the “Putting IC into 
Practice” project (Thorleifsdottir & Claessen, 2006). Nevertheless, the disclosure guidelines 
adopted do not seem to be related to a higher or lower quality of the disclosure provided 
(H4(b)).  
6 Discussion of results and limitations 
In current literature, INCD is understudied, what stands in contrast to the overall proclaimed 
micro- and macro-economic importance of innovations and the resulting interest in related 
firm efforts. Therefore, our paper investigates 51 European ICS, as suitable instruments to 
disclose about INC, with regard to (1) quantity and quality of INCD, and (2) characteristics 
likely to drive between-firms differences in this quantity and quality. 
Concerning the first question, we can infer from the fact that each ICS encompasses at 
least one and on average 29.16 items on INC that, overall considered, the benefits of disclo-
sure on INC in ICS seem to exceed the costs of disclosure. ICS seem to respond to the need 
for more disclosure on innovation raised, for example, by the European Union and the OECD 
(European Commission, 2006; OECD, 2010). This inference can be detailed by considering 
the distribution of INCD across the IC categories. Even if human capital is the category with 
most INCD in ICS, we find a fairly balanced distribution. This empirically supports the prop-
osition that INC is derived by investments in all IC categories (Lev, 2001) and that the differ-
ent IC categories are highly interwoven with each other and create a network that facilitates 
innovation and value creation (Mouritsen, et al., 2008). 
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Furthermore, non-financial, qualitative, historical INCD seems to display the most 
advantageous cost-benefit relationship. Possibly, financial information is considered a matter 
for mandatory reporting, but not for voluntary disclosure, i.e., disclosing financial data that 
may be partially already available to stakeholders is not considered to respond in a sufficient 
way to the expectations of the public. Furthermore, the fear of proprietary costs may deter 
firms from quantitative, more verifiable disclosure. At the same time, qualitative texts allow 
to explain means-ends-chains that, due to space constraints, are not addressable elsewhere in 
disclosure. One further point deserves attention. In contradiction to the purpose of ICS to be a 
disclosure instruments that provide insights into the future value creation of firms (e.g. 
Mouritsen, et al., 2001a), we find a low degree of forward-looking INCD in our ICS sample. 
The benefits derived from fulfilling the information expectations of stakeholders about the 
future value of the firm and the related intentions concerning innovations efforts seem not to 
be sufficient to outperform the proprietary costs of disclosing information about future inno-
vation behaviour. Similar results on the type of disclosure have been found also by other dis-
closure studies (Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Mouritsen, et al., 2001b; Ordóñez de Pablos, 2005; 
Striukova, et al., 2008), indicating that from this point of view INCD does not differ from 
other forms of IC. 
Concerning the second question, we find industry, size, country of domicile of the 
firm, and disclosure guideline adopted to be significantly related to the quantity of INCD in 
ICS, while only industry makes a difference for the quality.  
Thus, we can infer that firms in high R&D intensity industries underlie a higher pres-
sure by public, investors, and other stakeholders to legitimate themselves as part of this in-
dustry and to provide value relevant information on innovations than firms in low R&D in-
tensity industries. In other terms, if costs of disclosure are presumed equal, high R&D inten-
sity firms profit more from a high quantity and a higher quality of disclosure on INC than 
other firms.  
Similarly, benefits of INCD disclosure may be higher and costs of INCD disclosure 
may be lower for larger firms. Larger firms gain more attention from society, investors, and 
other stakeholders, what leads to uncertainties about the firm outcome. This can be reduced 
by a higher disclosure quantity than necessary for smaller firms. Additionally, large firms can 
usually exploit economies of scales in overall disclosure, thus allowing them to add disclo-
sures to decreasing marginal costs. A result that deserves particular attention is that the quali-
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ty of disclosure does not differ significantly between small and large firms. From this result, 
we infer that the benefits and costs of disclosing high quality items are nearly the same for 
small and large firms. This result is worth mentioning in relation to the efforts undertaken by 
the European Commission (2006) and described in the RICARDIS report to encourage SMEs 
to use ICS to disclose their innovation activities. If compared with the findings by Striukova, 
et al. (2008), who analysed a wide range of firm reports but not ICS, and found an overall 
higher disclosure quality with larger firms, our results may stress the homogeneous applica-
bility of ICS for both large and small firms. Therefore, our study may highlight a particular 
potential related to non-codified ICS disclosure when compared with other firm reports. 
While the quantity of disclosure differs significantly across regions, we find no signif-
icant differences in the quality of disclosure provided. Interestingly, the regions with most 
INCD are Southern Europe and German-speaking countries, what stands in contrast to the 
thoughts by Chaminade & Johanson (2003), who argue for higher (perceived) proprietary 
costs in Southern countries and lower for Nordic countries. The differences in quantity do not 
translate in higher INCD quality for Southern and German-speaking countries, indicating 
homogenous disclosure quality across European regions. 
Finally, while quantity of INCD disclosure differs across ICS disclosure guidelines 
adopted, no quality differences are found. This qualitative homogeneity could be attributed 
either to high levels of similarity in the guidelines concerning the type of disclosures recom-
mended, or to a low impact from the differences in the guidelines on the disclosure practices 
of firms. For both cases, in the light of the different attempts by multi-national projects to 
homogenise the use of ICS (e.g. European Commission, 2006), our results provide some evi-
dence of the success of these efforts.  
Of course, we must acknowledge a number of limitations inherent to our study. The 
generalizability of this research is limited to INCD decisions in ICS in European for-profit 
firms. However, our findings suggest avenues for further exploration by researchers on dis-
closure in ICS and for other forms of IC. Further limitations relate to the methods employed 
in this study. First, the indexes used might be criticised based, for example, on the weightings 
used in INCDQUAL. Nevertheless, we preferred relying on indexes found to be helpful for 
prior disclosure analyses and which had thus already been validated instead of developing our 
own, new disclosure index. At the same time, we tested if our results are susceptible to 
changes if we measure INCDQUAL in a different way. We standardised INCDQUAL with 
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the number of words per ICS and with the number of characters per ICS (instead of with the 
number of pages per ICS), and once do not standardise at all. Additionally, we refer to Beat-
tie, McInnes, & Fearnley (2004) and measure INCDQUAL by the Herfindahl concentration 
index (summed squared proportion of disclosure over the internal, external, and human capi-
tal category) and by the number of non-empty disclosure categories (internal, external, human 
capital) per ICS. All these different measures of  INCDQUAL do not change our results, with 
the only exception of not standardising INCDQUAL, what leads to a significant difference in 
disclosure quality due to the ICS framework adopted. Secondly, as can be said for practically 
every content analysis, our results cannot be ultimately claimed to be unshakeably reliable 
and valid. This issue impels a certain degree of caution in the interpretation and generaliza-
tion of our results. Nonetheless, we made intensive efforts to maximise the reliability and 
validity of the content analysis carried out, and provide a detailed schedule of our attempts 
following the guidelines of Krippendorff (2004) and Weber (1990).  
Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe that our paper contributes to research in 
several ways. (1) We learn that ICS are used to disclose about INC with an average frequency 
of 29.16 items per ICS. This shows that firms are able to achieve one of the major firm goals 
when publishing ICS identified by Mouritsen, et al. (2001b), i.e., to show innovation efforts. 
Similarly to other disclosure instruments analysed in empirical literature, the type of disclo-
sure remains mostly constrained to qualitative and historical data, thus not tapping the full 
potential of ICS. (2) We find that INCD in ICS is done by fairly using items across the inter-
nal, external, and human capital categories. Therewith, we show how INC is interrelated with 
different types of IC and provide quantitative evidence of the argument that innovations can 
be generated by accurately mixed investments in IC. (3) We contribute to research on disclo-
sure drivers in that we find that INCD quantity is driven be industry, size, region of domicile, 
and disclosure guideline adopted, but especially by showing that the quality with which this 
information is disclosed, i.e., the type of information and the intensity with which this is con-
veyed, is homogeneous across different firm sizes, regions, and disclosure guidelines. This 
demonstrates the potential generated by ICS: to be a disclosure instrument which is equally 
applicable across different types of firms.    
Our findings have also implications for policy and practice: (1) small firms especially 
may identify ICS as adequate instruments toward meeting the demand for INCD; (2) policy-
makers may achieve insights into the current disclosure practices on INC and find approaches 
for further improvements in policy-making. For example, policy-makers in Nordic countries 
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could recognize in our data the necessity to increase the narratives on INC in their countries 
to increase the perception of the innovativeness of their economies; (3) guideline-setters may 
recognize that there is currently no relationship between disclosure framework adopted and 
the quality of disclosure and may wish to establish common standards to increase the quality 
of INCD, e.g., by fostering the disclosure of forward-looking information. 
 
60
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 I
I 
- 
1
: 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 I
C
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 g
u
id
el
in
es
 (
so
rt
ed
 c
h
ro
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
ly
) 
G
u
id
el
in
es
 
S
k
a
n
d
ia
 N
av
ig
at
o
r 
(E
d
v
in
ss
o
n
 &
 M
al
o
n
e,
 1
9
9
7
 
In
ta
n
g
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s 
M
o
n
it
o
r 
(S
v
ei
b
y
, 
1
9
9
7
) 
M
o
d
el
o
 I
n
te
le
ct
 (
E
u
ro
fo
ru
m
, 
1
9
9
8
) 
D
u
tc
h
 M
in
is
tr
y
 o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s 
(B
ac
k
h
u
ij
s,
 H
o
lt
er
m
a
n
, 
O
u
d
m
an
, 
O
v
er
g
o
o
r,
 &
 Z
ij
ls
tr
a,
 1
9
9
9
) 
A
u
st
ri
a
n
 R
e
se
ar
ch
 C
en
te
rs
 (
A
u
st
ri
a
n
 R
e
se
ar
ch
 C
e
n
te
rs
, 
2
0
0
0
) 
M
er
it
u
m
 p
ro
je
ct
 (
M
er
it
u
m
, 
2
0
0
0
) 
D
an
is
h
 M
in
is
tr
y
 o
f 
S
c
ie
n
ce
 T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 a
n
d
 I
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
 (
2
0
0
3
) 
N
o
rd
ik
a 
(N
o
rd
ic
 I
n
d
u
st
ri
al
 F
u
n
d
, 
2
0
0
1
);
 F
ra
m
e 
(N
o
rd
ic
 I
n
d
u
st
ri
al
 F
u
n
d
, 
2
0
0
3
);
 N
o
rd
ic
 H
ar
m
o
n
iz
ed
 K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
In
d
ic
at
o
rs
 (
N
H
K
I)
; 
an
d
 t
h
e 
fo
ll
o
w
-u
p
 p
ro
je
ct
 “
P
u
t-
ti
n
g
 I
C
 i
n
to
 P
ra
ct
ic
e”
 (
P
II
P
) 
(T
h
o
rl
ei
fs
d
o
tt
ir
 &
 C
la
e
ss
e
n
, 
2
0
0
6
) 
S
ch
m
al
e
n
b
ac
h
 w
o
rk
in
g
 g
ro
u
p
 “
A
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 R
ep
o
rt
in
g
 o
f 
In
ta
n
g
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s”
 (
S
c
h
m
al
en
b
ac
h
 w
o
rk
in
g
 g
ro
u
p
 "
A
cc
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 R
ep
o
rt
in
g
 o
f 
In
ta
n
g
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s"
, 
2
0
0
5
) 
G
er
m
an
 F
ed
er
al
 M
in
is
tr
y
 o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s 
a
n
d
 T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
N
o
te
: 
W
h
il
e 
th
e 
o
th
er
s 
g
u
id
el
in
es
 p
u
b
li
sh
  
th
ei
r 
o
w
n
 r
ec
o
m
m
en
d
at
io
n
s,
 N
o
rd
ik
a;
 F
ra
m
e;
 N
o
rd
ic
 H
ar
m
o
n
iz
ed
 K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
In
d
ic
at
o
rs
 (
N
H
K
I)
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
fo
ll
o
w
-u
p
 p
ro
-
je
ct
 “
P
u
tt
in
g
 I
C
 i
n
to
 P
ra
ct
ic
e”
 (
P
II
P
) 
at
te
m
p
t 
to
 s
u
m
m
ar
is
e 
al
re
ad
y
 e
x
is
ti
n
g
 I
C
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 g
u
id
el
in
e
s.
 G
u
id
el
in
e
s 
li
st
ed
 h
a
v
e 
b
ee
n
 d
et
ec
te
d
 o
n
 t
h
e 
b
as
is
 o
f 
an
 e
x
te
n
-
si
v
e 
li
te
ra
tu
re
 a
n
d
 i
n
te
rn
et
 r
es
ea
rc
h
 f
o
r 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 g
u
id
el
in
es
 a
im
ed
 a
t 
en
co
u
ra
g
in
g
 t
h
e 
d
el
iv
er
y
 o
f 
a 
co
n
so
li
d
at
ed
 n
u
m
er
ic
 a
n
d
 n
ar
ra
ti
v
e 
re
p
o
rt
 f
o
r 
ex
te
rn
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
p
u
rp
o
se
s 
b
y
 p
ro
fi
t-
o
ri
en
te
d
 f
ir
m
s.
 G
u
id
el
in
es
 i
ss
u
ed
 o
u
ts
id
e 
E
u
ro
p
e 
(e
.g
.,
 t
h
o
se
 b
y
 t
h
e 
Ja
p
an
es
e 
M
in
is
tr
y
 o
f 
E
co
n
o
m
y
 T
ra
d
e 
an
d
 I
n
d
u
st
ry
 (
M
E
T
I)
, 
2
0
0
5
 o
r 
b
y
 t
h
e 
A
u
st
ra
li
a
n
 S
o
ci
et
y
 f
o
r 
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s 
(S
K
E
),
 2
0
0
5
) 
h
av
e 
b
ee
n
 e
x
cl
u
d
ed
 a
s 
th
e
y
 w
o
u
ld
 n
o
t 
b
e 
ex
p
ec
te
d
 t
o
 h
av
e 
a
n
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
n
 t
h
e 
IC
 d
is
c
lo
su
re
 i
n
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 
fi
rm
s.
 S
in
ce
 t
h
e 
re
se
ar
c
h
 d
es
ig
n
 i
s 
re
st
ri
ct
ed
 f
o
r 
th
e 
sa
k
e 
o
f 
b
et
te
r 
co
m
p
ar
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
th
e 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 o
f 
IN
C
 t
o
 o
n
ly
 f
o
r-
p
ro
fi
t 
fi
rm
s,
 g
u
id
el
in
es
 w
h
ic
h
 a
d
d
re
ss
 o
n
ly
 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 b
y
 n
o
n
-p
ro
fi
t 
en
ti
ti
es
 (
e.
g
.,
 t
h
o
se
 b
y
 t
h
e 
A
u
st
ri
a
n
 M
in
is
tr
y
 o
f 
S
ci
en
ce
 a
n
d
 R
es
ea
rc
h
, 
2
0
0
2
) 
h
av
e 
al
so
 b
ee
n
 e
x
c
lu
d
ed
. 
A
p
p
ro
ac
h
es
 a
im
ed
 a
t 
in
te
rn
al
 r
ep
o
rt
-
in
g
, 
b
u
t 
w
h
ic
h
 a
re
 n
o
t 
d
es
ig
n
e
d
 f
o
r 
ex
te
rn
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 (
e.
g
.,
 t
h
e 
B
al
an
ce
d
 S
co
re
ca
rd
 b
y
 K
a
p
la
n
 &
 N
o
rt
o
n
, 
1
9
9
6
) 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
co
n
si
d
er
ed
. 
  
 
61
 
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 I
I 
- 
2
: 
C
at
eg
o
ri
es
 a
n
d
 d
ef
in
it
io
n
s 
C
at
eg
o
ry
 a
n
d
 s
u
b
ca
te
g
o
ry
 n
a
m
e
 
D
ef
in
it
io
n
 /
 k
e
y
 c
o
n
ce
p
ts
 
In
te
rn
al
 (
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l)
 c
ap
it
al
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 
1
.1
 I
n
te
ll
ec
tu
al
 p
ro
p
er
ty
 
L
e
g
al
 r
ig
h
ts
, 
i.
e.
, 
m
aj
o
rl
y
 p
at
en
ts
 a
n
d
 c
o
p
y
ri
g
h
ts
, 
th
at
 p
ro
te
ct
 f
ir
m
’s
 i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
1
.2
 M
an
ag
e
m
e
n
t 
p
h
il
o
so
p
h
y
  
G
en
er
al
 b
el
ie
fs
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
fi
rm
, 
u
su
al
ly
 f
o
rm
u
la
te
d
 i
n
to
 v
is
io
n
 o
r 
m
is
si
o
n
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 
1
.3
 C
o
rp
o
ra
te
 c
u
lt
u
re
 
S
et
 o
f 
co
m
m
o
n
 b
eh
a
v
io
rs
 a
n
d
 a
tt
it
u
d
es
 a
d
o
p
te
d
 b
y
 a
 f
ir
m
 i
n
 o
rd
er
 t
o
 e
n
co
u
ra
g
e 
in
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
 
1
.4
 M
an
ag
e
m
e
n
t 
p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
F
u
n
ct
io
n
al
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
, 
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
s,
 a
n
d
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 u
se
d
 b
y
 f
ir
m
 f
o
r 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
 e
ff
o
rt
s 
1
.5
 I
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 n
et
w
o
rk
in
g
 s
y
st
e
m
 
N
et
w
o
rk
 o
f 
al
l 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 c
h
a
n
n
e
ls
 u
se
d
 w
it
h
in
 a
 f
ir
m
 t
o
 f
ac
il
it
at
e 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
 
1
.6
 I
n
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
R
es
o
u
rc
e 
co
m
m
it
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
 f
o
r 
in
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
 e
ff
o
rt
s 
E
x
te
rn
al
 (
re
la
ti
o
n
a
l)
 c
ap
it
al
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 
2
.1
 C
u
st
o
m
er
s 
an
d
 m
ar
k
et
 
C
u
st
o
m
er
 i
n
v
o
lv
e
m
en
t 
an
d
 c
u
st
o
m
er
 r
ea
ct
io
n
s 
to
 i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
s,
 i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
d
ev
e
lo
p
ed
 w
it
h
 c
u
st
o
m
er
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 f
in
a
n
ci
al
 i
m
p
ac
t 
o
f 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
in
 t
er
m
 o
f 
in
co
m
e,
 r
et
u
rn
s,
 m
ar
k
et
 s
h
ar
e,
 a
n
d
 s
av
in
g
s 
 
2
.2
 D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 c
h
a
n
n
el
s 
P
ro
ce
ss
 i
n
v
o
lv
in
g
 m
ar
k
et
in
g
 a
n
d
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
fi
rm
’s
 i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
2
.3
 F
ir
m
 r
ep
u
ta
ti
o
n
 
F
ir
m
’s
 c
re
d
it
 d
u
e 
to
 i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
 e
ff
o
rt
s 
2
.4
 B
u
si
n
es
s 
co
ll
ab
o
ra
ti
o
n
s 
R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
 b
et
w
ee
n
 f
ir
m
 a
n
d
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
s 
o
r 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s 
th
at
 i
s 
c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
ze
d
 b
y
 m
u
tu
a
l 
co
o
p
er
at
io
n
 o
n
 i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
 e
ff
o
rt
s 
 
H
u
m
an
 (
e
m
p
lo
y
ee
) 
ca
p
it
al
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 
3
.1
 E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s 
W
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
in
v
o
lv
ed
 i
n
 i
n
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
 e
ff
o
rt
s 
3
.2
 E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 l
e
v
el
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
in
 o
rd
er
 t
o
 g
en
er
at
e 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
3
.3
 T
ra
in
in
g
 
A
ct
io
n
s 
ta
k
e
n
 t
o
 i
m
p
ar
ti
n
g
 s
k
il
ls
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
3
.4
 W
o
rk
-r
el
at
ed
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
C
o
m
p
et
e
n
ci
es
, 
ca
p
ab
il
it
ie
s,
 a
n
d
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
t 
fo
r 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
3
.5
 I
n
n
o
v
at
iv
e
n
es
s 
o
f 
e
m
p
lo
y
e
es
 
R
es
u
lt
s 
o
f 
th
e 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
 p
ro
ce
ss
 g
e
n
er
at
ed
 b
y
 e
m
p
lo
y
ee
s 
in
 t
er
m
s 
o
f 
n
e
w
 i
d
ea
s,
 n
e
w
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s,
  
n
e
w
 s
er
v
ic
es
, 
n
e
w
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
, 
an
d
 r
el
at
ed
 s
ci
en
ti
fi
c 
p
u
b
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
 
62
 
 
 
III The interplay of the levers of control in product development 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the research on management control systems (MCS) in product de-
velopment (PD) by exploring the performance effects and the interplay of the levers of control 
(LOC), i.e., interactive, diagnostic, beliefs, and boundary control systems. We use data from a 
survey of 468 senior managers from the manufacturing industry and identify the direct and 
indirect effects of the LOC on PD performance and organizational performance. Therefore, 
we first scrutinize the possible types of interplay of the levers by comparing by structural 
equation modeling a base model of unrelated LOC (additive model) with (a) a model of mutu-
al association of LOC (interdependence model), (b) a model of joint use of LOC (interaction 
model), and (c) a combined model of mutual association and joint use of LOC (combined 
interdependence/interaction model). The results show that the interdependence model is the 
most suitable in terms of fit to the data and parsimony, providing evidence of the fact that the 
LOC move together and influence PD performance and organizational performance both di-
rectly and mediated through each other. Interestingly, PD performance is positively affected 
by both the beliefs system and the diagnostic use of performance measures, as these LOC 
have a significant direct effect and generate the largest total effects on PD performance. How-
ever, the boundary system and the interactive use of performance measures, the last being 
praised in previous literature for its suitability for PD, have no significant direct effects, show 
lower total effects than beliefs and diagnostic control systems, but have rather meaningful 
indirect effects on PD performance. These results hold across different industries and firm 
sizes. The paper contributes to research and practice by uncovering the interdependence of the 
LOC in PD, thus clarifying the role of each of the levers for PD performance and organiza-
tional and therefore providing suggestions for a more successful design of LOC for PD. Fur-
thermore, it directs the attention of researchers to the consequences of potential misspecifica-
tions of LOC models.  
Keywords: Management control system, levers of control, product development 
JEL Classifications: C39, C83, L60, M40, O32
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1 Introduction 
Management control systems (MCS) refer to all the actions or activities taken by management 
in order to direct the behavior of organizational members toward the achievement of organiza-
tional goals (Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998; Flamholtz, 1983; Otley, 1994; Simons, 1995). 
One field in which MCS are used is product development (PD). The need to ensure predicta-
ble goal achievement without hindering opportunity-seeking and innovation has made MCS 
for PD an important area of research (Davila, Foster, & Oyon, 2009). Previous empirical re-
search provides seemingly contradictory results on the effect of formal MCS on PD perfor-
mance. For example, on the one hand, Abernethy & Brownell (1997) find formal accounting 
and behavior control systems to be unsuitable for research and development tasks involving a 
high and frequent number of exceptions. Similarly, interactive control in the form of man-
agement intervention is found to be detrimental to PD project performance by Bonner, Ruek-
ert, & Walker Jr. (2002). On the other hand, Bisbe & Otley (2004) find evidence that interac-
tive control enhances PD performance, at least for low-innovating companies, while Henri 
(2006) identifies a clearly positive relationship between interactive control and innovative-
ness. It is defensible to argue that at least part of the contradictions stems from (a) the re-
striction “[…] on a limited set of concepts” (Davila, Foster, & Oyon, 2009, p. 294) used to 
analyze MCS for PD (e.g., a focus on interactive and/or diagnostic control systems), (b) fol-
lowing on from this, the suppression of non-modeled, but existing relationships between dif-
ferent MCS components (Simons, 1995), and (c) the ambiguity about how these relationships 
are designed in practice (Davila, Foster, & Oyon, 2009). Our study adds to this area of re-
search as we put our analysis on a broader conceptual basis than previous research, thus al-
lowing a more extended understanding of the phenomenon of control for PD in terms of the 
relationship between different MCS components. In particular, the paper addresses both the 
direct and indirect effects of MCS components on PD performance and on organizational per-
formance. In this study, PD performance is defined according to OECD (2005) from an output 
perspective. Thus, it refers to the results of the PD process in terms of new or significantly 
improved products and related effects on sales and profit. Organizational performance is un-
derstood as financial results of firm activities in terms of profit and return measures. 
For decades the impact of different MCS components, like budgets, accounting con-
trols, or the use of performance measures, have been considered separately from each other, 
as if they act as stand-alone components (in PD as well as in other areas of MCS research) 
(Malmi & Brown, 2008). However, conceptual developments since the 1980s suggest that 
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MCS components operate in a combined way as a package (Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1998; 
Malmi & Brown, 2008; Otley, 1980). This means that firms may implement different MCS 
components with different emphasis simultaneously in a system in which the MCS compo-
nents all interplay (Malmi & Brown, 2008; Simons, 1995). Recent findings from qualitative 
studies support the existence of MCS packages (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Marginson, 2002; 
Mundy, 2010; Revellino & Mouritsen, 2009; Sandelin, 2008, Tuomela, 2005). Notwithstand-
ing the high level of agreement on the concept of interplay and the “[…] potential for serious 
model underspecification” (Chenhall, 2003, p. 131) when ignoring it, most quantitative MCS 
research still relies on the analysis of isolated MCS components (Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
There is still scarce quantitative evidence of how these components are coupled within the 
package (Malmi & Brown, 2008; Sandelin, 2008).  
Informed by these developments, we use data from a survey of 468 senior managers to 
learn how different MCS components affect PD performance and organizational performance. 
To achieve this, we start by comparing competing models that explain how the MCS compo-
nents are interrelated and use the best-fitting and most parsimonious model (i.e., the model 
that is most likely to replicate in further samples) to investigate the direct, indirect, and total 
effects of MCS components on PD performance and organizational performance.  
We analyze the interplay within a MCS based on the levers of control (LOC) frame-
work by Simons (1995), who posits that the relation between the interactive use of PD per-
formance measures (e.g., the use of performance measures to sensitize organizational mem-
bers to strategic uncertainties), the diagnostic use of PD performance measures (e.g., the use 
of performance measures to monitor results), beliefs (e.g., values and mission statements), and 
boundaries (e.g., codes of conduct) enhances performance. We prefer the LOC framework to 
other MCS frameworks like those of Flamholtz, Das, & Tsui (1985), Merchant & Van der 
Stede (2003), Ouchi (1977), or Ouchi (1979) for several reasons. First, Simons’ work incorpo-
rates the issue of MCS for PD settings by addressing the need to balance between predictable 
goal achievement and innovation, which makes his framework a commonly used framework 
for research on MCS for innovative settings (e.g. Bisbe & Otley, 2004) and allows us to com-
pare the results with previous research in the area. Second, Simons (1995) explicitly addresses 
the need to combine and balance different levers. This interplay is one of the core aspects of 
the study. In his own words: “The power of these levers in implementing strategy does not lie 
in how each is used alone, but rather in how they complement each other when used together” 
(Simons, 2000, p. 301).  
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While it clearly stresses the importance of the interplay of the levers, at the same time 
the LOC framework remains nebulous about the type of interplay. For example, following 
Simons: “The four control levers are nested – they work simultaneously but for different pur-
poses. Their collective power lies in the tension generated by each of the levers” (Simons, 
1995, p. 5). However, what do we learn from this in terms of the type of interplay? Do the 
LOC simply coexist in firms, without intentional or unintentional reciprocal interferences, 
since they have different purposes? Alternatively, are they all mutually associated, since they 
work simultaneously to pursue the same goal of directing employee behavior toward goal 
achievement? Furthermore, is the performance effect of the levers even conditional on the 
emphasis placed to the other levers, as they generate “collective power”? Since the LOC 
framework leaves these questions unanswered, empirical research formulates diversified, not 
consistent specifications of the interplay of the LOC in empirical studies (e.g., the interactions 
in Henri, 2006 and the interdependences in Widener, 2007). Conceptual and empirical differ-
ences in the specification of the interplay of the LOC, or at least the lack of proper discussion 
of these differences, lead to results that are hardly comparable and possibly driven by model 
specification.   
To the best of our knowledge, a quantitative analysis of the effect of all four LOC on 
PD performance and organizational performance is not available and thus we add to the MCS 
discourse by investigating this relationship. In addition to considering an additive model (i.e., 
merely coexistent LOC), we look for interdependencies between the LOC (i.e., model 1, with 
associated LOC), for interactions between them (i.e., model 2, with LOC as mutual conditions 
for high performance), as well as for both effects simultaneously (i.e., model 3, with both in-
terdependencies and interactions between the levers). Hence, we start our analysis with the 
simple additive LOC model as a pure base model and compare this with competing models 
suggesting a different interplay of LOC. The competing models are shown in figure III - 1. 
Model 1 suggests mutual interdependencies between LOC in a way that a changed 
emphasis on one lever is associated with a changed emphasis on each of the other LOC. Mod-
el 2 supports the existence of interactions between LOC, meaning that the impact of one lever 
on performance is dependent on the level of another interacting lever. Model 3 supposes the 
existence of both interdependencies and interactions. The base model is the model against 
which these three models are tested. After identifying the best-fitting model, we scrutinize the 
best-performing model to detect the direct and indirect effects generated from each of the 
LOC on both PD performance and organizational performance. 
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Figure III - 1: Base model and competing models 
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This study contributes to the research in three ways. First, we provide a detailed un-
derstanding of the LOC effects in a PD setting. The existing research offers only fragmented 
evidence of this relationship. For example, Bisbe & Otley (2004) find no generally valid di-
rect effect of the interactive control system on product innovation, while Henri (2006) recog-
nizes a significant positive direct effect and Bonner, et al. (2002) detects a detrimental effect 
of interactive control systems on PD performance. Following Davila, Foster, & Oyon (2009), 
one possible reason for these contradictory results is the restriction to a limited concept of 
control, which omits components of the entire package of controls. Thus, we (a) consider the 
beliefs, boundary, interactive, and diagnostic control systems simultaneously and (b) discuss 
the way in which they are related to each other in the context of PD. While we can gain im-
portant insights into the isolated effects of interactive and diagnostic control systems from 
previous studies, we supplement their results and offer a more encompassing picture of the 
relationship between all the levers and the performance in a PD setting. This provides re-
searchers with a better understanding of the conceptual work by Simons (1995) in an innova-
tive setting, while practitioners can profit from this study by identifying the levers that are 
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best suited to enhancing the PD performance as well as the overall organizational perfor-
mance. 
Second, there is a strong consensus in the literature on the existence of relationships 
among different MCS components. This consensus is encouraged by insightful case study 
research, but nevertheless, it remains unclear whether these findings are generalizable to firms 
other than those analyzed. We put these analyses on a broader empirical basis by using data 
from a cross-sectional survey of 468 firms, and show empirically the superiority of models 
acknowledging the interplay of the LOC. This allows for more generalizable results on the 
existence of a MCS package that provides support for the underspecification of purely addi-
tive MCS models, as conceptually argued by Chenhall (2003). Research can profit from these 
findings since they provide robust evidence of a phenomenon – the interplay of MCS compo-
nents in a MCS package – that is widely agreed on, but has lacked solid empirical evidence 
until now. Practice may be sensitized by this result and thus recognize that changes in the em-
phasis on one lever will not leave the other levers and/or their performance effects unaffected.   
Third, the type of interplay that best describes the MCS package is vague. We add to 
the discussion on the MCS package by comparing three types of LOC interplay analyzed sep-
arately in the literature. For example, Henri (2006) deals with the interplay of different LOC 
by postulating an interaction between the interactive control system and the diagnostic control 
system, while Widener (2007) interprets the LOC package as the interdependence between the 
beliefs, boundary, interactive, and diagnostic control systems. This somehow contradictory 
modeling leaves researchers doubtful about the soundest model specification. In this vain, we 
compare an interdependence model that follows Widener’s (2007) understanding with an in-
teraction model reflecting Henri’s (2006) point of view and with a model combining interde-
pendence and interaction between the levers. Since we use the same construct measurement 
for these models and cover all four LOC, we are able to compare the models in terms of the 
best specification. We show in our sample that the interdependence model is superior in terms 
of fit to the data and parsimony, thus being the specification that is most likely to be replicat-
ed in future samples. While we do not claim to formulate the overall and “best” ever model 
specification, these reflections are intended to prompt MCS researchers to make the specifica-
tion of the relationship between MCS components a core issue of their research and to the 
disclose related efforts. Practitioners can learn from the interdependence model how changes 
in only one lever of control may have a meaningful impact on performance both directly and 
mediated through the other levers.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The section “Theory develop-
ment and hypotheses formulation” discusses the relationship between LOC, PD performance, 
and organizational performance, formulates hypotheses, and proposes competing models on 
the LOC interplay. The section on “Methods” gives an overview of the data collection pro-
cess, the variable measurement, and the data analysis procedure. The results are discussed in 
the related section, while the “Conclusion” section provides the limitations of the study as 
well as avenues for future research.  
2 Theory development and hypotheses formulation 
2.1 The levers of control framework 
Following Simons (1995), four levers contribute to strategy implementation: the boundary 
system, diagnostic control system, beliefs system, and interactive control system. While 
boundary and diagnostic control systems represent constraining forces that impose compli-
ance with rules, beliefs and interactive control systems focus on opportunity-seeking, enabling 
creativity, and problem-solving (Simons, 1995). Boundary systems “[…] delineate the ac-
ceptable domain for opportunity-seeking for organizational participants” (Simons (1995), 
p. 39). They induce the behavior constraints necessary to prevent employees from engaging in 
misleading, non-goal-congruent activities. The definition of the off-limits behavior and risks 
that should be avoided can be formally stated in a code of business conduct or in internal 
guidelines and should be reinforced by the management (Simons, 1995). In a PD setting, this 
implicates the definition of markets, product areas, or customers, for which PD is not carried 
out. An example of such a definition of off-limits behavior for PD can be found with the fur-
niture designer BoConcept: “Principle: We strive to avoid making products that are non-
recyclable” (BoConcept, 2011). Similarly focused on rule compliance, the diagnostic control 
system supports management by exceptions, i.e., budgets, project timelines, milestones, as 
well as other data from management accounting are used by managers to set standards, moni-
tor organizational outcomes, and correct deviations from preset standard performance, while 
management intervention only occurs if the results deviate from the standards or goals. The 
diagnostic use of management accounting information is intended to make goal achievement 
predictable (Simons (1995), pp. 59). PD has to be tracked in order to monitor the progress of 
each project according to costs, time, and quality key measures and to compare the achieve-
ments with the expectations.   
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While boundary and diagnostic control systems are constraining forces, beliefs and diagnostic 
control systems are enabling forces. Beliefs systems are “[…] the explicit set of organization-
al definitions that senior managers communicate formally and reinforce systematically to pro-
vide basic values, purpose, and direction for the organization” (Simons (1995), p. 34). Formal 
instruments for communicating firm values are, for example, the mission, the vision, and the 
value statement. Together with the communication of values by the top management during 
daily activities, mission, vision, and value statements are designed to motivate employees to 
expand their efforts toward the desired opportunity-seeking (Simons, 1995). In settings where 
PD is crucial, the mission statement should communicate innovation as a primary value of the 
firm. Managers should stress the importance of successful PD to foster innovative behavior 
(Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996). An example of the formulation of innova-
tive behavior as a major value of the firm can be found with the computer manufacturer Mi-
crosoft: “Our vision is to create innovative technology that is accessible to everyone and that 
adapts to each person’s needs” (Microsoft, 2012). Interactive control systems are character-
ized by frequent dialogue between managers and employees and are intended to assure the 
adaptation capability of the firm in uncertain environments. Management accounting data that 
are monitored and discussed by the management are used to orient the firm toward key issues 
and critical success factors, to tie the organization together, and to provide a common vocabu-
lary across departments and hierarchies (Simons, 1995). In terms of PD, an interactive control 
system requires the use of management accounting data from, for example, project mile-
stones, budgets, or project timelines to align the firm with the critical success factors, like 
innovation speed. Furthermore, an interactive use of management accounting data generates a 
common understanding of the issues in PD across different departments, such as the finance, 
marketing, and PD departments.  
Actually, the LOC framework proposes a coherent typology of levers used to control 
employees’ actions by balancing opportunity-seeking and management attention, intended 
and emergent strategy processes, self-interest, and the desire to contribute (Simons, 1995). 
This requires the need for interplay of the levers, and this in turn should be considered in the 
specification of LOC models for research. However, Simons (1995) remains vague about the 
relation between the levers. He writes about the need to balance the different levers of control 
(“Implementing strategy effectively requires a balance among the four levers of control” 
(Simons (1995), p. 10)), about their mutual reinforcement (“These four [levers] are mutually 
reinforcing” (Simons (1995), p. 161); “These four [levers] are highly interdependent” (Simons 
(1995), p. 167)), about the dynamic tension they generate (“The interplay of positive and neg-
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ative forces generated by these systems creates a dynamic tension between the opportunistic 
innovation and predictable goal achievement that is necessary for profitable growth” (Simons, 
1995, p. 153)).  
Facing these vague conceptual definitions, we define competing models. The additive 
model (i.e., a model that does not display any relationship between the different levers) is our 
base model, against which we test our LOC interplay models. These are model 1 (i.e., the in-
terdependence model), model 2 (i.e., the interaction model) and model 3 (i.e., the combined 
interdependence/interaction model) and are introduced hereafter.   
2.2 The interdependence model 
The interdependence model (model 1) suggests that the LOC are mutually associated, i.e., 
they somehow move together, so that changes in one of the levers are accompanied by chang-
es in the other levers. This model is supportable by Simons’ framework, since he suggests that 
the levers work together to provide an effective MCS environment (Simons, 1995).  
Firms must ascertain that employees’ behavior is beneficial for goal-achievement. To 
do so, they can rely on the four LOC previously described, which operate in different ways, 
but follow the same goal of securing and increasing performance. Interactive use of perfor-
mance measures for PD is implemented to focus the attention of the firm on strategic uncer-
tainties and thus to encourage opportunity-seeking, which is likely to increase in turn PD per-
formance. At the same time, the diagnostic use of performance measures for PD drives the 
focus of the firm’s actions on critical performance variables, which stimulates compliance 
with the goals in PD without requiring time- and cost-consuming management intervention. 
Stressing innovativeness as a core value of the firm by a properly designed beliefs system 
generates the commitment of firm’s members toward its business strategy, therefore safe-
guarding that employees are motivated to operate in terms of an increase in PD performance. 
Finally, boundary systems delimitate the opportunity-seeking area for firm members by defin-
ing the range of actions that is likely to be harmful to PD performance (Simons, 1995). The 
empirical results partially support the postulates from the LOC framework. Bisbe & Otley 
(2004) find, at least for low-innovative firms, a significant positive relationship between in-
teractive control systems and product innovation, while Henri (2006) finds an overall signifi-
cant positive relationship between the interactive use of performance measures and innova-
tiveness. But at the same time he detects a significantly negative association between the di-
agnostic control system and innovativeness, while Craig (1995) found bureaucracy in terms of 
formal rules, guidelines, and evaluation systems as a supportive mechanism for PD. Bonner, 
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et al. (2002) show that the involvement of employees in the development of controls used to 
monitor PD performance, i.e., an interactive way to deal with control, has a positive impact on 
PD project performance, while other components of an interactive control system, like man-
agement intervention, have no or a detrimental effect on performance. In a field study, Collier 
(2005) shows the importance of the beliefs and boundary systems for an entrepreneurial or-
ganization. Informed by these conceptual and empirical research results, we formulate the 
following hypotheses: 
H1a: The emphasis firms place on the interactive use of performance measures, on the 
diagnostic use of performance measures, on the beliefs system, and on the boundary 
system for product development is each positively associated with product develop-
ment performance. 
The mutual association between the LOC is peculiar to the interdependence model. 
Following Simons (1995), the LOC are “nested” (p. 5) and their use relies on “continual in-
terplay” (p. 30). One defensible statistical specification of this relationship between the LOC 
is in terms of correlations. This implies that the levers move together, i.e., changes in one lev-
er occur at the same time as changes in other levers. How these interdependencies can be jus-
tified is drawn by previous empirical research. Different works argue for an association be-
tween a firm’s beliefs system, e.g., its mission statement, and other instruments designed to 
manage and control employees’ behavior (Pearce II & David, 1987; Widener, 2007). On the 
one hand, if the management is not able to communicate what the firm stands for, then it is 
likely that the other LOC are not being particularly accentuated, since the overall direction 
and motivation provided by the beliefs system is missing. On the other hand, if the LOC apart 
from the beliefs system are only emphasized a little and are therefore unable, or able only to a 
small degree, to define the boundaries of action, to diagnose the level of goal achievement, 
and to generate a common understanding of the firm’s goals, then it is likely that the firm is 
omitting to emphasize what the overall directions and values of the firm should be. Consist-
ently, Sandelin (2008) finds in her case study about a high-tech entrepreneurial firm that busi-
ness units’ operations “[…] were controlled by mutually reinforcing forms of cultural, per-
sonnel, and action control” (Sandelin, 2008, p. 331), while Widener (2007) detects signifi-
cantly positive correlations between the beliefs system and the interactive, as well as the diag-
nostic control systems.  
In a similar manner, the emphasis on the boundary system might be interwoven with 
the emphasis on other LOC. The boundary system delineates the area for which opportunity-
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seeking is desired and, in turn, for which an evaluation of results based on accounting data is 
required. Thus, it is likely that a strong emphasis on the boundary system is accompanied by 
emphasis on both diagnostic and interactive control systems, which are responsible for the 
evaluation of the compliance with and shaping of organizational goals. Since the boundary 
system and the diagnostic control system both represent the constraining, negative forces of 
the LOC framework (Simons, 1995), we suppose that an emphasis on one constraining force 
coexists with an emphasis on the other constraining LOC (Widener, 2007). At the same time, 
Mundy (2010) finds in her case study that in the PD process of the financial services firm she 
investigates an emphasized boundary system is accompanied by an emphasized interactive 
control system. She finds that changing conditions in PD increase the necessity to debate the 
new, changing issues and goals of the firm, while the boundary system has to formulate new 
constraints for operations in PD on that basis. Widener (2007) sees a significant correlation 
between the boundary system and both the interactive and the diagnostic control systems.  
Following the seminal work by Miller & Friesen (1982), the entrepreneurial firm pur-
sues innovation efforts aggressively. The LOC implied by this sort of firm is an interactive 
control system (Simons, 1995), that supports forward-looking, risk-seeking behavior. Never-
theless, to reduce the risks of excessively aggressive innovative behavior, firms put in place at 
the same time diagnostic control systems that prevent employees from improper, unstructured 
innovation, but track the progress of the PD efforts (Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Miller & Friesen, 
1982). Tuomela (2005) shows in her case study about the introduction of a new performance 
measurement system that the interactive discussion about firm goals is accompanied by the 
diagnostic reporting and review of performance data. This result is supported by Widener’s 
finding that the interactive and the diagnostic control systems are significantly correlated with 
each other (Widener, 2007). 
Besides these arguments for a positive association between the levers, the use of LOC 
requires management attention, which in turn implicates the consumption of time as one of 
managers’ most limited and thus costly resources. For this reason, it is likely that an increase 
in emphasis on one lever occurs simultaneously with a reduced emphasis on another lever. 
Simons (1991) first discusses the issue of the trade-off between the attention paid to different 
LOC. Mundy (2010) finds that certain LOC are suppressed by managers when their attention 
is driven toward other LOC. In summary of these considerations, we formulate the following 
hypothesis:  
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H1b: The emphases firms place on the beliefs system, on the boundary system, on the 
interactive use of performance measures, and on the diagnostic use of performance 
measures for product development are mutually correlated.     
Since decades, PD performance is expected to lead to a sustained competitive ad-
vantage and thus to contribute to organizational performance (e.g. Clark & Fujimoto, 1994; 
Damanpour, 1991; Drucker, 2001; Schumpeter, 1943). Numerous empirical studies confirm 
this positive relationship between measures of PD performance and measures of organization-
al performance (e.g. Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990; Griliches, 1981; Hall & Mairesse, 
1995). Thus, we hypothesize:  
H1c: Product development performance is positively associated with organizational 
performance. 
Consequently, if the LOC are positively linked with PD performance and PD perfor-
mance is positively linked with organizational performance, than the levers are expected to 
have a positive impact on organizational performance through the enhancement of PD per-
formance. Thus, we implicitly suggest an indirect effect between the levers designed for PD 
and organizational performance. In line with previous research (Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Henri, 
2006), we do not hypothesize the existence of a direct effect between the levers and organiza-
tional performance. From a conceptual perspective, levers which are designed to control PD 
are not likely to have a direct impact on the performance of the entire organization (Bisbe & 
Otley, 2004). From an empirical perspective, previous research mostly could not find such a 
direct relationship (e.g. Abernethy & Brownell, 1999; Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Henri, 2006; 
Widener, 2007). However, in case the levers used for PD show unpredicted direct effects for 
the achievement of overall firm goals, we control for the relationship in our statistical anal-
yses.    
2.3 The interaction model 
The second competing model we present is the interaction model (model 2). Simons (1995) 
refers to a “[…] collective power [that] lies in the tension generated by each of the levers” (p. 
5) and to “dynamic tension” (p. 30) between the levers. Tensions refer to the combination of 
opposing but interrelated components of the same system (Lewis, 2000). In Simons’ under-
standing, these tensions are referred to as “dynamic” since they do not generate stagnancy, but 
rather involve reinforcing cycles between the components in tension (Lewis, 2000). The LOC 
framework proposes constraining and enabling levers which are perceived as opposing (and 
thus in tension), but are nevertheless all aimed at increasing performance. The generated ten-
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sions urge the management and employees to look for solutions (Dent, 1987). These solutions 
are achieved by communication and debates among firm members on firm goals. These in 
turn generate a plurality that enhances innovations and that is useful for allowing employees 
to get involved in the finally agreed goals, which increases organizational performance 
(Henri, 2006). We follow Henri (2006) and define the dynamic tensions by using interaction 
terms between the LOC that generate constraining forces and the LOC that generate enabling 
forces. Thus, the relationship between the LOC described in this model assumes joint use of 
the levers in tension in a way that the performance impact of one lever is conditional on the 
emphasis placed to another opposing lever (and vice versa).  
These conceptual thoughts find reflection in previous empirical works. Lewis, Welsh, 
Dehler, & Green (2002) analyze dynamic tensions in a PD setting and find that successful PD 
requires the ability of managers to cope with tensions between conflicting project manage-
ment styles, i.e., an emergent, freedom- and innovation-oriented style and a planned, goal 
implementation-oriented style. They suggest the use of “[…] subtle control: effective manag-
ers provide strong leadership to keep teams focused and on schedule, while empowering team 
members to foster motivation and creativity” (Lewis, et al., 2002, p. 562). In the same vein, 
Mundy (2010) shows how managers of a financial services firm consciously use opposing 
LOC jointly, i.e., interactive and diagnostic control systems, beliefs and boundary systems, as 
well as interactive and boundary control systems with the aim of balancing these opposing 
forces in order to enhance performance. Henri (2006) tests the effect of the dynamic tension 
between interactive and diagnostic control systems on innovativeness and finds no significant 
effect. However, we follow Simons’ notion of positive and negative forces in the LOC 
framework, which subsumes the beliefs system and the interactive control system to the first, 
and the boundary system as well as the diagnostic control system to the latter. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H2: The emphasis firms place on the dynamic tension resulting from a joint use of in-
teractive and diagnostic control systems, of beliefs and boundary systems, of boundary 
and interactive control systems, and of beliefs and diagnostic control systems is posi-
tively associated with product development performance. 
Again and consistent with previous research, we do not see sufficient support for a hy-
pothesis on the direct relation between these dynamic tensions generated in the area of PD and 
organizational performance. However, we make sure that the direct effect between the dy-
namic tensions and organizational performance is captured in our statistical model, thus al-
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lowing us to differentiate direct effects on organizational performance from effects that are 
generated through an enhancement of PD performance.  
Finally, we incorporate into our interaction model the hypotheses H1a and H1c from 
the previous model. While we expect that the positive effect of PD performance on organiza-
tional performance is still true, we need the H1a relationships in order to separate the main 
effects of the levers on PD performance from the effects generated by the joint use of differ-
ent levers. 
2.4 The combined interdependence/interaction model 
Model 1 and model 2 suppose that the levers are either interdependent (i.e., they move togeth-
er), or interacting (i.e., the impact of one lever is conditioned by another lever). However, 
even if these two relationships are considered as competing in previous literature, this does 
not preclude that the levers are simultaneously interdependent and interacting, i.e., changes in 
the emphasis placed to one lever changes the emphasis placed to another lever and, at the 
same time, changes the performance impact of the levers with which the lever considered is 
interacting. For example, the beliefs system may be stronger emphasized by a strengthening 
of manager communication on the peculiar role of innovations for the firm. This increased 
emphasis may require at the same time a clearer specification of the boundaries to the activi-
ties in PD to constrain excessive opportunity-seeking. Furthermore, the magnitude of the im-
pact of the boundary system on PD performance may depend on how much emphasis is 
placed to the beliefs system. Thus, the intensified communication of innovations as a primary 
focus for the firm may simultaneously lead to an increased impact of the boundary system on 
PD performance. 
Therefore, we propose with model 3 a model of combined interdependence/interaction 
by both considering our mutual correlation hypothesis from model 1 (i.e., H1b) as well as our 
interactions hypothesis from model 2 (H2). To distinguish these effects from the main effects 
we add to model 3 also the main effects between the levers and PD performance (H1a). Final-
ly, we add the relation between PD performance and organizational performance (H1c).    
3 Methods 
3.1 Data collection 
The data were collected through a structured written questionnaire sent by mail to members of 
the top management of the target firms, i.e., the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), the Chief 
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Technology Officer (CTO), or the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
1
 We chose them as in-
formants since they are knowledgeable about the LOC and their implementation in PD 
(Davila, Foster, & Li, 2009; Widener, 2007), which was confirmed by our pilot test. For 85 
firms, duplicates, i.e., two questionnaires from two different respondents from one firm, were 
returned and used to control for interrater reliability potentially affected by different respond-
ents’ perceptions (see appendix III - 3). The target population consisted of 8,555 large and 
medium-sized firms in the manufacturing sector (the C-section in the NACE Revision 2 clas-
sification) from German-speaking countries (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland).
2
 Firms re-
specting the following size criteria were sampled: (1) at least 50 employees (full-time equiva-
lents) for the year 2008; (2) at least 10 million euro sales for the year 2008. Since the survey 
was conducted during the 2008/2009 world economic crisis, we were seeking results that 
were as far as possible unbiased by this critical event. Thus, we referred our survey questions 
to the average firm situation over the last three years. In order to be able to check for respond-
ent bias, we sampled those firms that provided financial data in the AMADEUS database for 
the last three years. Thus, the sample consisted of 2,695 firms, from which we identified 
4,961 potential respondents.
3
 In order to collect the contact data from this sample, we contact-
ed the firms by phone or e-mail and, wherever possible, prenotified the respondents. This 
helped us to increase the likelihood that the respondent whom we wanted to answer our ques-
tions was indeed the person who received the questionnaire. Each mail-out package included 
a personally addressed signed cover letter (in which we guaranteed the confidentiality of an-
swers and anonymity in the result reports), the questionnaire, and a prepaid reply envelope. 
As an incentive to respond, we offered an executive summary of our results and participation 
in a workshop to discuss the results with researchers and practitioners. The follow-up wave 
consisted of a second package with a cover letter urging an answer and a replacement ques-
tionnaire sent to those who had not answered yet (Dillman, 2007).  
From the initial 2,695 potential respondent firms, 87 could not be contacted since the 
firms had closed, failed, or moved to an unknown address, or they could not provide useful 
insights since they stated that they did not undertake PD. We received a reply questionnaire 
                                                 
1
 All the potential respondents within one firm received the same questionnaire and had to answer the same 
questions.  
2
 The target population is identified through the AMADEUS database. AMADEUS is a database that in Octo-
ber 2009 contained financial information on over 11 million public and private companies in 41 European 
countries. It combines data from over 30 regional information providers using public mandatory disclosure 
data. 
3
 For most of the firms, both the CFO and the CTO could be identified and addressed. For 429 mostly small 
firms, only the CEO could be identified. 
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from 962 firms. After correcting for those 68 firms for which the questionnaire came from a 
respondent who was beyond the scope of our analysis (e.g., a different functional and/or hier-
archical level), 894 firms were left. Referring to the 2,695-87=2,608 firms that could be ap-
proached with our questionnaire, this equals a response rate of 34.3%. We investigated unit 
non-response bias by comparing the respondents with the addressed non-respondents and the 
respondents with the survey population (i.e., all 8,555 manufacturing firms in German-
speaking countries with at least 50 employees and 10 million euro sales available in the 
AMADEUS database for the last available year). The pattern of industry distribution of the 
respondents following the NACE Rev. 2 divisions compares well with the industry distribu-
tion of the addressed non-respondents (chi square(23)=33.079, p=0.08) and of the population. 
Only division 33 of the NACE classification required corrective actions (reweighting by ran-
dom deletion of n=61 cases from division 33 “Repair and installation of machinery and 
equipment”), since there was an overrepresentation of firms in this division compared with 
the distribution of the population.
4
 After this correction, 833 firms remained in our sample 
and the chi square statistic does not show significant differences in the industry distribution 
between the respondents and the population (chi square(23)=34.895, p=0.053). In unreported 
results, we find no statistical differences in the number of employees, sales, EBIT, fixed as-
sets, and intangible assets between the respondents and the addressed non-respondents as well 
as between the respondents and the survey population.  
From the 833 firms considered, 365 declared that they had not any type of perfor-
mance measure for their PD and could thus not be analyzed in terms of our research question, 
so we carried out our research based on 468 responses.
5
 Table III - 1 shows that there are no 
statistical differences in the number of employees, sales, EBIT, fixed assets, and intangible 
assets between the respondents with PD performance measures and the addressed non-
respondents as well as between the respondents with PD performance measures and the sur-
vey population at p<0.05 (with exception for the number of employees for the comparison of 
the respondents with PD performance measures and the survey population). However, as ex-
pected, we find significant differences between the 365 firms without any performance meas-
ure for PD and the 468 firms employing performance measures for PD. 
                                                 
4
 When carrying out further analyses including the 61 deleted cases, the results remained mostly unchanged. 
Nevertheless, in order to safeguard the highest possible level of representativeness of our sample, we omitted 
these cases from the following analyses. 
5
 Additionally, we received 85 duplicates, i.e., questionnaires completed by a second senior manager from a 
firm that had already responded. We did not include these questionnaires in our basic analyses in order to 
avoid the bias from considering the same firm twice, but used these duplicates to test for interrater reliability 
(see the “Results” section). 
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Table III - 1: Unit non-response analysis for firm characteristics 
Variable Respondents 
with perfor-
mance measures 
for PD (n=468) 
Respondents without 
performance 
measures for PD 
(n=365) 
Addressed                            
non-respondents 
(n=1,801) 
Survey population        
(n=8,087) 
Number of em-
ployees  (in 
thousands) 
2.74 0.38 (t=2.725, 
p=0.007) 
1.22  (t=1.660, 
p=0.097) 
0.78 (t=-2.265, 
p=0.024) 
Net sales                      
(in millions 
euro) 
806.36 89.73 (t=2.511, 
p=0.012) 
354.41  (t=1.523, 
p=0.128) 
247.66 (t=-1.946, 
p=0.052) 
EBIT                            
(in million euro) 
40.87 5.32 (t=2.325, 
p=0.020) 
25.79  (t=1.094, 
p=0.274) 
13.62 (t=-1.771, 
p=0.077) 
Fixed assets                  
(in million euro) 
386.20 21.61 (t=2.521, 
p=0.012) 
151.61  (t=1.552, 
p=0.121) 
104.16 (t=-1.934, 
p=0.054) 
Intangible assets        
 (in million euro) 
96.71 1.22 (t=2.438, 
p=0.015) 
52.91  (t=0.978), 
p=0.328) 
29.47 (t=-1.687, 
p=0.092) 
The table reports variable means as well as t-statistics and related p-values for the comparison of means of varia-
bles between the respondents with and without performance measures for PD, between the respondents with 
performance measures for PD and the addressed non-respondents as well as between the respondents with per-
formance measures for PD and the survey population (two-sided test). The respondents are already corrected for 
overrepresentation of NACE div. 33. 
 
The 468 questionnaires used led us to a ratio of 9.55 respondents per parameter esti-
mate for the simplest base model and a ratio of 5.38 for the most complex model 3, which 
indicates an adequate sample size for the estimation of our models (Bentler & Chou, 1987).  
To approximate further the unit non-response bias, we compared the responses of ear-
ly and late respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). We did not find significant differences 
at the 5% level in construct means, which further supports the representative character of our 
sample for the manufacturing sector. The results are displayed in table III - 2. 
We additionally analyzed item non-response. The descriptive analyses show that a 
maximum of 6.2% of the responses per question are missed, with most questions ranging be-
tween 0.2% and 1.1% of responses missed. There are no indications of patterns of non-
random item non-response, as found by Little’s MCAR test (chi square(5,002)=5,144.005, 
p=0.079) (Rubin, 1976). In order to avoid the shortcomings of traditional missing data tech-
niques like mean imputation (i.e., distortion of estimated variances and correlations) (Schafer 
& Graham, 2002), we used the EM-algorithm to replace the missing values. This algorithm 
provides consistent and efficient maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for missing completely 
at random values (Schafer & Graham, 2002, Yuan & Bentler, 2000). 
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Table III - 2: Comparison of constructs means for early and late respondents 
Construct Early respondents  
(before the follow-up  
procedure) 
Late respondents  
(after the follow-up  
procedure) 
t-statistics, p-values 
(two-sided test) 
Diagnostic control system 3.60 (n=290)  3.54 (n=174) t=-0.839, p=0.402 
Interactive control system 2.91 (n=289)  2.93 (n=172) t=-0.386, p=0.700 
Boundary system 2.85 (n=288)  2.78 (n=168) t=0.525, p=0.420 
Beliefs system 3.96 (n=288)  4.04 (n=174) t=-1.231, p=0.219 
Product development performance 2.52 (n=289)  2.48 (n=168) t=0.567, p=0.571 
Organizational performance 2.70 (n=271)  2.70 (n=154) t=-0.023, p=0.982 
The table reports construct means and t-tests on the difference in construct means for early and late respond-
ents. Early respondents are the respondents who returned the questionnaire before the reminder action; late 
respondents are the respondents who returned the questionnaire after the reminder action. n varies due to 
missing values. 
 
3.2 Construct measurement 
All the measures were borrowed from existing and validated instruments and slightly adapted 
to the PD setting. We developed the questionnaire in English and then translated it into Ger-
man for adaption to the sample. Back-translation by an independent party following Brislin 
(1970) was adopted to verify the equivalence between the translated and the original items. To 
safeguard the content validity, we additionally talked to experts in the field (both academics 
and practitioners) to discuss the questionnaire. The three-step test-interview method was used 
to pilot test the questionnaire with six potential respondents to obtain feedback on the layout 
of the questionnaire, the clarity of the questions, and the content validity (Hak, van der Veer, 
& Ommundsen, 2006). This led to slight adjustments to the wording and layout of the ques-
tionnaire.  
Due to the reflective nature of the constructs (items of one construct were all signifi-
cantly positively correlated with each other), we could purify our construct measurement by 
excluding a few items from the original instruments to increase the reliability, without chang-
ing the meaning of the factors (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). To make sure that the constructs 
were still content valid, two experts in MCS research were asked to discuss whether the 
meaning of the constructs had changed. Appendix III - 1 displays the questionnaire items, 
descriptive statistics, standardized loadings, and individual item reliability, as well as 
Cronbach’s alpha, average variance extracted, and composite reliability for each construct. 
The common thresholds for these measures were generally met (standardized loading>0.6 and 
significantly different from zero, Cronbach’s alpha>0.7, individual item reliability>0.4, com-
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posite reliability>0.6; see Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), with slight de-
partures from the thresholds for one item for the boundary system construct and one item for 
the PD performance construct.
6
  
The interactive and diagnostic control systems were measured using an instrument de-
veloped by Vandenbosch (1999) and refined by Henri (2006).
7
 In this study we investigate the 
interactive and diagnostic use of performance measures for PD. Performance measures have 
been chosen due to their diffusion in practice and research (Widener, 2007). The measures of 
the beliefs and boundary systems was taken from Widener (2007). All these instruments are 
grounded in Simons (1995) LOC framework and allowed us to use already validated scales 
that are directly related to the theoretical framework of our analysis. We slightly adapted the 
questions to the area of PD. The dynamic tensions operationalized in model 2 and 3 are calcu-
lated through interaction terms based on the four LOC constructs mentioned above. The inter-
action constructs can be implemented in SEM with different approaches (Cortina, Chen, & 
Dunlap, 2001, Marsh, Wen, & Hau, 2004). We followed the interaction approach by Marsh, et 
al. (2004), who propose using a subset of indicators suggested in the seminal work by Kenny 
& Judd (1984) and leaving the variance of measurement errors and loadings to be freely esti-
mated. The Marsh, et al. (2004) approach is based on the use of matched-pair products in 
which the information on each indicator is considered only once (e.g., if factor X has x1 and 
x2 as indicators and factor Y has y1 and y2 as indicators, the approach suggests for the latent 
variable interaction XY two indicators, i.e., x1*y1 and x2*y2).
8
 We favored this approach since 
it does not require the specification of constraints based upon the assumption of multivariate 
normality of data (Marsh, et al., 2004). To avoid issues of multicollinearity, the variables were 
centered before the interaction construct was built (Jöreskog & Yang, 1996).   
PD performance was measured with indicators taken from Bisbe & Otley (2004), Ca-
pon, Farley, Lehman, & Hulbert (1992) and Griffin (1997) and focused on the share of new 
products in the product portfolio, the share of profit from new products, and the share of sales 
from new products. Our construct required the rating of the performance of the firm in com-
                                                 
6
 The second item of the boundary system construct (see appendix III - 1) displays a factor loading and indi-
vidual item reliability below the thresholds. The further results in this paper remain unchanged if we delete 
this item, while the variance extracted, actually slightly below the cutoff value, increases above the threshold. 
The first items of the PD performance construct (see appendix III - 1) have individual item reliability slightly 
below the threshold. Deleting these items does not change the results of the further analyses. 
7
 Widener (2007) uses different items to measure interactive control systems. We also collected the items de-
veloped in her paper, but found this construct measurement not to be reliable.  
8
 For latent variable interaction between constructs with different numbers of items, we chose the items with 
the highest individual item reliability to build the interaction. 
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parison with the industry in which the firm operates and therefore followed Govindarajan 
(1984). Like Bisbe & Otley (2004), we also asked for a rating of the subjective importance of 
the difference indicators, which allowed us to weight each PD performance criterion with the 
attached importance. In the same fashion, we referred to the measure of organizational per-
formance by Govindarajan (1984) and asked for a rating about the return and profit growth 
measures with regard to the industry average.  
Since the questions used in our survey relate to the area of PD, we report in appendix 
III - 2 the results of an exploratory factor analysis across all the questions employed for these 
analyses to show that the six main factors discriminated as expected. 
All our rating scales can be interpreted as interval-scaled, since we respected the con-
dition of at least five scale-points (Bagozzi, 1981) and anchored each of the five points in or-
der to suggest to respondents that the intervals between the points are equal (Westermann, 
1985). This allows for the use of methods that require continuous data (Bentler & Chou, 
1987). 
Table III - 3 reports the correlations between constructs, which are significant but gen-
erally moderate and thus suggest discriminant validity. 
The confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) for each construct show a good model fit ac-
cording to the commonly used fit indexes (Henri, 2007, Kline, 2011) for each of the meas-
urement model components. The classical chi square statistic was used to test the exact-fit 
hypothesis, which can be considered implausible in most empirical research (MacCallum, 
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Therefore, we supplemented the chi square information with 
more informative approximate fit indexes, i.e., the absolute fit indexes AGFI, RMSEA and 
SRMR, and the incremental fit index CFI. The thresholds are as follows: p-value of chi square 
test>0.05, AGFI>0.9 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988), RMSEA<0.1 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993), 
CFI>0.95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and SRMR<0.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
9
 Besides the men-
tioned CFA, we carried out a number of procedures and tests aimed at providing evidence of 
construct validity. These are summarized in appendix III - 3. Overall, we find strong evidence 
of the validity of our constructs. 
                                                 
9
 The majority of these measures lie within the thresholds. The beliefs system construct displays a p-
value<0.05 and a RMSEA>0.1. Modification indexes for the beliefs system CFA suggest adding two error 
term correlations. Further results in this paper are qualitatively unchanged if the beliefs system construct is 
supplemented by these two error term correlations.  
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3.3 Data analysis 
In order to investigate the relationship between the LOC and the PD performance as well as 
the organizational performance, we start by comparing the four models presented above fol-
lowing a SEM approach, in order to find the model that best and most parsimoniously fits the 
data. This model is then analyzed in greater detail in terms of direct, indirect, and total effects. 
SEM is chosen since it allows the explicit consideration and estimation of residuals 
and their variance, and it can incorporate latent, i.e., unobserved, variables. This study follows 
the alternative model approach proposed by Jöreskog (1993) as an approach that differs from 
the classical strictly confirmatory approach, which requires the testing of a single model end-
ing with its acceptance or rejection. The alternative approach is suitable for research questions 
with more than one theoretically justifiable model. This approach is aimed at identifying, 
based on the same data sample, the model among a number of competing models that best fits 
the data (Jöreskog, 1993).   
We use the AMOS 18 software program with the maximum likelihood (ML) estima-
tion approach. ML requires multivariate normally distributed data. Mardia’s test for multivar-
iate kurtosis (Mardia, 1970) gives an indication of multivariate non-normality of the data, but 
the univariate kurtosis and skewness are far lower than the thresholds for the identification of 
non-normality (the highest absolute value for skewness in sample=1.443<3.00 threshold; the 
highest absolute value for kurtosis in sample=2.043<10.00 threshold) (Kline, 2011). Further-
more, the normal probability plots do not provide any evidence of deviations from univariate 
normal distribution (D'Agostino, Belanger, & D'Agostino Jr., 1990). Therefore, the employ-
ment of ML estimation seems reasonable. To make sure that the slight departure from multi-
variate normality does not affect the estimates in a meaningful way, we take 2,000 bootstrap 
samples with replacement for each model estimated and inspect for all the estimates the bias 
between the mean estimate from all the bootstrap samples and the estimate from the original 
model. According to Nevitt & Hancock (2001), our sample size (since n≥200) is sufficient to 
obtain accurate bootstrapping results. For all the models tested and presented in the following 
section, we can find no meaningful bias in the estimates. 
The four proposed models are evaluated based on two major types of goodness-of-fit 
indexes. First, we analyze the model fit to the data by using the exact-fit chi square test, AG-
FI, CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR. Second, we compare the four models. This is accomplished for 
nested models (i.e., the base model and model 1, as well as model 2 and model 3, respective-
ly) with a chi square difference test. Additionally, for nested as well as non-nested models we 
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employ the three criteria proposed by Jöreskog (1993): the Akaike’s information criterion 
(AIC), the consistent Akaike’s information criterion (CAIC), and the expected cross-
validation index (ECVI). AIC (Akaike, 1974) is a predictive fit index that measures model fit 
based on the ability of the model to replicate in future samples. The AIC is adjusted for par-
simony by considering the degrees of freedom of the model. In a similar manner, the CAIC 
(Bozdogan, 1987) extends the AIC by providing a penalty for complex models by additionally 
considering the sample size. Finally, the ECVI (Browne & Cudeck, 1989) analyzes the differ-
ence between the estimated variance-covariance matrix and the expected variance-covariance 
matrix that would be obtained from a sample with the same size taken from the population. To 
strengthen our inferences, we scrutinize the 90% confidence interval for the ECVI. The lower 
the values, the better fitting and more parsimonious the model is (Jöreskog, 1993; Kline, 
2011).  
4 Results 
4.1 Model testing 
The results of the model comparison are displayed in table III - 4. We find a significant posi-
tive relationship between the beliefs system and PD performance (p<0.001) as well as be-
tween the diagnostic control system and PD performance (p<0.001). Furthermore, we identify 
the expected significant positive relationship between the PD performance and organizational 
performance (p<0.001). We controlled for a non-hypothesized direct relationship between the 
levers and organizational performance and did found only one meaningful relationship be-
tween the beliefs system and organizational performance. All other tested relations are non-
significant. The poor fit of the base model (e.g., AGFI=0.863 and SRMR=0.137) suggests that 
this model is not likely to describe adequately the functioning of the LOC in a PD context.  
Model 1 postulates interrelated LOC. All the correlations between the LOC are shown 
to be significant at p<0.001 and positive, ranging from a minimum of 0.305 for the correlation 
between the emphasis on the beliefs system and the emphasis on the boundary system to a 
maximum of 0.396 for the correlation between the emphasis on the beliefs system and the 
emphasis on the interactive control system. The significant main effects identified in the base 
model are still valid in model 1. The fit of the model to the data is fairly good (e.g., AG-
FI=0.919 and SRMR<0.044). It seems that within the package, the LOC move together in the 
same direction. Comparing this model with the base model, we find a clear superiority of the 
interdependence model over the additive model, as can be recognized by the significant chi 
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square difference test (chi square(6)=187.413, p<0.001). Additionally, all three indexes for 
the comparison of models (AIC, CAIC, ECVI with its confidence interval) show that model 1 
performs better than the base model, which supports a better-fitting and more parsimonious 
description of the functioning of the LOC in a PD environment with the interdependence ap-
proach.  
Model 2 proposed to understand the relationship between LOC within the package as 
dominated by the dynamic tension between those LOC that represent opposing forces in Si-
mons’ (1995) understanding. We included the four dynamic tension constructs as latent inter-
action constructs. Against our expectation, we cannot find significant effects arising from the 
interaction terms for PD performance. This is consistent with the findings of Henri (2006), 
who is also unable to find a significant effect of the dynamic tension between the interactive 
and the diagnostic control systems on innovativeness.  
Against all the expectations from theory, the joint use of LOC seems not to be so 
complex and seems not to require one lever to be put into place and emphasized in order to 
allow another lever to produce a stronger impact on PD performance. Nevertheless, we find 
an unexpected significant positive effect (p<0.001) of the dynamic tension between the beliefs 
and the boundary systems on organizational performance. This means that the positive effect 
of the beliefs system on organizational performance is higher when the beliefs system is em-
phasized jointly with the boundary system. In other words, the boundary system serves as a 
condition for a stronger impact of the beliefs system on organizational performance. Thus, the 
beliefs system is especially effective when the boundary system makes sure that the oppor-
tunity-seeking postulated through the beliefs system is not exacerbated in a manner that goes 
beyond the borders of what is considered to be positive for firm development (et vice versa). 
The significant positive effects between the beliefs system as well as the diagnostic control 
system and PD performance, between the PD performance and organizational performance, 
and between the beliefs system and organizational performance detected in the base model 
replicate in this model. However, these effects do not pay off in terms of an increased model 
fit when compared with the two previous rival models. Instead, there is an overall poor model 
fit (e.g., AGFI=0.828 and SRMR=0.109).  
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Additionally, the model comparison based on the AIC, CAIC, and ECVI ranks this 
model as the one that is least able to fit the data if compared with the base model and to model 
1. Since the base model and model 2 are non-nested due to the addition of the dynamic ten-
sion variables to model 1, we cannot employ a chi square difference test to compare these 
models. The AIC, CAIC, and ECVI are of course not comparable with statistical tests. Never-
theless, the 90% confidence interval computed for the ECVI shows us with an error probabil-
ity of 10% that the ECVI value for model 2 is clearly larger than both the value for the base 
model and the value for model 1 (since the three confidence intervals are non-overlapping). 
Finally, model 3 suggests a combination of the interrelation and the interaction be-
tween the levers. The model confirms the significant (all p<0.001) effects found in model 1 
and model 2. This leads to a nearly acceptable overall model fit (e.g., AGFI=0.854 and 
SRMR=0.072) and to a model that is significantly better able to describe the data in the sam-
ple than model 2 (chi square(6)=187.413, p<0.001). The AIC, CAIC, and ECVI further sup-
port a better performance of model 3 over model 2. 
Comparing the AIC, CAIC, and ECVI shows that the model out of the four that best 
and most parsimoniously describes the interplay of the levers and their effect on PD and or-
ganizational performance is the interdependence model. Indeed, the AIC, CAIC, and ECVI 
values are the smallest with this model. Furthermore, the ECVI 90% confidence interval is 
non-overlapping with the ECVI 90% confidence interval of the other models. Thus, we in-
spect model 1 more in detail.   
We find a significant positive association between the beliefs system designed for PD 
and the PD performance as well as organizational performance. This indicates that communi-
cating innovativeness as a core value of the firm through mission statements or by manage-
ment communication influences employees’ behavior and encourages a fruitful idea-
generating and idea-implementing attitude. The beliefs system represents the most powerful 
lever in a PD setting, as can be seen from the coefficient size (λ=0.239 in model 1). This re-
sult, which is consistent with the LOC framework, clearly stresses what decades of creativity 
and innovation management researchers have preached: the importance of the generation of a 
common understanding of the importance of innovativeness in the firm and of a culture that 
formally and informally reinforces the great relevance of PD to corporate activities (Amabile, 
1998). Moreover, the beneficial effect of the beliefs system does affect not only the PD per-
formance and organizational performance through PD performance, but also shows a positive 
direct effect on organizational performance (λ=0.243 in model 1). This finding may be ex-
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plained by the fact that the encouragement of innovativeness primarily affects the area of PD, 
but is also able to support opportunity-seeking in other firm areas (e.g., marketing), what in 
turn may directly impact organizational performance. 
Also interesting, in the same vein, is that the diagnostic control system of control does 
not only show a significant association with PD performance, but this association bears a 
positive sign in all four models (λ=0.166 in model 1). It seems that the Miller & Friesen’s 
(1982) and the Adler & Borys’ (1996) arguments about the importance of formal controls 
aimed at constraining excessive innovation efforts shows up in our data and are still valid. A 
diagnostic control system helps the firm to avoid preventable resource wasting due to exces-
sive, uncontrolled opportunity-seeking, which detracts attention from the firm goals. These 
results seemingly stands in contrast to the finding of Henri (2006), who identifies a signifi-
cantly negative association between the diagnostic control system and innovativeness. This 
difference might arise from the fact that Henri (2006) concentrates on innovativeness in terms 
of a competency, while we focus on PD performance in terms of outputs achieved by PD. It is 
likely that the two results can be reconciled: while the search for innovation may be con-
strained by the diagnostic system, the results of the process in terms of, for example, sales 
with the new products, may increase with an increase in the emphasis of the diagnostic con-
trol system, since it allows concentration on the most promising PD projects. Against the ex-
pectations from theory and empirical research, the interactive control system and the bounda-
ry system are not associated significantly with PD performance and organizational perfor-
mance, in either a positive, or a negative way. The benefits from the implementing interactive 
and boundary systems may – at least for the direct effects – be outweighed by the costs of 
implementation, e.g., management involvement is required (Widener, 2007). This result is 
consistent with the work by Bisbe & Otley (2004), who do not find a significant direct rela-
tionship between interactive control systems and PD performance.  
Finally, as expected, PD performance is positively associated with organizational per-
formance (λ=0.255 in model 1). It is still true that firms that perform well in PD generate a 
competitive advantage that helps them to create outstanding organizational performance. 
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Table III - 5: Decomposition of the effects of the LOC on PD performance and organizational 
performance 
 PD performance Organizational performance 
 Base model 
(0.111) 
Model 1 
(0.159) 
Base model 
(0.156) 
Model 1 
(0.161) 
Beliefs system 
 Direct effect 0.252 0.239 0.232 0.243 
 Indirect effects 0.000 0.053 0.063 0.080 
 Total effects 0.252 0.292 0.295 0.323 
Boundary system 
 Direct effect 0.088 0.072 -0.017 -0.028 
 Indirect effects 0.000 0.104 0.022 0.094 
 Total effects 0.088 0.176 0.005 0.066 
Interactive control system 
 Direct effect 0.084 0.060 -0.069 -0.088 
 Indirect effects 0.000 0.105 0.021 0.103 
 Total effects 0.084 0.165 -0.048 0.015 
Diagnostic control system 
 Direct effect 0.181 0.166 0.066 0.071 
 Indirect effects 0.000 0.063 0.045 0.080 
 Total effects 0.181 0.229 0.111 0.151 
The table reports the standardized direct, indirect, and total effects of the LOC on 
the two performance constructs for both the base model and model 1. In this 
scope, the correlations between the LOC are turned into reciprocal direct rela-
tions and pairwise constrained to be equal (Kline (2011)). Squared multiple cor-
relations for the endogenous variables are displayed in parentheses. 
Note: Significance levels are not displayed since there are no tests of statistical 
significance for indirect effects through two or more mediators (Kline, 2011). 
 
A more detailed insight into the functioning of the LOC-performance relationship in 
PD is achieved through an inspection of the indirect and total effects (see table III - 5). As for 
the direct effects, the highest total effects on PD performance are derived from the beliefs 
system, followed by the diagnostic control system. However, the total effects of the boundary 
system and of the interactive control system are also remarkable. This is due to their relatively 
high indirect effects (relative to negligible direct effects). This means that in the LOC package 
the beliefs and the diagnostic control systems are useful mediators of the effects of the other 
levers. An increase in emphasis in the boundary and the interactive control systems is accom-
panied by an increase in emphasis on the other levers, which in turn have a large impact on 
PD performance. For organizational performance, the highest direct effect can again be found 
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with the beliefs system. For the remaining levers, the indirect effects, mediated, for example, 
by the beliefs system itself, are larger than the direct effects and thus do not serve as direct 
triggers of enhanced organizational performance, but are rather legitimized to complete the 
LOC package by leading to an increase in emphasis on the other levers, the direct impact of 
which on performance is higher. 
The difference in modeling the interplay between the LOC as additive or interdepend-
ent and thus the risk of misspecification are supported by this scrutiny of the total effects. We 
show that modeling disregarding the fact that the LOC move together (i.e., without correla-
tions between the LOC) leads to the suppression of a considerable amount of total effects by 
artificially constraining the correlation between the LOC to zero.  
4.2 Robustness of results 
In order to lend credibility to our results, several procedures were carried out. We already 
presented the procedures related to construct validity in appendix III - 3 and found indications 
for the validity of the measurements carried out. Now we supplement this discussion by 
providing evidence of the robustness of our results regarding the issues of internal and exter-
nal validity. The related procedures are summarized in appendix III - 4. For example, we cope 
with the issue of correlated omitted variables by modeling possible drivers of the LOC (envi-
ronmental unpredictability, innovativeness of the firm, and PD strategy) and see that the re-
sults are qualitatively unchanged (see appendix III - 5). Furthermore, we inspect the effect of 
firm size and industry and found that these variables do not moderate the results (see appendix 
III - 6). Even if neither internal nor external validity can be definitively proved or rejected, we 
find evidence of the fact that the design of our study has an acceptable level of validity and 
we are confident that the findings are likely to be replicated in future studies. 
5 Conclusion 
Our study uncovers the interplay between the four LOC in PD. We find that the beliefs system 
generates the largest direct effects on PD performance, followed by the diagnostic control 
system, while the boundary and interactive control systems transmit their effect mainly 
through other levers, as they all move together in the same direction. The beliefs and diagnos-
tic control systems have the highest impact on PD performance in terms of the total effects. 
However, while the diagnostic control system loses some of its power in terms of its effects 
on organizational performance, the beliefs system again plays the most important role be-
tween the levers in the enhancement of organizational performance.     
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Of course, some limitations must be noted. Our study concentrates on the PD setting 
of the manufacturing industry in German-speaking countries. We put a great deal of effort 
into safeguarding the representativeness of our study. However, even if the representativeness 
of our sample holds, the sample is only representative of a narrow population, i.e., our find-
ings cannot per se be generalized outside our setting. Further research will be required to test 
our hypotheses for other industries, other regions, and other business areas. Furthermore, our 
study equals a snapshot of a certain moment in time. We tried to achieve a certain degree of 
stability of answers by referring our questions to the situation that was experienced on aver-
age in the last three years. Nevertheless, our results may be affected by external events that 
we could not control for. Therefore, it would be helpful to see other studies dealing with our 
research questions at different moments in time. However it should be remarked that the aim 
of our paper is not to claim without any restriction that the interdependence model is the best, 
but to prompt future research to reflect the implications of the different model specifications.  
Furthermore, our study follows a cross-sectional, survey-based approach. Thus, we 
could not demonstrate causality between our variables empirically, which would, for example, 
require a time lag between the dependent and the independent variables. Future studies could 
employ a longitudinal approach to overcome this limitation. Nevertheless, the analyses of 
interrater agreement and convergent validity offer reasons to be optimistic that our inferences 
hold in other studies. Additionally, careful theoretical reasoning may allow implying a direc-
tion in the relation between the variables in the model.      
Our model specification also needs to be critically reviewed. We tested models that 
were carefully derived from theory and empirical research. Of course, these are not the only 
models that could be plausible. Therefore, further research should attempt to propose addi-
tional rival models in order to validate our results. Furthermore, we cannot compare model 2 
and model 3 with the base model and with model 1 by means of a statistical test, since the 
base model and model 1 are not nested models of model 2 and model 3. Nevertheless, the 
AIC, the CAIC, and especially the ECVI confidence intervals seem to clearly suggest that 
model 2 and model 3 perform worse that the other two models. 
Our findings contribute to the research in several ways. First, we join the discussion 
raised by Malmi & Brown (2008), among others, about the existence of a package of MCS, 
i.e., a number of MCS components that operate in a combined way when influencing employ-
ees behavior. Therefore, we analyze a non-package model (our base model, the additive mod-
el) to see whether the package notion itself holds based on cross-section data from the manu-
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facturing industry for a PD setting. We find that the additive model is not able to reflect the 
data in an adequate manner and can therefore confirm that a package model may better de-
scribe what firms experience when implementing LOC in PD. 
Second, we propose and test three models of interplay between LOC in order to shed 
some light on the nebulous concept of MCS packages. We compare the interdependence 
model with the interaction model and with the combined interrelation/interaction model and 
find that the interdependence model is the one that best represents the data. This means that 
the notion that emphasizing one lever is a condition for a higher impact of another lever on 
performance does generally not describe the real world situation in an accurate and parsimo-
nious manner.  
Finally, we refine the previous findings on the effect of single LOC on PD perfor-
mance. Especially, we add to the work of Bisbe & Otley (2004), who did not find an overall 
significant effect of interactive control systems on PD performance, and could confirm this 
finding. Furthermore, we can add to Bisbe & Otley’s (2004) work by stating that, against 
what was expected according to the LOC framework, the diagnostic control system has a sig-
nificant positive impact on PD performance. Similarly to Henri (2006) we cannot identify a 
significant relationship between the tension among interactive and diagnostic control systems 
and the PD performance. A significant and positive effect is generated from the beliefs sys-
tem, which stresses the importance of the PD efforts in the firm. Scrutiny of the total effects 
demonstrates how powerful the beliefs and diagnostic control systems are in a PD setting. 
These findings are relevant to practitioners dealing with the issue to design a MCS able to 
enhance the PD performance. Based on our results, firms should particularly care about the 
emphasis placed to the beliefs and diagnostic control systems. Thus, on the one hand, it seems 
advisable to formulate the importance attached to innovativeness both in the mission state-
ment and in the regular communication of the management with the employees. On the other 
hand, the management should make sure that clear goals are developed for the PD and that the 
achievement of these goals is regularly monitored in a way that that allows immediate inter-
vention and corrective actions in case of deviations.  
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t.
 
 
 
 
 
0
.7
4
8
 
 
O
u
r 
fi
rm
 h
as
 a
 s
y
st
e
m
 t
h
at
 c
o
m
m
u
n
i-
ca
te
s 
to
 o
u
r 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
ri
sk
s 
th
at
 s
h
o
u
ld
 
b
e 
av
o
id
ed
 i
n
 p
ro
d
u
ct
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t.
 
 
 
 
 
0
.4
9
7
 
 
O
u
r 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
is
 
a
w
ar
e 
o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
’s
 
co
d
e 
o
f 
b
u
si
n
e
ss
 
co
n
d
u
ct
 
fo
r 
p
ro
d
u
ct
 
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t.
 
 
 
 
 
0
.8
1
6
 
 
O
u
r 
m
is
si
o
n
 
st
at
e
m
e
n
t 
cl
ea
rl
y
 
co
m
-
m
u
n
ic
at
e
s 
in
n
o
v
at
iv
e
n
es
s 
as
 
a 
fi
rm
’s
 
co
re
 v
al
u
e 
to
 o
u
r 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0
.8
2
6
 
T
o
p
 
m
an
a
g
er
s 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
te
 
in
n
o
v
a
-
ti
v
e
n
es
s 
a
s 
a 
fi
rm
’s
 c
o
re
 v
al
u
e 
to
 o
u
r 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.8
0
7
 
O
u
r 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e 
is
 a
w
ar
e 
o
f 
in
n
o
v
at
iv
e
-
n
es
s 
as
 a
 f
ir
m
’s
 c
o
re
 v
al
u
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.7
6
5
 
O
u
r 
m
is
si
o
n
 
st
at
e
m
e
n
t 
in
sp
ir
es
 
o
u
r 
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e.
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.7
3
5
 
T
h
is
 t
ab
le
 r
ep
o
rt
s 
th
e 
re
su
lt
s 
o
f 
an
 e
x
p
lo
ra
to
ry
 f
ac
to
r 
an
al
y
si
s 
ac
ro
ss
 t
h
e 
q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
o
f 
o
u
r 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
. 
W
e 
u
se
 p
ri
n
ci
p
al
 f
ac
to
r 
an
al
y
si
s 
w
it
h
 p
ro
m
ax
 r
o
ta
ti
o
n
 t
o
 e
x
tr
ac
t 
fa
ct
o
rs
 
w
it
h
 e
ig
en
v
al
u
es
 >
1
. 
L
o
ad
in
g
s 
<
0
.3
 a
re
 o
m
it
te
d
. 
 
97
 
 
 A
p
p
en
d
ix
 I
II
 -
 1
: 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
 v
al
id
it
y
 
C
o
n
te
n
t 
v
a
li
d
it
y
 

 
U
se
 o
f 
ex
is
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 v
al
id
at
ed
 s
ca
le
s;
 t
ra
n
sl
at
io
n
 i
n
to
 G
er
m
a
n
; 
b
ac
k
-t
ra
n
sl
at
io
n
 i
n
to
 E
n
g
li
sh
 t
o
 v
er
if
y
 e
q
u
iv
a
le
n
ce
 (
B
ri
sl
in
, 
1
9
7
0
) 

 
N
o
 s
u
b
st
a
n
ti
al
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
d
et
ec
te
d
 b
y
 b
ac
k
-t
ra
n
sl
at
io
n
 

 
T
al
k
 t
o
 e
x
p
er
ts
 (
p
ra
ct
it
io
n
er
s 
an
d
 a
ca
d
e
m
ic
s)
 

 
S
li
g
h
t 
ad
ju
st
m
e
n
ts
 t
o
 t
h
e 
w
o
rd
in
g
 a
n
d
 l
a
y
o
u
t 
o
f 
th
e 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
 

 
P
il
o
t 
te
st
 w
it
h
 s
ix
 p
o
te
n
ti
a
l 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 (
th
re
e
-s
te
p
s 
te
st
 i
n
te
r-
v
ie
w
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 H
a
k
, 
et
 a
l.
, 
2
0
0
6
) 

 
S
li
g
h
t 
ad
ju
st
m
e
n
ts
 t
o
 t
h
e 
w
o
rd
in
g
 a
n
d
 l
a
y
o
u
t 
o
f 
th
e 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
 

 
C
au
ti
o
u
s 
c
h
o
ic
e 
o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 

 
R
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
 h
ad
 s
er
v
ed
 o
n
 a
v
er
ag
e 
fo
r 
6
.3
 y
ea
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e
ir
 c
u
rr
en
t 
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
an
d
 f
o
r 
1
3
.1
 y
ea
rs
 i
n
 t
h
ei
r 
cu
rr
en
t 
fi
rm
, 
th
u
s 
im
p
ar
ti
n
g
 c
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
 i
n
 t
h
ei
r 
ab
il
it
y
 t
o
 e
v
al
u
at
e 
th
e 
is
su
e
s 
in
 t
h
e 
q
u
e
st
io
n
n
ai
re
 o
b
je
ct
iv
el
y
 
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
: 
 
In
te
rn
al
 c
o
n
si
st
e
n
c
y
 

 
C
ro
n
b
ac
h
’s
 a
lp
h
a 

 
V
al
u
es
 a
b
o
v
e 
th
e 
0
.7
 t
h
re
sh
o
ld
 f
o
r 
al
l 
co
n
st
ru
ct
s 
(s
ee
 a
p
p
en
d
ix
 I
II
 -
 1
) 
R
el
ia
b
il
it
y
: 
 
In
te
rr
at
er
 r
el
ia
b
il
it
y
 

 
C
al
cu
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
in
te
rc
la
ss
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 c
o
ef
fi
ci
e
n
t 
(I
C
C
(1
))
 f
o
r 
ag
re
e
m
e
n
t 
b
et
w
ee
n
 r
at
er
s 
in
 t
h
e 
8
5
 d
u
p
li
ca
te
 f
ir
m
s1
 
 

 
A
cc
ep
ta
b
le
 l
ev
e
l 
o
f 
ag
re
e
m
e
n
t 
th
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t 
th
e 
q
u
e
st
io
n
n
ai
re
 i
te
m
s.
 H
o
w
-
ev
er
, 
th
e 
b
o
u
n
d
ar
y
 s
y
st
e
m
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e 
co
n
si
d
er
ed
 w
it
h
 s
o
m
e 
ca
u
-
ti
o
n
, 
si
n
ce
 t
h
e 
IC
C
(1
) 
o
f 
al
l 
it
s 
it
e
m
s 
fa
ll
 b
el
o
w
 t
h
e 
0
.1
 t
h
re
sh
o
ld
, 
as
 d
o
es
 
al
so
 t
h
e 
IC
C
 (
1
) 
o
f 
th
e 
it
e
m
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e 
p
er
ce
iv
ed
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
ce
 o
f 
p
ro
fi
t 
g
ro
w
th
 a
n
d
 o
f 
th
e 
it
e
m
 a
b
o
u
t 
th
e 
p
er
ce
iv
ed
 i
m
p
o
rt
an
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
n
e
w
 p
ro
d
u
ct
s 
in
 t
h
e 
fi
rm
’s
 p
ro
d
u
ct
 p
o
rt
fo
li
o
. 
A
ll
 t
h
e 
o
th
e
r 
it
e
m
s 
sh
o
w
 
IC
C
(1
) 
v
al
u
e
s 
ly
in
g
 b
et
w
ee
n
 0
.1
5
4
 a
n
d
 0
.5
4
2
. 

 
M
u
lt
ip
le
 g
ro
u
p
 c
o
m
p
ar
is
o
n
s 
(i
.e
.,
 a
 s
er
ie
s 
o
f 
ch
i 
sq
u
ar
e 
d
if
-
fe
re
n
ce
 t
e
st
s 
w
h
en
 s
te
p
w
is
e 
ad
d
in
g
 a
n
 a
d
d
it
io
n
al
 c
o
n
st
ra
in
t 
ac
ro
ss
 m
o
d
el
s)
 p
er
fo
rm
ed
 f
o
r 
m
o
d
el
 1
 t
o
 c
o
m
p
ar
e 
th
e 
es
ti
-
m
at
es
 a
cr
o
ss
 r
e
sp
o
n
se
s 
fr
o
m
 C
F
O
s,
 C
T
O
s,
 o
r 
C
E
O
s 
fo
r 
th
e
 
en
ti
re
 s
a
m
p
le
2
 

 
W
e 
fi
n
d
 m
ea
su
re
m
e
n
t 
an
d
 s
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l 
in
v
ar
ia
n
ce
 a
cr
o
ss
 C
F
O
 a
n
d
 C
T
O
 

 
T
h
e 
m
o
d
el
 c
o
m
p
ar
is
o
n
 b
et
w
e
en
 C
F
O
 a
n
d
 C
E
O
 d
is
p
la
y
s 
m
e
as
u
re
m
en
t 
in
-
v
ar
ia
n
ce
, 
b
u
t 
a 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 t
h
e 
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
m
o
d
el
 d
u
e 
to
 t
h
e 
b
o
u
n
d
ar
y
 s
y
st
e
m
–
P
D
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 p
at
h
, 
w
h
ic
h
 i
s 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
C
E
O
 g
ro
u
p
 o
f 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 a
n
d
 n
o
n
-s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
C
F
O
 g
ro
u
p
 

 
C
o
m
p
ar
in
g
 t
h
e 
m
ea
su
re
m
e
n
t 
m
o
d
el
 o
f 
th
e 
C
T
O
 w
it
h
 t
h
a
t 
o
f 
th
e 
C
E
O
 d
is
-
p
la
y
s 
m
ea
su
re
m
e
n
t 
n
o
n
-i
n
v
ar
ia
n
ce
 d
u
e 
to
 t
h
re
e 
it
e
m
 l
o
ad
in
g
s.
 T
o
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
fo
r 
th
is
 i
ss
u
e,
 w
e 
d
ro
p
 t
h
e 
re
la
te
d
 i
te
m
s 
a
n
d
 r
ee
st
im
a
te
 t
h
e 
m
o
d
el
s.
 W
e 
fi
n
d
 
th
at
 t
h
es
e 
it
e
m
s 
d
o
 n
o
t 
d
ri
v
e 
o
u
r 
re
su
lt
s,
 s
in
ce
 t
h
e 
e
st
im
at
es
 a
re
 q
u
al
it
at
iv
e
-
ly
 u
n
c
h
an
g
ed
. 
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 A
p
p
en
d
ix
 I
II
 -
 3
: 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
 v
al
id
it
y
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
) 
C
o
n
v
er
g
e
n
t 
v
al
id
it
y
 

 
In
sp
ec
ti
o
n
 o
f 
C
F
A
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
 

 
C
F
A
 f
o
r 
ea
ch
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
 s
h
o
w
s 
a 
g
o
o
d
 m
o
d
el
 f
it
; 
co
m
p
o
si
te
 r
el
ia
b
il
it
ie
s 
>
0
.6
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
si
st
en
tl
y
 h
ig
h
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
iz
ed
 f
ac
to
r 
lo
ad
in
g
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
  

 
F
o
r 
th
e 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
: 
ex
a
m
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
re
sp
o
n
d
e
n
ts
 a
n
d
 
th
e 
o
b
je
ct
iv
e 
d
at
a 
co
ll
ec
te
d
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
A
M
A
D
E
U
S
 d
at
ab
as
e 
 

 
M
ea
su
re
s 
ar
e 
m
o
d
es
tl
y
, 
b
u
t 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
tl
y
 p
o
si
ti
v
e
ly
 c
o
rr
el
at
e
d
 (
r=
0
.1
9
9
 
(p
<
0
.0
0
1
) 
fo
r 
p
ro
fi
t 
g
ro
w
th
, 
0
.1
9
5
 (
p
<
0
.0
0
1
) 
fo
r 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 s
a
le
s,
 a
n
d
 0
.2
4
5
 
(p
<
0
.0
0
1
) 
fo
r 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 i
n
v
es
tm
en
t)
; 
th
e 
m
a
g
n
it
u
d
e 
o
f 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
is
 i
n
 
li
n
e 
w
it
h
 p
re
v
io
u
s 
re
se
ar
ch
 (
V
en
k
at
ra
m
a
n
 &
 R
a
m
an
u
ja
m
, 
1
9
8
7
) 
 

 
F
o
r 
th
e 
d
y
n
a
m
ic
 t
e
n
si
o
n
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
s:
 e
x
a
m
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
ro
b
u
st
-
n
es
s 
o
f 
re
su
lt
s 
d
u
e 
to
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
es
 f
o
r 
b
u
il
d
in
g
 t
h
e 
la
-
te
n
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
b
y
 c
o
m
p
ar
in
g
 t
h
e 
M
ar
sh
, 
et
 
al
.(
2
0
0
4
) 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
  
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
P
in
g
 J
r.
 (
1
9
9
5
) 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
, 
w
h
ic
h
 
is
 a
 s
in
g
le
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
r 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
 t
h
at
 c
o
n
st
ra
in
s 
er
ro
r 
v
ar
ia
n
ce
s 
an
d
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 l
o
ad
in
g
s 
an
d
 m
u
lt
ip
li
es
 t
h
e 
su
m
s 
o
f 
th
e 
in
d
ic
a-
to
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
b
as
ic
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
s 
(i
.e
.,
 t
h
e 
su
m
 o
f 
th
e 
in
d
ic
at
o
rs
 o
f 
ea
ch
 l
ev
er
) 
to
 b
u
il
d
 t
h
e 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
la
te
n
t 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
co
n
st
ru
ct
 

 
W
h
il
e 
th
e 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
th
e 
d
y
n
a
m
ic
 t
en
si
o
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 b
el
ie
fs
 a
n
d
 
b
o
u
n
d
ar
y
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 o
n
 o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
al
 p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 d
o
es
 n
o
t 
h
o
ld
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
P
in
g
 J
r.
 (
1
9
9
5
) 
ap
p
ro
ac
h
, 
th
e 
ra
n
k
in
g
 o
f 
m
o
d
el
 2
 a
n
d
 m
o
d
el
 3
 i
n
 t
h
e 
m
o
d
-
el
 c
o
m
p
ar
is
o
n
 a
n
d
 a
ll
 t
h
e 
o
th
e
r 
in
fe
re
n
ce
s 
fr
o
m
 m
o
d
el
 2
 a
n
d
 m
o
d
el
 3
 r
e-
m
ai
n
 u
n
ch
a
n
g
ed
. 
 
D
is
cr
im
in
a
n
t 
v
al
id
it
y
 

 
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
s 

 
C
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 c
o
n
st
ru
c
ts
 a
re
 m
o
d
er
at
e 
(s
ee
 t
ab
le
 I
II
 -
 3
) 

 
F
o
rn
el
l 
&
 L
ar
c
k
er
’s
 (
1
9
8
1
) 
cr
it
er
io
n
 

 
F
o
r 
ea
ch
 c
o
n
st
ru
c
t,
 t
h
e 
v
ar
ia
n
ce
 e
x
tr
ac
te
d
 i
s 
la
rg
er
 t
h
a
n
 t
h
e 
sq
u
ar
ed
 c
o
rr
e-
la
ti
o
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
co
n
st
ru
ct
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
o
th
er
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
s 

 
A
 s
er
ie
s 
o
f 
c
h
i 
sq
u
ar
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 t
es
ts
 t
o
 c
o
m
p
ar
e 
a 
m
o
d
el
 
w
it
h
 t
w
o
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
s 
th
a
t 
ca
n
 f
re
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
e 
w
it
h
 a
 m
o
d
el
 
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
 t
o
 a
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 o
f 
1
 

 
F
o
r 
al
l 
th
e 
p
ai
rs
 o
f 
co
n
st
ru
ct
s 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
u
n
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
 m
o
d
el
 

 
E
x
p
lo
ra
to
ry
 f
ac
to
r 
an
al
y
si
s 
w
it
h
 a
ll
 t
h
e 
it
e
m
s 
e
m
p
lo
y
ed
 
(H
ar
m
an
’s
 s
in
g
le
-f
ac
to
r 
te
st
) 

 
E
x
p
lo
ra
to
ry
 f
ac
to
r 
an
al
y
si
s 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
g
e
n
er
at
e 
o
n
e 
fa
ct
o
r 
(t
h
u
s 
co
m
m
o
n
 
m
et
h
o
d
 b
ia
s 
d
o
es
 n
o
t 
se
e
m
 l
ik
el
y
 t
o
 h
a
v
e 
o
cc
u
rr
ed
),
 b
u
t 
ra
th
er
 t
h
e 
si
x
 f
a
c
-
to
rs
 c
o
n
je
ct
u
re
d
 (
se
e 
ap
p
en
d
ix
 I
II
 -
 2
) 

 
L
ac
k
 o
f 
cr
o
ss
-l
o
ad
in
g
s 
>
0
.3
 
1
 F
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 S
h
ro
u
t 
&
 F
le
is
s 
(1
9
7
9
),
 I
C
C
(1
) 
is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d
 a
s 
fo
ll
o
w
s:
 I
C
C
(1
)=
(B
M
S
-W
M
S
)/
(M
S
B
+
(K
-1
)*
W
M
S
) 
, 
w
h
er
e 
B
M
S
=
b
et
w
ee
n
-t
ar
g
et
s 
m
ea
n
 s
q
u
ar
e,
 W
M
S
=
w
it
h
in
-
ta
rg
et
s 
m
ea
n
 s
q
u
ar
e,
 a
n
d
 K
=
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ju
d
g
e
s.
 I
n
 o
u
r 
an
al
y
si
s,
 t
h
e 
ta
rg
e
ts
 a
re
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fi
rm
s 
w
h
il
e 
th
e 
ju
d
g
es
 a
re
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
re
sp
o
n
d
en
ts
 (
se
e 
S
h
ro
u
t 
&
 F
le
is
s,
 1
9
7
9
, 
p
. 
4
2
3
).
 I
n
 g
en
er
al
, 
th
e 
IC
C
(1
) 
li
es
 b
et
w
ee
n
 -
1
 a
n
d
 +
1
 f
o
r 
th
e 
tw
o
 r
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
 c
as
e,
 v
a
lu
e
s 
ab
o
v
e 
0
.1
 a
re
 c
o
n
si
d
er
ed
 i
n
d
ic
at
iv
e 
o
f 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 r
es
p
o
n
se
s 
th
at
 a
p
p
ro
x
im
a
te
 t
h
e 
p
er
-
ce
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
o
th
er
 f
ir
m
 m
e
m
b
er
s 
w
el
l 
(B
li
es
e,
 1
9
9
8
; 
S
h
ro
u
t 
&
 F
le
is
s,
 1
9
7
9
).
 
2
 M
o
d
el
 1
 t
u
rn
s 
o
u
t 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
b
es
t-
p
er
fo
rm
in
g
 m
o
d
el
 a
n
d
 i
s 
th
u
s 
ch
o
se
n
 f
o
r 
th
is
 t
e
st
. 
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 A
p
p
en
d
ix
 I
II
 -
 2
: 
In
te
rn
al
 a
n
d
 e
x
te
rn
al
 v
al
id
it
y
 
C
ri
te
ri
o
n
 
P
ro
ce
d
u
re
 o
r 
te
st
 
R
es
u
lt
s 
In
te
rn
al
 
v
al
id
it
y
 

 
T
es
t 
fo
r 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 i
n
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
an
d
 d
e-
p
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 

 
S
ee
 t
ab
le
 I
II
 -
 4
 

 
T
h
e 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e 
d
es
ig
n
 t
ak
e
s 
in
to
 a
cc
o
u
n
t 
th
at
 v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
in
d
e
-
p
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e 
co
n
te
m
p
o
ra
n
eo
u
s 
w
it
h
, 
o
r 
p
re
ce
d
e,
 v
ar
ia
ti
o
n
 
in
 t
h
e 
d
ep
en
d
e
n
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 

 
T
h
e 
su
rv
e
y
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
an
d
 i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 r
ef
er
 t
o
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
ti
m
e 
p
er
io
d
 

 
T
h
e 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e 
st
ar
ts
 w
it
h
 d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
s,
 t
h
an
 i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
fo
ll
o
w
 t
o
 a
v
o
id
 b
ia
s 
d
u
e 
to
 r
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
’ 
im
p
li
c
it
 t
h
eo
ri
es
 

 
W
e 
ex
cl
u
d
e 
p
la
u
si
b
le
 a
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
ex
p
la
n
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
si
g
n
if
ic
an
t 
co
rr
el
a-
ti
o
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
L
O
C
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
co
n
tr
o
l 
in
 m
o
d
el
 1
, 
in
 l
in
e 
w
it
h
 D
a
v
il
a 
(2
0
0
0
),
 f
o
r 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l 
u
n
p
re
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
,1
 i
n
n
o
v
at
iv
e
n
es
s 
o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
,2
 
an
d
 P
D
 s
tr
at
eg
y
3
 a
s 
p
o
te
n
ti
al
 d
ri
v
er
s 
o
f 
th
e 
L
O
C
 

 
O
v
er
al
l,
 w
e 
fi
n
d
 t
h
a
t 
m
o
d
el
 1
 r
e
m
ai
n
s 
u
n
c
h
an
g
ed
 t
h
e 
b
es
t-
p
er
fo
rm
in
g
 m
o
d
el
 i
n
 
te
rm
s 
o
f 
fi
t 
a
n
d
 p
ar
si
m
o
n
y
 (
se
e 
ap
p
en
d
ix
 I
II
 -
 5
) 

 
In
cl
u
d
in
g
 L
O
C
 d
ri
v
er
s,
 o
f 
co
u
rs
e 
a 
d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 m
a
g
n
it
u
d
e 
o
f 
th
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
le
v
er
s 
is
 s
h
o
w
n
, 
b
u
t 
th
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
re
m
ai
n
, 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
e
x
ce
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
b
el
ie
fs
-d
ia
g
n
o
st
ic
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
, 
p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 z
er
o
. 
 

 
O
v
er
al
l,
 t
h
e 
d
ri
v
er
s 
ac
co
u
n
t 
o
n
ly
 f
o
r 
a 
p
ar
t 
o
f 
th
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
 b
e
tw
ee
n
 t
h
e 
L
O
C
 
E
x
te
rn
al
 
v
al
id
it
y
 

 
A
n
al
y
se
s 
o
f 
th
e 
e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
m
o
d
er
at
in
g
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
 i
.e
.,
 f
ir
m
 s
iz
e 
an
d
 i
n
d
u
s-
tr
y
, 
b
y
 m
u
lt
ip
le
 g
ro
u
p
 c
o
m
p
ar
is
o
n
 (
m
ed
ia
n
 s
p
li
t 
fo
r 
fi
rm
 s
iz
e 
in
 t
er
m
s 
o
f 
sa
le
s 
an
d
 a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
in
d
u
st
ry
 t
o
 R
&
D
-i
n
te
n
si
v
e 
v
s.
 n
o
n
-R
&
D
-i
n
te
n
si
v
e 
in
d
u
st
ri
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
re
su
lt
s 
o
f 
th
e 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 I
n
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
 S
u
rv
e
y
 
(E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
, 
2
0
0
8
) 

 
N
ei
th
er
 f
ir
m
 s
iz
e 
n
o
r 
in
d
u
st
ry
 m
o
d
er
at
e
s 
th
e 
p
at
h
s 
an
d
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
s 
in
 m
o
d
el
 1
 
as
 a
 w
h
o
le
 (
se
e 
ap
p
en
d
ix
 I
II
 -
 6
) 

 
A
n
al
y
si
s 
o
f 
sa
le
s 
as
 a
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 d
ir
ec
tl
y
 a
d
d
ed
 t
o
 m
o
d
el
 1
 

 
T
h
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 d
o
es
 n
o
t 
h
av
e 
an
y
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
e
ff
ec
t 
ei
th
er
 o
n
 P
D
, 
o
r 
o
n
 o
rg
an
iz
a-
ti
o
n
al
 p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 

 
T
es
t 
fo
r 
st
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
th
e 
re
su
lt
s 
ac
ro
ss
 t
w
o
 r
an
d
o
m
 s
u
b
-s
a
m
p
le
s 

 
T
h
e 
ra
n
k
in
g
 o
f 
th
e 
m
o
d
el
s 
is
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
in
 t
h
e 
fu
ll
 s
a
m
p
le
 a
n
d
 i
n
 b
o
th
 s
u
b
sa
m
-
p
le
s 
1
 T
h
e 
h
ig
h
er
 t
h
e 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
, 
th
e 
la
rg
er
 t
h
e 
g
ap
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
d
es
ir
ed
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
av
a
il
ab
le
 i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
, 
th
u
s 
th
e 
g
re
at
er
 t
h
e 
n
e
ed
 t
o
 u
se
 t
h
e 
L
O
C
 i
n
 o
rd
er
 t
o
 r
ed
u
ce
 t
h
is
 g
ap
. 
W
e 
p
ro
x
y
 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
 b
y
 m
ea
su
ri
n
g
 t
h
e 
p
er
ce
iv
ed
 u
n
p
re
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
th
e 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t.
 E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l 
u
n
p
re
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
 i
s 
m
ea
su
re
d
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 i
te
m
s 
ta
k
e
n
 f
ro
m
 G
o
rd
o
n
 &
 N
ar
a
y
a
n
an
 (
1
9
8
4
) 
ab
o
u
t 
h
o
w
 t
h
e 
p
re
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
 c
o
m
p
et
it
o
rs
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
ta
st
es
 a
n
d
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s 
o
f 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
h
av
e 
d
ev
el
o
p
ed
 o
v
er
 t
h
e 
la
st
 t
h
re
e 
y
ea
rs
. 
T
h
e 
h
ig
h
er
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
, 
th
e 
le
ss
 p
re
d
ic
ta
b
le
 t
h
e
 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t 
h
as
 b
ec
o
m
e.
 
2
 A
s 
th
e
 L
O
C
 a
re
 d
es
ig
n
ed
 t
o
 r
ec
o
n
ci
le
 i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
 w
it
h
 p
re
d
ic
ta
b
le
 g
o
al
 a
c
h
ie
v
e
m
e
n
t,
 i
t 
is
 l
ik
el
y
 t
h
at
 t
h
e
 d
eg
re
e 
o
f 
in
n
o
v
at
iv
e
n
es
s 
is
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
e
m
p
h
as
is
 o
n
 
th
e 
L
O
C
. 
T
h
e 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
in
n
o
v
at
iv
en
e
ss
 i
s 
b
o
rr
o
w
ed
 f
ro
m
 M
il
le
r 
&
 F
ri
es
e
n
 (
1
9
8
2
) 
an
d
 a
d
d
re
ss
es
 t
h
e
 e
m
p
h
as
is
 o
f 
th
e
 f
ir
m
 o
n
 R
&
D
, 
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 l
ea
d
er
sh
ip
, 
an
d
 i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
, 
th
e
 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
n
e
w
 l
in
e
s 
o
f 
p
ro
d
u
ct
s 
m
ar
k
et
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
la
st
 t
h
re
e 
y
ea
rs
 w
it
h
 r
es
p
ec
t 
to
 t
h
e 
co
m
p
e
ti
to
rs
, 
an
d
 t
h
e 
d
eg
re
e 
o
f 
ch
a
n
g
e 
in
 p
ro
d
u
ct
 l
in
es
 o
v
er
 t
h
e
 l
as
t 
th
re
e 
y
e
ar
s.
 T
h
e 
h
ig
h
er
 t
h
e
 
sc
o
re
, 
th
e 
m
o
re
 i
n
n
o
v
at
iv
e 
th
e
 f
ir
m
. 
3
 S
im
o
n
s 
(1
9
9
5
) 
ar
g
u
es
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
L
O
C
 a
re
 n
ec
e
ss
ar
y
 t
o
 b
al
an
ce
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ty
p
es
 o
f 
st
ra
te
g
y
. 
W
e 
as
k
 f
o
r 
P
D
 s
tr
at
eg
y
 u
si
n
g
 a
 o
n
e
-i
te
m
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
t 
b
a
se
d
 o
n
 M
in
tz
b
er
g
 &
 W
at
er
s 
(1
9
8
5
) 
an
d
 a
n
ch
o
re
d
 o
n
 t
h
e 
o
n
e 
h
a
n
d
 w
it
h
 “
O
u
r 
P
D
 s
tr
at
eg
y
 i
s 
co
m
p
le
te
ly
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 t
h
e 
fi
rm
’s
 i
n
te
n
si
o
n
s”
 a
n
d
 o
n
 t
h
e 
o
th
er
 h
a
n
d
 w
it
h
 “
O
u
r 
P
D
 s
tr
at
eg
y
 i
s 
co
m
p
le
te
ly
 i
m
p
o
se
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t”
. 
T
h
e 
h
ig
h
er
 t
h
e 
sc
o
re
, 
th
e 
m
o
re
 e
m
er
g
e
n
t 
an
d
 t
h
e 
le
ss
 d
el
ib
er
at
e 
th
e 
st
ra
te
g
y
 i
s.
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R
es
u
lt
s 
o
f 
S
E
M
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
u
r 
co
m
p
et
in
g
 m
o
d
el
s 
in
cl
u
d
in
g
 d
ri
v
er
s 
o
f 
L
O
C
 (
ro
b
u
st
n
es
s 
ch
ec
k
 f
o
r 
en
v
ir
o
n
m
en
ta
l 
p
re
d
ic
ta
b
il
it
y
, 
in
n
o
-
v
at
iv
en
es
s 
o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
, 
an
d
 P
D
 s
tr
at
eg
y
) 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 
(e
x
p
ec
te
d
 s
ig
n
) 
B
as
e 
m
o
d
el
  
A
d
d
it
iv
e 
m
o
d
el
 
M
o
d
el
 1
  
In
te
rd
ep
en
d
en
ce
 m
o
d
el
 
M
o
d
el
 2
  
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
 m
o
d
el
 
M
o
d
el
 3
  
C
o
m
b
in
ed
 i
n
te
rd
ep
en
d
en
ce
/i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 m
o
d
el
 
S
ta
n
d
. 
es
ti
m
at
e 
S
ta
n
d
. 
es
ti
m
at
e 
S
ta
n
d
. 
es
ti
m
at
e 
S
ta
n
d
. 
es
ti
m
at
e 
P
D
 p
er
fo
rm
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ce
 
In
te
ra
ct
iv
e 
co
n
tr
o
l 
sy
st
em
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+
) 
0
.0
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6
 
0
.0
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 l
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 l
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 d
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d
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 t
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IV  Combinations of the levers of control in product development 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the relationship between management control 
systems (MCS) and innovation (e.g. Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Bisbe & Malagueno, 2009) by con-
sidering how the four levers of control (LOC), i.e. interactive and diagnostic control systems, 
as well as beliefs and boundary systems, are combined in product development (PD). In a 
survey of 468 manufacturing firms, I employ cluster analysis to determine how the LOC are 
combined, depending on the type of strategy formation (i.e., intended or emergent) and the 
degree of innovativeness of the firm. I identify three clusters and label them “Values and 
Norms Control”, “Performance Measures Control”, and “Limited Control”. While the first 
two clusters are consistent overall with my hypotheses, thus representing a situation of fit 
between strategy, LOC, and environment, and are equifinal in terms of PD performance and 
organizational performance, the third cluster has a significantly lower performance. The re-
sults contribute to research in that (1) they respond to the call for analysis of “packages” of 
control instead of isolated MCS components; (2) they provide first quantitative evidence of 
the relationship between strategy formation and LOC and thus build on previous qualitative 
results; and (3) they enrich the MCS-innovation literature by addressing the combinations of 
LOC that are capable of generating the highest performance. Practice can profit from my re-
sults by identifying the best combination of LOC, which depends on the manifestation of 
strategy and environment variables.  
 
 
Keywords: management control systems, levers of control, product development, cluster  
analysis  
JEL Classifications: C38, C83, L60, M40, O32
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1 Introduction 
Understanding the appropriateness of different control mechanisms in different environments 
has been recognized as an important line of research in management accounting and control 
research in the last decades (Chenhall, 2007; Fisher, 1995). In this vein, a considerable num-
ber of researchers has dealt with the appropriateness of management accounting and control 
systems in innovative settings (Davila, Foster, & Oyon, 2009). While the traditional view 
considered formal management control systems (MCS) unconditionally as a deterrent to in-
novation (e.g. Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Ouchi, 1979), several empir-
ical studies found that some MCS components foster innovation (e.g. Abernethy & Brownell, 
1997; Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Bonner, Ruekert, & Walker Jr., 2002; Davila, 2000). However, 
there has only been little research on which different MCS components operate in combina-
tion in different strategic and environmental backgrounds in these innovative settings (Bisbe 
& Malagueno, 2009). Which different MCS components complement each other? Which sub-
stitute each other? How is this complementary or substitutive relationship conditional on the 
innovative environment of the firm or on its strategy formation? Are these combinations 
equifinal? To answer these questions, I cluster firms based on the different MCS components 
they employ for product development (PD). I focus on PD rather than on additional innova-
tion efforts such as the development of new processes or new marketing methods since I 
found when talking with practitioners that PD for the manufacturing sector I am surveying is 
the most common form of innovation. I analyze MCS components based on the well-accepted 
levers of control (LOC) framework by Simons (1995) and thus distinguish between beliefs 
and boundary systems, interactive and diagnostic use of performance measures. I focus on the 
use of performance measures for PD (instead of, e.g., budgets) since (1) performance 
measures are commonly used in product development, as revealed both by my talks with ex-
perts and previous literature (Davila, 2000); (2) these are commonly used in empirical re-
search in order to investigate the use of LOC (e.g. Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007); and (3) per-
formance measures allow the monitoring of issues critical to firm performance beyond mere 
accounting data and thus are suitable for the PD area (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). The environ-
ment is considered by using the degree of innovativeness as a proxy for the environmental 
uncertainty experienced by the firm (Salomo, Weise, & Gemünden, 2007). I further investi-
gate how strategies are formed in the firms by distinguishing between intended (i.e. a priori 
planned) and emergent (i.e. derived from impulses from the environment) strategies 
(Mintzberg, 1978). To investigate if different LOC combinations are equifinal, I scrutinize PD 
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performance and organizational performance of the firm categories identified. I follow the 
OECD (2005) in defining PD performance from an output perspective. Thus, PD performance 
refers to the results of the PD process in terms of new or significantly improved products, 
their time to market, and related effects on sales and profit. Organizational performance is 
understood as financial results of firm activities in terms of sales, profit, and return measures. 
As regards my setting, Bisbe & Malagueno (2009) analyzed the combination of the 
management accounting system used interactively with the organizational and managerial 
processes employed to manage innovations, and found the two aspects to be related. Thus, 
Bisbe & Malagueno (2009) draw the attention of researchers toward the existence of different 
configurations of approaches to control product innovation activities in firms. Henri (2006) 
considered the joint effect of interactive and diagnostic use of performance measurement sys-
tems, but did not find a significant effect of this interaction on innovativeness. To the best of 
my knowledge, there are no studies that allow drawing conclusions on the combinations of 
the four different levers in PD.  
This stands in contrast to prior conceptual (e.g. Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1998; Malmi 
& Brown, 2008; Otley, 1980) and empirical research (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Mundy, 
2010; Revellino & Mouritsen, 2009; Sandelin, 2008; Tuomela, 2005) that already established 
the importance of the simultaneous consideration of multiple MCS components. Furthermore, 
the literature acknowledges that different MCS components do not only complement, but also 
substitute each other (Fisher, 1995; Gerdin, 2005; Widener, Shackell, & Demers, 2008). The 
simultaneous need for predictable goal achievement and creative innovation can be accom-
plished by different MCS designs, which may be equifinal in terms of PD performance and 
organizational performance. For example, the demand for predictable goal achievement and 
creative innovation may be met either satisfied by formal cultural controls, e.g., by using a 
constraining boundary system together with an enabling beliefs system, or by the interactive 
use of performance measures.  
This substitutive relation may hold under certain conditions, while under other condi-
tions the LOC may be complementary (Gerdin, 2005). The contingency tradition calls for the 
consideration of environmental and strategic variables to draw conclusions on the best combi-
nation of structural variables (Donaldson, 2001). In this respect, it is likely that the combina-
tion of the LOC is related to the overall degree of innovativeness of the firm (Bisbe & Otley, 
2004). For example, a culture-related control may be more appropriate for firms with a high 
degree of innovativeness (Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997). Additionally, the combination of the 
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LOC may be related to the type of strategy that is dominating the area of PD (Simons, 1991). 
The use of a diagnostic control system may be particularly related to an intended strategy 
which clearly defines the goal achievements that have to be monitored. Hence, I consider de-
gree of innovativeness and type of strategy formation as variables related to the combination 
of the LOC. Finally, I test if certain clusters outperform other clusters or whether, alternative-
ly, the clusters are equifinal.  
The method for data analysis is cluster analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1995). 
Cluster analyses are the superior methods when researching typologies of firm, since they 
allow for a consideration of a “[…] wider variety of dimension of context and MCS” 
(Chenhall, 2003, p. 156) than other statistical approaches.  
Based on previous research, I argue for the existence of at least two clusters. I hypoth-
esize that highly innovative firms operate in a rapidly changing environment that requires 
strategies to emerge from employees, who perceive changes in the environment and design 
potential reactions to these changes. These firms will particularly emphasize the beliefs, 
boundary, and interactive control systems. Allowing strategies to emerge requires the defini-
tion of values (beliefs system) and norms (boundary system) that give an overall direction 
(arising, for example, from the mission statement or from the code of conduct) to these 
emerging strategies. Furthermore, interactive control systems will encourage new strategies 
by to the continual challenge and debate of assumption and plans. Firms that are less innova-
tive will focus more on intended strategies and rely on diagnostic systems to control the 
achievement of these intended strategies. I argue that these two combinations of LOC, degree 
of innovativeness, and type of strategy formation will be equifinal, i.e., they will not lead to 
significant differences in performance. 
My results show three clusters, with two that are pretty similar to those hypothesized 
above, while a third encompasses firms that place low emphasis to all the four LOC. I label 
my clusters “Values and Norms Control” (cluster 1), “Limited Control” (cluster 2), and “Per-
formance Measures Control” (cluster 3). Clusters 1 and 3 do not display significant perfor-
mance differences and can thus be defined as equifinal alternatives.   
 This study contributes both to research and practice in multiple ways. First, my paper 
adds to the emerging body of literature arguing for a simultaneous consideration of different 
LOC implemented at the same time in firms, instead of focusing on just one. By covering all 
the four LOC, I allow for the identification of typologies of firms that combine the levers in 
different ways; thus, researchers are able to learn more about the “package” of LOC used in 
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firms (e.g., do the different LOC complement each other?) (Gerdin, 2005). This is in response 
to the original issue raised by, for example, Bisbe & Malagueno (2009) as well as Chenhall 
(2007) for the use of a broader taxonomy of control. I also supplement the qualitative results 
on the interplay of the LOC (e.g. Mundy, 2010 and Tuomela, 2005) with my quantitative 
findings.  
Second, I search for associations between intended and emergent strategies with the 
emphasis on the four LOC. This extends the work of Simons (1991) on the association be-
tween interactive control systems and emergent strategy and, therefore, enriches the body of 
literature on LOC and strategy formation (e.g. Davila, 2005; Marginson, 2002). That is, I fill 
in the research gap identified by Langfield-Smith (2007): “[…] in empirical research the im-
portance of the distinction between intended and realized strategy is rarely acknowledged 
[…]” (Langfield-Smith, 2007, p. 756).  
Third, I contribute to the research on LOC and innovation. While previous literature 
focused on the overall relation between one or two LOC and innovation performance (e.g. 
Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Bonner, et al., 2002; Henri, 2006), this paper identifies for the first time 
categories of firms based on the combination of the four LOC for PD. Related results show 
performance effects of different possible combinations, thus widening perception from the 
individual relation between one lever of control and innovation performance to the relation 
between a package of LOC and innovation performance. I relate my results to the degree of 
innovativeness and to the type of strategy formation, in order to provide a clearer picture of 
the different PD control categories. In the words of Gerdin (2005): “[…] the use of categories, 
rather than single one-dimensional variables, may give a clearer picture of the appropriateness 
of different control mechanisms in different environments” (Gerdin, 2005, p. 119). 
My analysis also addresses performance differences across clusters. This makes the 
findings of interest not only to researchers, but also practitioners, who will be able, based on 
the identification of the degree of innovativeness and on the firm’s typical strategy formation, 
to identify the most favorable emphasis on all the four LOC for PD.   
The paper is organized as follows: the description of the LOC framework, the degree 
of innovativeness, the types of strategy formation, as well as the expected performance effects 
are accomplished within the next section. The data collection, the measurement of the varia-
bles, and the cluster analysis carried out are detailed in the “Methods” section. The resulting 
clusters are investigated in the “Results” section, which also sketches the robustness of re-
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sults. Finally, the “Conclusion” section discusses and summarizes the findings and limita-
tions, and suggests future research. 
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses formulation 
2.1 Levers of control 
The LOC framework proposes a coherent typology of levers used to control employees’ ac-
tions by balancing opportunity-seeking and management attention, intended and emergent 
strategy formation, self-interest and desire to contribute (Simons, 1995). Following Simons 
(1995), four LOC contribute to strategy implementation: boundary system, diagnostic control 
system, beliefs system, and interactive control system. While boundary and diagnostic control 
systems represent constraining forces that impose compliance with rules, beliefs and interac-
tive control systems focus on opportunity-seeking, enabling creativity, and problem-solving 
(Simons, 1995). Boundary systems “[…] delineate the acceptable domain for opportunity-
seeking for organizational participants” (Simons (1995), p. 39). They induce behavior con-
straints necessary to prevent employees from engaging in misleading, goal-incongruent exper-
imentation. The definition of the off-limits behavior and risks that should be avoided can be 
formally stated in a code of business conduct or in internal guidelines and should be rein-
forced by management. Boundary systems allow the emergence of new strategies since they 
provide transparency about the area for which emerging strategies are desired (Davila, 2005; 
Simons, 1995). In a PD setting, this implicates the definition of markets, product areas, or 
customers, for which PD is not carried out. Similarly focused on rule compliance, the diag-
nostic control system supports management by exceptions, i.e., budgets, project timelines, and 
milestones, as well as other data from management accounting used by managers to set stand-
ards, monitor organizational outcomes, and correct deviations from preset standard perfor-
mance. Management attention is limited because intervention is only required if results devi-
ate from goals. The diagnostic use of management accounting information is intended to 
make goal achievement predictable, thus it is appropriate for the implementation of intended 
strategies (Simons (1995). PD has to be tracked in order to monitor the progress of each pro-
ject according to costs, time, and quality key measures, and to compare the achievements with 
the expectations.   
While boundary and diagnostic control systems tend to be constraining LOC forces, 
beliefs and diagnostic control systems are more enabling forces. Beliefs systems are “[…] the 
explicit set of organizational definitions that senior managers communicate formally and rein-
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force systematically to provide basic values, purpose, and direction for the organization” (Si-
mons (1995), p. 34). Formal instruments to communicate firm values are, for example, the 
mission, the vision, and the values statement. Together with the communication of values by 
top management during daily activities, the mission, vision, and value statements are designed 
to motivate employees to increase efforts toward desired opportunity-seeking and thus toward 
the emergence of new strategies (Davila, 2005; Simons, 1995). In PD settings, the mission 
statement as well as managers daily actions should communicate innovation to be a primary 
value of the firm. Interactive control systems are characterized by a frequent dialogue be-
tween managers and employees and are intended to ensure the adaptation capability of the 
firm, e.g., by the emergence of new strategies in unstable environments (Davila, 2005; Si-
mons, 1995). Management accounting data that is monitored and discussed by management 
are used to orient the firm toward key issues and critical success factors, to tie the organiza-
tion together, and to provide a common vocabulary across departments and hierarchies 
(Simons, 1995). In terms of PD, an interactive control system requires the use of management 
accounting data from, for instance, project milestones, budgets, or project timelines to align 
the firm to the critical success factors, and to challenge regularly and debate the assumptions 
behind the existing strategy. In Simons’ (1995) framework, the interactive control system is 
considered particularly well-suited for innovative environments, since it is focused on the 
analysis of strategic uncertainties – which may be the basis for renewal and change.  
2.2 Strategy formation 
MCS are designed to direct employees’ behavior toward the implementation of strategies 
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998; Flamholtz, 1983; Otley, 1994; Simons, 1995). But while 
traditional MCS approaches have been mostly understood as management-by-exception or 
command-and-control tools to implement intended strategies (Andrews, 1971), the LOC 
framework proposes the interactive use of management accounting techniques as an instru-
ment allowing new strategies to emerge (Simons, 1990; Simons, 1991). The distinction be-
tween intended and emergent strategies goes back to Mintzberg (1978) and refers to strategies 
that are purposeful and formally planned by the firm (intended strategies) and strategies that 
come up in absence of an a priori intention, but arise from day-to-day activities and the inter-
action with a firm’s environment (emergent strategies) (Mintzberg, 1978). Between these two 
types of strategy formation there is a continuum of hybrid strategies that are more or less in-
tended or emergent (Davila, 2005; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Thus, in line with Simons 
(1995) argument that the type of strategy formation plays a central role in the LOC frame-
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work, this study investigates the combination of the LOC with these different types, i.e., in-
tended and emergent strategies. This distinction has been considered crucial by previous liter-
ature, since it overcomes the common understanding of strategies as conscious plans formu-
lated prior to actions (Dent, 1990; Langfield-Smith, 2007). 
The relationship between the LOC and the type of strategy formation was previously 
considered by Marginson (2002), who found in his case study of a telecommunication firm 
that beliefs and boundary systems are helpful in allowing and directing the emergence of new 
strategies, while notably the interactive use of key performance indicators did not provide 
strategic impetus. In contrast, Henri (2006) found the interactive use of performance meas-
urement systems to be positively related to capabilities required for strategic change. In this 
paper, I examine the combination of all four LOC and the degree to which strategies are 
emergent or intended.  
2.3 Degree of innovativeness 
The degree of innovativeness of the firm is defined as the degree of change the firm experi-
ences in terms of new product lines and in terms of the importance attributed to this change. 
The degree of innovativeness may influence the combination of LOC which is best applicable 
(Salomo, et al., 2007). The contingency approach suggests that uncertainty is a major contin-
gency variable that should match the organizational variables (Donaldson, 2001; Duncan, 
1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1976). Since the degree of innovativeness is a proxy for the uncer-
tainty which is experienced by the firm (Salomo, et al., 2007), it is in line with the contingen-
cy tradition to expect a relationship between strategy and LOC on the one hand, and innova-
tiveness on the other hand. Salomo, et al. (2007) found that innovativeness does not moderate 
the positive relationship between PD project planning and innovation success, while it does 
moderate negatively the relationship between process formality and innovation success. Ac-
cording to Droge, Calantone, & Harmancioglu (2008), the organicity of the organizational 
structure is positively related to the degree of innovativeness of the firm. This result is rooted 
in the conceptual work by Miller & Friesen (1982), who distinguish between organic and 
mechanistic systems, whereby the former are appropriate for changing and uncertain condi-
tions, while the latter are better suited for stable, certainty conditions. Organic systems are 
often related to interactive control systems (Chenhall & Morris, 1995; Henri, 2006; Widener, 
2007) and are considered to be more adequate for high-innovative settings than for low-
innovative settings. In these organic systems, where there is a day-to-day interaction between 
management and subordinates about the premises and goals of the firm, the emergence of new 
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strategies is more likely to occur than in mechanistic systems (Davila, 2005; Miller & Friesen, 
1982). 
2.4 Combinations of levers of control, strategy formation, and degree of innovative-
ness 
There is theoretical and empirical evidence of the relationship between the LOC, the strategy 
formation, and the degree of innovativeness of the firm. 
I expect that firms with a high degree of innovativeness operate in uncertain environ-
ments and thus their performance is dependent on the ability to allow the emergence of proper 
new strategies (Davila, 2005). This becomes feasible through the interactive use of perfor-
mance measures, since this lever of control requires the continual challenge and debate of the 
assumptions resting on the performance measures used and their implicit relation to strategy, 
thus stimulating organizational learning and focusing the attention on strategic uncertainties 
(Henri, 2006; Simons, 1995). Furthermore, emerging strategies have to be directed according 
to the norms and values the firm is based on. This requires a particular emphasis on the 
boundary system, which has to define, for example, for which product lines, market, and cus-
tomer PD will not be carried out and thus will not be part of emerging strategies. Furthermore, 
emerging strategies require an emphasized beliefs system that formulates the importance of 
product innovations for the firm and thus the areas where opportunity-seeking is desired 
(Marginson, 2002). I summarize this category into the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms with a high degree of innovativeness have emergent strategies and empha-
size beliefs, boundary, and interactive control systems. 
In contrast to this first category, I expect that firms with a low degree of innovative-
ness experience a stable environment, which allows them to rely on intended strategies. Stable 
environments are more predictable and thus performance is dependent on the degree in which 
plans are intentionally formulated and consequently pursued. Consequent pursuing of strate-
gies is most appropriately carried out with a command-and-control approach inherent to the 
diagnostic use of some critical performance variables. Management attention is required only 
on exception basis, if deviation analyses indicate upcoming problems (Simons, 1995). I sum-
marize this category into the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firms with a low degree of innovativeness have intended strategies and empha-
size diagnostic control systems. 
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In line with the contingent tradition, the above categories describe the fit between 
strategy, context, and structure variables (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; (Gerdin & Greve, 
2004). Adapted to the LOC context, the categories describe the firms that are in fit. Therefore, 
both should ascertain a high level of performance and be equifinal alternatives. That is, I ex-
pect firms allocated to one of the two categories to be in fit concerning their strategy, LOC, 
and innovativeness, and to outperform the PD performance and organizational performance of 
the firms that fall outside the two hypothesized clusters. Formally stated: 
H3: Firms that have a LOC combination that fits to the type of strategy formation and 
to the degree of innovativeness outperform firms that are not in fit. 
3 Methods 
3.1 Data collection 
I investigate the combination between LOC, strategy formation, and degree of a firm’s inno-
vativeness. I refer the LOC and strategy formation to the area of PD because both LOC and 
strategy formation processes are likely to differ across the firm. I select the PD area since in 
my discussions with experts they stressed the importance of this area as critical to perfor-
mance, confirming previous research findings (e.g. Capon, Farley, & Hoenig, 1990).  
The data were collected through a structured written questionnaire sent by mail to 
members of the top management of the target firms, i.e., the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), 
the Chief Technology Officer (CTO), or the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
1
 I chose them as 
informants since they are knowledgeable about the LOC and their implementation in PD 
(Davila, Foster, & Li, 2009; Widener, 2007), which was confirmed by our pilot test. For 85 
firms, duplicates, i.e., two questionnaires from two different respondents from one firm were 
returned and used to control for interrater reliability potentially affected by different respond-
ents’ perceptions. The target population consisted of 8,555 large and medium-sized firms in 
the manufacturing sector (the C-section in the NACE Revision 2 classification) from German-
speaking countries (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland).
2
 Firms respecting the following size 
criteria were sampled: (1) at least 50 employees (full-time equivalents) for the year 2008; (2) 
                                                 
1
 All the potential respondents within one firm received the same questionnaire and had to answer the same 
questions.  
2
 The target population is identified through the AMADEUS database. AMADEUS is a database that in Octo-
ber 2009 contained financial information on over 11 million public and private companies in 41 European 
countries. It combines data from over 30 regional information providers using public mandatory disclosure 
data. 
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at least 10 million euro sales for the year 2008. Since the survey was conducted during the 
2008/2009 world economic crisis, I was seeking results that were as far as possible unbiased 
by this critical event. Thus, I referred my survey questions to the average firm situation over 
the last three years. In order to be able to check for respondent bias, I sampled those firms that 
provided financial data in the AMADEUS database for the last three years. Thus, the sample 
consisted of 2,695 firms, from which I identified 4,961 potential respondents.
3
 In order to 
collect the contact data from this sample, I contacted the firms by phone or e-mail and, wher-
ever possible, prenotified the respondents. This helped me to increase the likelihood that the 
respondent whom I wanted to answer my questions was indeed the person who received the 
questionnaire. Each mail-out package included a personally addressed signed cover letter (in 
which I guaranteed the confidentiality of answers and anonymity in the result reports), the 
questionnaire, and a prepaid reply envelope. As an incentive to respond, I offered an execu-
tive summary of my results and participation in a workshop to discuss the results with re-
searchers and practitioners. The follow-up wave consisted of a second package with a cover 
letter urging an answer and a replacement questionnaire sent to those who had not answered 
yet (Dillman, 2007).  
From the initial 2,695 potential respondent firms, 87 could not be contacted since the 
firms had closed, failed, or moved to an unknown address, or they could not provide useful 
insights since they stated that they did not undertake PD. I received a reply questionnaire from 
962 firms. After correcting for those 68 firms for which the questionnaire came from a re-
spondent who was beyond the scope of our analysis (e.g., a different functional and/or hierar-
chical level), 894 firms were left. Referring to the 2,695-87=2,608 firms that could be ap-
proached with my questionnaire, this equals a response rate of 34.3%.  
                                                 
3
 For most of the firms, both the CFO and the CTO could be identified and addressed. For 429 mostly small 
firms, only the CEO could be identified. 
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Table IV - 1: Unit non-response analysis for firm characteristics 
Variable Respondents 
with perfor-
mance 
measures for 
PD (n=468) 
Respondents without 
performance 
measures for PD 
(n=365) 
Addressed                            
non-respondents 
(n=1,801) 
Survey population        
(n=8,087) 
Number of em-
ployees  (in 
thousands) 
2.74 0.38 (t=2.725, 
p=0.007) 
1.22  (t=1.660, 
p=0.097) 
0.78 (t=-2.265, 
p=0.024) 
Net sales                      
(in millions 
euro) 
806.36 89.73 (t=2.511, 
p=0.012) 
354.41  (t=1.523, 
p=0.128) 
247.66 (t=-1.946, 
p=0.052) 
EBIT                            
(in million euro) 
40.87 5.32 (t=2.325, 
p=0.020) 
25.79  (t=1.094, 
p=0.274) 
13.62 (t=-1.771, 
p=0.077) 
Fixed assets                  
(in million euro) 
386.20 21.61 (t=2.521, 
p=0.012) 
151.61  (t=1.552, 
p=0.121) 
104.16 (t=-1.934, 
p=0.054) 
Intangible assets        
(in million euro) 
96.71 1.22 (t=2.438, 
p=0.015) 
52.91  (t=0.978), 
p=0.328) 
29.47 (t=-1.687, 
p=0.092) 
The table reports variable means as well as t-statistics and related p-values for the comparison of means of varia-
bles between the respondents with and without performance measures for PD, between the respondents with 
performance measures for PD and the addressed non-respondents as well as between the respondents with per-
formance measures for PD and the survey population (two-sided test). The respondents are already corrected for 
overrepresentation of NACE div. 33. 
 
I investigated unit non-response bias by comparing the respondents with the addressed 
non-respondents and the respondents with the survey population (i.e., all 8,555 manufacturing 
firms in German-speaking countries with at least 50 employees and 10 million euro sales 
available in the AMADEUS database for the last available year). The pattern of industry dis-
tribution of the respondents following the NACE Rev. 2 divisions compares well with the 
industry distribution of the addressed non-respondents (chi square(23)=33.079, p=0.08) and 
of the population. Only division 33 of the NACE classification required corrective actions 
(reweighting by random deletion of n=61 cases from division 33 “Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment”), since there was an overrepresentation of firms in this division 
compared with the distribution of the population. After this correction, 833 firms remained in 
my sample and the chi square statistic does not show significant differences in the industry 
distribution between the respondents and the population (chi square(23)=34.895, p=0.053). In 
unreported results, I find no statistical differences in the number of employees, sales, EBIT, 
fixed assets, and intangible assets between the respondents and the addressed non-respondents 
as well as between the respondents and the survey population.  
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From the 833 firms considered, 365 declared that they had not any type of perfor-
mance measure for their PD and could thus not be analyzed in terms of our research question, 
so I carried out my research based on 468 responses. Table IV - 1 shows that there are no sta-
tistical differences in the number of employees, sales, EBIT, fixed assets, and intangible as-
sets between the respondents with PD performance measures and the addressed non-
respondents as well as between the respondents with PD performance measures and the sur-
vey population at p<0.05 (with exception for the number of employees for the comparison of 
the respondents with PD performance measures and the survey population). However, as ex-
pected, I find significant differences between the 365 firms without any performance measure 
for PD and the 468 firms employing performance measures for PD. 
To approximate further the unit non-response bias, I compared the responses of early 
and late respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). I did not find significant differences at 
the 5% level in construct means, which further supports the representative character of my 
sample for the manufacturing sector. The results are displayed in table IV - 2. Thus, I am con-
fident to use for the categorization of firms data that are representative of the population of 
manufacturing firms in German-speaking countries. This representativeness is a prerequisite 
of cluster analysis, the method used to classify my cases (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 
2010). 
I additionally analyzed item non-response. The descriptive analyses show that a max-
imum of 6.2% of the responses per question are missed, with most questions ranging between 
0.2% and 1.1% of responses missed. There are no indications of patterns of non-random item 
non-response, as found by Little’s MCAR test (chi square(5,002)=5,144.005, p=0.079) 
(Rubin, 1976). In order to avoid the shortcomings of traditional missing data techniques like 
mean imputation (i.e., distortion of estimated variances and correlations) (Schafer & Graham, 
2002), I used the EM-algorithm to replace the missing values. This algorithm provides con-
sistent and efficient maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for missing completely at random 
values (Schafer & Graham, 2002, Yuan & Bentler, 2000).  
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Table IV - 2: Comparison of constructs means for early and late respondents 
Construct Early respondents  
(before the follow-up  
procedure) 
Late respondents  
(after the follow-
up procedure) 
t-statistics, p-values 
(two-sided test) 
Diagnostic control system 3.64 (n=290)  3.59 (n=173) t=-0.720, p=0.472 
Interactive control system 3.13 (n=288)  3.14 (n=172) t=-0.238, p=0.812 
Boundary system 3.05 (n=288)  2.98 (n=168) t=0.938, p=0.349 
Beliefs system 3.96 (n=288)  4.04 (n=174) t=-1.231, p=0.219 
Degree of innovativeness 3.25 (n=287)  3.27 (n=169) t=-0.255, p=0.799 
Product development strategy formation 2.41 (n=291)  2.46 (n=177) t=-0.430, p=0.668 
Product development performance 2.57 (n=289)  2.55 (n=166) t=0.282, p=0.778 
Organizational performance 2.69 (n=271)  2.66 (n=152) t=0.412, p=0.680 
The table reports construct means and t-tests on the difference in construct means for early and late respondents. 
Early respondents are the respondents who returned the questionnaire before the reminder action; late respondents 
are the respondents who returned the questionnaire after the reminder action. n varies due to missing values. 
 
3.2 Measurement of variables 
All measures used in the questionnaire are borrowed from existing and validated instruments 
and slightly adapted for the PD setting. I developed the questionnaire in English and then 
translated it into German for adaption to the sample. Back-translation by an independent party 
following Brislin (1970) was adopted to verify equivalence between translated and original 
items. To safeguard content validity, I also discussed the questionnaire with experts in the 
field (both academics and practitioners). The three-steps test-interview method was used to 
pilot test the questionnaire with six potential respondents to obtain feedback on the layout of 
the questionnaire, clarity of the questions, and content validity (Hak, van der Veer, & 
Ommundsen, 2006). This led to slight adjustments in wording and layout of the questionnaire.  
Appendix IV - 1 shows the questionnaire items and descriptive statistics, as well as 
Cronbach’s Alpha and variance extracted for each factor. Cronbach’s alpha values lie all 
above the 0.7 threshold, with the exception of the degree of innovativeness construct that 
amounts to a value larger than 0.5, which is still acceptable for exploratory research 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Additionally, I use principal component analysis for each con-
struct separately and display the variance extracted by each of these procedures, which is 
above the 0.5 threshold for all constructs considered. 
The LOC are measured using instruments by Vandenbosch (1999) and refined by 
Henri (2006) for interactive and diagnostic control systems as well as instruments by Widener 
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(2007) for beliefs and boundary systems.
4
 The items for the degree of innovativeness are tak-
en from Miller & Friesen (1982). The question for strategy formation is developed based on 
the description by Mintzberg & Waters (1985). PD performance is measured with indicators 
taken from Bisbe & Otley (2004), Capon, Farley, Lehman, & Hulbert (1992) and Griffin 
(1997), while the organizational performance measure is grounded in Govindarajan (1984). 
The wording of the original items has been slightly adapted to the area of PD, where neces-
sary. While the strategy formation and the degree of innovativeness questions are based on 5 
point differential scales, the remaining questions are 5 point Likert scales. All scales are fully 
anchored.  
3.3 Data analysis 
Wolf (1926) and Kemeny (1959) suggest that classification should be both the first and the 
last effort used in a research area. Cluster analysis provides such a powerful instrument to 
classify objects into groups (i.e., clusters) that display internal cohesion and external isolation. 
This, therefore, is the method of choice for my analysis (Milligan, 1980). Cluster analysis 
allows both identification of natural groups of firms and detection of the relation between the 
variables considered (Hair, et al., 2010). 
Cluster analysis is typically used when investigating the fit between multiple design, 
strategy, and contextual variables (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; Gerdin & Greve, 2008) and is 
a well-accepted instrument in management accounting and control research (Bisbe & 
Malagueno, 2009; Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998; Gerdin, 2005). While Chenhall (2003) 
points out that cluster analysis suffers from some limitations, like the numerous research deci-
sions required to carry out this method and the complexity of the relationships described, he, 
nevertheless, acknowledges its importance for a broader understanding of contingency rela-
tionships. Or, in the words of Ketchen Jr. & Shook (1996): “[…] cluster analysis can provide 
very rich descriptions of configurations without overspecifying the model” (Ketchen Jr. & 
Shook, 1996, p. 442). In my study, I search for clusters of firms that are similar in terms of 
their use of the LOC in PD, their strategy formation, and their degree of innovativeness.  
Following Milligan (1980), the best-performing clustering method is a combination of 
a hierarchical and a non-hierarchical clustering method. I use the K-means non-hierarchical 
                                                 
4
 I differ from Henri (2006) in that I do not use the item “Enable continual challenge and debate underlying 
data, assumptions and action plans” for the interactive use of performance measures, since I collected this 
item, but found that it had a very low correlation with the other items of the interactive control system which 
it was intended to measure. On account of the item’s unclear nature, I preferred to delete it form further anal-
yses, as the cluster analysis I employed may have reacted sensibly to the inclusion of a noisy item (e.g. Hair, 
et al., 2010).  
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method to allocate the cases to cluster. The algorithm involves an optimization procedure that 
minimizes the distance between the cases in each cluster and maximizes the distance between 
clusters by an iterative assignment of cases until a convergence criterion is met. This criterion 
addresses the change in cluster means by each step and is set equal zero. The K-means clus-
tering method is superior to hierarchical methods since it involves an optimization procedure 
(instead of stopping after the first pass through the data), and is less susceptible to changes to 
the distance measure used, to the inclusion of random noise variables, and to the existence of 
outliers in the data (Hair, et al., 2010; Ketchen Jr. & Shook, 1996; Milligan, 1980; Punj & 
Stewart, 1983). 
The K-means non-hierarchical method allocates cases to clusters, but requires a priori 
knowledge of the number of clusters in the data. Thus, I follow the suggestion by Milligan 
(1980) and Punj & Stewart (1983) to use a hierarchical method in order to predetermine the 
number of clusters in the data as basis for the K-means non-hierarchical method. I choose one 
of the most frequently used cluster methods in social sciences (Everitt, 1993), i.e., Ward’s 
hierarchical method, an agglomerative technique that minimizes the variance within each 
cluster. Punj & Stewart (1983) reviewed a number of studies analyzing the performance of 
different clustering methods and found Ward’s method to outperform the rest in most of the 
cluster method efficacy studies they reviewed.  
The goal of Ward’s method is to determine the number of clusters that best represent 
the categories in the population and that are the basis for the allocation of cases by the K-
means non-hierarchical method. Determining the proper number of clusters is the most criti-
cal issue in cluster analysis, since it is often the step of the analysis that relies most on re-
searchers’ discretion. In order to avoid this drawback, I employ, beside the inspection of the 
dendrogram and the graph of the development of the amalgamation coefficient throughout the 
possible cluster solutions, the Calinski-Harabasz stopping rule (Calinski & Harabasz, 1974). 
This stopping rule suggests choosing the number of clusters where the relation of the be-
tween-cluster sum of squares and the within-cluster sum of squares is maximized. Milligan & 
Cooper (1985) found that the Calinski-Harabasz stopping rule is the best-performing stopping 
rule among the 30 they tested.  
While the cluster method defines the way in which the cases are assigned to clusters, 
no matter how the distance between the cases or clusters is calculated, the distance measures 
allow for calculation of how (dis-)similar the cases are in terms of all their variables and, fi-
119
 
 
 
nally, to apply the cluster method. The distance measure most suitable for the cluster method I 
employ is the squared Euclidian distance (Hair, et al., 2010).
5
 
Multicollinearity can create serious problems in cluster analysis by overweighting one 
or more variables in the data (Hair, et al., 2010). Indeed, my items have been used in previous 
literature to measure constructs. Thus, items used to measure the same construct are likely to 
correlate, as can be confirmed by untabulated results. For this reason, I follow Punj & Stewart 
(1983) by using a principal component analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation, and employ 
the resulting – uncorrelated – factor scores for my cluster analysis. The results of the factor 
analysis of all LOC and degree of innovativeness are displayed in appendix IV - 2.
6
 Appendix 
IV - 3 shows the results of a principal component analysis for the PD performance and organ-
izational performance items. 
The factor scores generated are already standardized, i.e., they have a zero mean and a 
standard deviation of 1. Standardization is considered useful in cluster analysis to avoid some 
variables being weighted higher than others due to differences in standard deviation or in 
range of the scale (Hair, et al., 2010). 
Employing Ward’s algorithm to define properly the number of clusters in the data re-
quires data that are free of severe outliers (Milligan, 1980). I ensured that the highest possible 
degree of representativeness was reached for the population of manufacturing firms in Ger-
man-speaking countries with my data collection. Therefore, and after careful analysis of de-
scriptive data, I do not have reasons to suspect the existence of outliers (Hair, et al., 2010). 
As with every empirical analysis method, cluster analysis suffers from some weak-
nesses. I address the potential drawbacks of the method by providing several tests for the ro-
bustness of my results. I address the stability of the results with changes in the methodological 
choices (stopping rule, cluster method, other plausible cluster solutions), the type of variables 
employed (data without factorization, data allowed to correlate freely and without standardi-
zation), and the sample (outlier detection). 
                                                 
5
 Squared Euclidean distance =∑        
  
   , where i=number of considered variables in the cluster analysis 
and x and y are the values of a variable for case x and y, respectively. 
6
 The item for strategy formation is not included in the factor analysis, since this is a single item variable and 
not a multiple item variable that requires factorization. Thus, only the strategy formation factor remains cor-
related with the other factors, whereby related correlations are negligible in magnitude.  
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4 Results 
4.1 Description of clusters and hypotheses tests 
I use Ward’s hierarchical cluster method based on the squared Euclidian distance measure in 
order to identify the number of clusters in my data. The dendrogram (i.e., the graphical depic-
tion of the distance between clusters), which is presented in figure IV - 1, displays where each 
cluster is formed and offers first insights into the number of clusters in the data.  
The dendrogram suggests the existence of three clusters, while the unreported graph 
displaying the development of the amalgamation coefficient throughout the possible cluster 
solutions does not show a clear flattening by a certain cluster solution. Thus, I supplement the 
visual identification of the number of clusters with the use of the Calinski-Harabasz stopping 
rule (Calinski & Harabasz, 1974). This rule supports that the most proper cluster solution, i.e., 
the number of clusters that maximizes the relation among the between-cluster sum of squares 
and the within-cluster sum of squares, is the three clusters solution.  
The three clusters solution is used as information for the allocation of the firms to 
clusters by the K-means non-hierarchical cluster method. Based on this allocation, I display 
the mean scores of variables for each of the three clusters in table IV - 3. 
I label cluster 1 as “Values and Norms Control”, cluster 2 as “Limited Control”, and 
cluster 3 as “Performance Measures Control”. 31% (n=144) of the firms belong to the Values 
and Norms Control cluster. These firms are characterized by particular emphasis on the be-
liefs and boundary systems of the LOC framework. They rely on more culture-oriented con-
trols than firms in the other clusters. Their approach to direct employees’ behavior toward the 
development of new successful products is to define clearly that innovativeness is one of the 
core values of the firm in which they operate. To allow employees to generate safely new 
ideas, these firms define the boundaries of acceptable behavior in PD, e.g., by emphasizing in 
the code of conduct for PD the markets, the customers, or the products for which PD should 
not be carried out. Interestingly and against my expectation, they combine the strong use of 
beliefs and boundary systems with a moderate use of their diagnostic control system.  
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Consistently with this combination, the strategy formation is allocated in an average 
position between a strong intended and a strong emergent focus. That is, the strategy for-
mation process relies both on a purposeful internal planning process and on reactions to 
changes in the environment. Therefore, the part of the strategy that is intended by the firm can 
be controlled by performance measures that are used diagnostically, while the part of the 
strategy that emerges from the environment is controlled by values and norms.  
Such a strategy-control combination appears in firms with a high degree of innova-
tiveness, that is, the innovativeness stressed by the beliefs system is reflected in the employ-
ees’ behavior and results. This cluster is consistent with the findings by Marginson (2002), 
that beliefs and boundary systems are combined to achieve organizational change and build 
the basis for innovation. Against the original assumption based on Simons (1995), high inno-
vativeness is not associated with a high emphasis on the interactive use of performance 
measures in PD. This strengthens the previous finding by Bisbe & Otley (2004), who asserted 
that interactive control systems are not beneficial in highly innovative firms, since dangerous 
experimentation can turn into dysfunctional innovation results. 
Firms in cluster 3, the Performance Measures Control cluster (40% of firms, n=190), 
place an average emphasis on their beliefs and boundary systems in PD, but focus highly on 
performance measures for their PD. I find both a high emphasis on an interactive use and on a 
diagnostic use. Thus, I identify, consistently with Tuomela (2005) and Widener (2007), that 
some performance measures are used strongly diagnostically, while others are, at the same 
time, used strongly interactively. Bisbe & Malagueno (2009) recognize this decision for 
which control instruments to be used interactively as dependent on the “[…] organisational 
and managerial processes by which innovation arises […]” (Bisbe & Malagueno, 2009, p. 
373). This cluster is related to the findings by Marginson (2002), who qualitatively identifies 
a cluster of firms focusing on performance measures and asserts that the use of performance 
measures may create tensions. Furthermore, Henri (2006) notes that the tensions originated by 
the joint use of performance measures in an interactive and diagnostic way may generate posi-
tive performance effects. In contrast to the Values and Norms Control cluster, where guidance 
for goal-achievement is provided by delineating the areas where opportunity-seeking is ex-
pected and where it is not, the focus in this cluster is on guiding employees’ behavior by 
providing accountability through the use of performance measures (Tuomela, 2005). Values 
and norms are present, but they do not make up the major control momentum. While a part of 
the measures related to PD are generated by continuous communication between managers 
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and subordinates, the remaining part is based on measures that are used in the traditional 
management-by-exceptions basis. Chenhall & Langfield-Smith (1998) already provided indi-
cation of the complementary relationship between different management accounting and con-
trol practices and techniques.  
The firms display a mediocre degree of innovativeness, while the strategy is strongly 
intended. Hence, the intended strategy is best controlled by the use of performance measures, 
while, additionally, the moderately emphasized values and norms help to delineate roughly 
the area for which opportunity-seeking is desired.  
Besides these two clusters that are similar to the clusters expected and described in the 
hypotheses section, I find a third cluster (cluster 2) encompassing 134 firms and thus 29% of 
the sample firms labeled the Limited Control cluster. This cluster is characterized by an over-
all low reliance on the LOC. The diagnostic control, the beliefs, and the boundary systems are 
underdeveloped, while there is an average interactive use of performance measures. This 
combination is related to a clearly emergent strategy and, at the same time, a low degree of 
innovativeness. It seems that the interactive control system contributes to the emergence of 
new strategies, for example, by integrating the information provided by the interaction with 
customers (Davila, 2005), but the low emphasis on the other LOC deters the firms from trans-
lating the early reception of changes in the environment into changes in the firm’s product 
lines. 
Table IV - 3 displays the ANOVA F-values for each variable and confirms that overall 
the clusters are substantially different from each other. Additionally, I compare the mean 
scores for each variable between the cluster ranked first and the cluster ranked second, as well 
as between the second and the third cluster by t-tests. Again, I see significant differences 
across the clusters.  
On the basis of these findings, I review my predictions formulated in the hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 expected that firms with a high degree of innovativeness have emergent strate-
gies and emphasize beliefs, boundary, and interactive control systems. I find that cluster 1, 
Values and Norms Control, is the cluster with the highest degree of innovativeness. It is char-
acterized by an average strategy formation, i.e., strategies are partially emergent and partially 
intended, but there is still a significant difference in the “degree of emergence” when com-
pared with cluster 2, the Limited Control cluster. Another finding is that the beliefs and 
boundary systems are indeed emphasized higher in this cluster than in all other clusters. 
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Against my expectation, the emphasis on the interactive use of performance measures is sig-
nificantly lower than in the other two clusters. Thus, I can partially support hypothesis 1. 
In hypothesis 2, I formulate the expectation that firms with a low degree of innova-
tiveness have intended strategies and emphasize diagnostic control systems. Cluster 3, Per-
formance Measures Control, emphasizes the diagnostic use of performance measures signifi-
cantly more than in the other two clusters. This is related to a clear predominance of intended 
formation of strategies. The degree of innovativeness is significantly lower than for cluster 1. 
However, in contrast to my theoretical arguments, I find that firms in this cluster also strongly 
emphasize the interactive control system. In summary, I can also partially support hypothe-
sis 2. 
On account of this (partial) support of hypotheses 1 and 2, I am now able to investi-
gate if firms that are in fit – i.e., firms where the type of strategy formation and the degree of 
innovativeness are accompanied by the combination of the LOC, of strategy, and innovative-
ness as predicted – outperform firms that are not in fit (hypothesis 3). The combination of 
LOC, degree of innovativeness, and type of strategy formation found in cluster 2 (Limited 
Control), does not display a combination according to theory. None of the LOC is strongly 
emphasized, meaning that no direction is provided for the strategy formation that is highly 
emergent. Even if the strategy is derived from the changing environment and could, therefore, 
be accompanied by organizational changes and a high degree of innovativeness, the opposite 
is the case. Hence, I expect that the PD performance and the organizational performance of 
firms in this cluster are significantly lower than the performance of firms in one of the two 
other clusters. Results from the t-tests show that firms whose LOC, strategy formation, and 
degree of innovativeness are in fit have a significantly higher performance than the firms in 
the Limited Control cluster. Thus, I find support for hypothesis 3. 
Moreover, the fact that there is no significant performance difference between the 
Values and Norms Control cluster and the Performance Measures Control cluster deserves 
particular attention. These LOC-strategy-innovativeness combinations are substitutes, i.e., 
both are equally capable of generating high performance. The equifinality of these alterna-
tives allows identifying the LOC that best complement each other, given the characteristics of 
the strategy and the environment of a firm. 
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4.2 Robustness of results 
As previously mentioned, the major drawback of cluster analysis is the high dependence of 
the results on the subjective judgment of the researchers. For this reason, I carried out inten-
sive efforts to validate the results by making transparent how changes to the decisions taken 
above affect results (Punj & Stewart, 1983). The use of different methods, different type of 
variables, or different data could change results. 
From a methodological point of view, I define the number of clusters in the data based 
on the inspection of the dendrogram and on the consistent result from the Calinski-Harabasz-
index. However, these instruments are not able to reflect the theoretical background of the 
analysis (Hair, et al., 2010). Therefore, I consider how the results of my analysis change if I 
choose a two clusters solution, as theoretically predicted. Of course, the cluster method cho-
sen (Ward’s method) influences the cluster solution found. Consequently, I validate results by 
using the complete linkage method, which measures the similarity of clusters based on the 
maximum distance of cases in each cluster, and the centroid method, which measures the sim-
ilarity of clusters based on the distance between the means of the variables used for clustering 
(Hair, et al., 2010). Milligan (1980) has shown that complete linkage and centroid methods 
perform differently from Ward’s procedure depending on the types of possible error perturba-
tion (i.e., outliers, random noise variables, etc.). Using these cluster methods allows control-
ling for biases of the cluster methods in some direction. While the centroid method suggests a 
two clusters solution, the complete linkage method finds a four clusters solution to deliver the 
best categorization. The two clusters solution is already reviewed for theoretical reasons. I 
review also the four clusters solution. Furthermore, I employ the Je(2)/Je(1) stopping rule by 
Duda & Hart (1973), which is, after the Calinski-Harabasz-index, the second best-performing 
stopping rule according to Milligan & Cooper (1985). I find that this stopping rule, applied to 
the results from Ward’s method, suggests that the five clusters solution performance is best (if 
forced to choose a cluster solution smaller or equal to five for the sake of interpretation). 
Therefore, I review also the five clusters solution.  
The two clusters solution replicates the existence of a Limited Control cluster that 
does not emphasize any of the levers and which is characterized simultaneously by low inno-
vativeness and predominantly by emergent strategies for PD. This cluster performs signifi-
cantly worse than the other cluster that seems to merge the Values and Norms Control cluster 
with the Performance Measures cluster of my basic solution. In this cluster, the strategy is 
dominantly intended and is implemented by a strong emphasis given to all LOC, which in 
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turn creates the environment required to keep the degree of innovativeness of the firm high. In 
this respect, the two clusters solution does not comply with the expectations I formulated in 
my hypotheses, since a high emphasis on all LOC is found in one cluster that outperforms the 
Limited Control cluster that I did not predict. This result is particularly interesting because it 
shows that a simultaneous emphasis on different components of formal MCS is compatible 
with high innovativeness (under the premise of prevailing intended strategies), which stands 
in contrast to the dominant previous understanding of MCS. Typically, the diagnostic control 
system was considered as impacting negatively the innovativeness of a firm (e.g. Henri, 
2006), but it seems that this effect is mitigated and compensated by the combined intensive 
use of the other three levers.  
The four clusters solution finds a cluster similar to the Limited Control cluster (low 
emphasis on the LOC, purely emergent strategy, low innovativeness) and one similar to the 
Performance Measures Control cluster (high emphasis on the interactive and diagnostic use of 
the performance measures, average innovativeness, and predominantly intended strategy), but 
splits the Values and Norms Control cluster into one cluster that strongly emphasizes the be-
liefs, but neglects the boundary system, and one cluster that strongly emphasizes the boundary 
system and has an average focus on the beliefs systems. For both these two latter clusters the 
strategy tends to be partially emergent and partially intended, but the beliefs control cluster 
displays a very low degree of innovativeness, while the boundary control cluster is the most 
innovative cluster. Only the Performance Measures Control cluster is equifinal with the 
boundary control cluster by both PD performance and organizational performance.   
Finally, the five clusters solutions identifies a cluster resembling the Performance 
Measures Control cluster (high emphasis on diagnostic and interactive control, average inno-
vativeness, and clearly emergent strategy) as well as one cluster resembling the Values and 
Norms Control cluster (high emphasis on the beliefs and boundary control, a strategy that is 
partially emergent and partially intended, but an average degree of innovativeness, and also a 
strong emphasis on the diagnostic control system). The remaining three clusters are different 
manifestations of the Limited Control cluster of my basic analysis. The Performance 
Measures Control cluster in this solution is equifinal to the Values and Norms Control cluster 
in this solution, which strengthens my basic findings. These clusters, that represent a fit be-
tween LOC, strategy, and environment, outperform all the other clusters in terms of organiza-
tional performance and, in all but one case, all the other clusters in terms of PD performance.  
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Overall, these robustness tests show that changes in the number of clusters change the 
manifestation of the clusters to a certain degree, but most importantly the main findings re-
main the same. I consistently detect a distinction between a Limited Control cluster and clus-
ter(s) that encompass different LOC. The Limited Control cluster relies on low emphasis on 
the LOC and is accompanied by strategies that are mostly emergent. With the exception of 
one of the clusters which has a limited emphasis on the LOC in the five clusters solutions, all 
the Limited Control clusters are characterized by a mediocre to low level of innovativeness. 
These clusters perform generally worse than the clusters that emphasize one or more LOC 
both in terms of PD performance and organizational performance. The Values and Norms 
Control cluster(s) as well as the Performance Measures cluster are overall equifinal (with the 
exception of the PD performance in the four clusters solution, where the performance of the 
Performance Measures Control cluster is significantly higher than that of the boundary system 
dominated cluster, and this, in turn, higher than the beliefs system dominated cluster). In the 
basic three, in the four, and in the five clusters solution I always detect a Performance 
Measures Control cluster. Thus, the combination of interactive and diagnostic control seems 
to be complementary, i.e., the performance measures that are developed interactively should 
be grounded in a number of performance measures adopted diagnostically. 
The results of the cluster analysis are also susceptible to the handling of the variables 
used. The data in this study were standardized before cluster analysis, which has the ad-
vantage of allowing each variable to contribute equally to the cluster solution. Nevertheless, 
this choice has a drawback, since the standardization may eliminate meaningful distances 
among elements (Edelbrock, 1979). I follow the advice by Ketchen Jr. & Shook (1996) and 
compare my cluster analysis solution based on standardized factor values with the solution 
generated by non-standardized factor values and find a two clusters solution. This solution 
leads to a Limited Control category (low emphasis on all LOC, emergent strategy, low inno-
vativeness) and to a category where both values and norms and performance measures are 
emphasized (high emphasis on all LOC, intended strategy, high innovativeness), where the 
latter outperforms the first. This result is equivalent to the two clusters solution proposed 
above. 
Furthermore, I carry out a cluster analysis with all items used in the questionnaire in 
order to control for the stability of results due to factorization (Ketchen Jr. & Shook, 1996) 
and obtain the same two clusters solution as above.  
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Overall, changes in the handling of the data do not majorly affect the results, since I 
still find the distinction between firms with either a high, or a low emphasis on the LOC (and 
related strategy as well as innovativeness), even if the Performance Measures Control cluster 
and the Values and Norms Control cluster merged together.  
Finally, the data structure used for clustering may cause unstable solutions. As a re-
sult, I detect outliers in my sample and repeat the clustering procedure to identify changes in 
the results. The single linkage cluster method allows the identification of outliers in the data. 
With single linkage, the distance between clusters is determined based on the shortest distance 
between cases. Thus, the cases that are aggregated in the last steps of the single linkage pro-
cedure can be considered as outliers. The inspection of the single linkage dendrogram and of 
the related distance measures for each clustering step show that the clustering of the last two 
cases is accompanied by a sudden increase in the distance between clusters. Thus, I delete 
these two cases, use Ward’s method to define the number of proper clusters, and then employ 
the K-means non-hierarchical method to allocate cases to clusters. I obtain a two clusters so-
lution whose interpretation is entirely consistent with the two clusters solution presented 
above. 
In summary, while obviously changes in the method used, in the type of variables em-
ployed, and in the shape of the data change the numbers of clusters detected, the interpretation 
of the clusters remains qualitatively unchanged.    
5 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between LOC and innovation. I 
analyzed the survey data and identified combinations of the LOC, which are, depending on 
the strategy and the environmental conditions, the combinations that assure the best perfor-
mance. There were three clusters: Values and Norms Control, Performance Measures Control, 
and Limited Control.  
Of course, the study suffers from some limitations. First, the cross-sectional nature of 
the survey data does not allow describing the development of the clusters over time. There is 
need, therefore, for future research analyzing the dynamics of the variables in consideration 
over time. Second, the sample used is restricted to firms from the manufacturing sector of 
German-speaking countries that are engaged in PD. Even if I carefully considered the repre-
sentativeness of the sample for this population, I am not able to make inferences for additional 
industries, sectors, or other business areas where the LOC are employed. An avenue for future 
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research is the investigation of various types of innovations in different industries in multiple 
countries. Third, the primary drawback of the method of cluster analysis is the reliance on the 
subjective judgment of the researcher for numerous decisions. This criticism can never be 
completely addressed, but the “Robustness of results” section should lend sufficient confi-
dence to my findings.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results contribute to research in several ways. 
First, evidence is offered of the combination of LOC that is best given certain strategy and 
environmental variables. Chenhall (2007), Fisher (1995), Malmi & Brown (2008), and Otley 
(1980), among others, have raised the call for more emphasis on the consideration of MCS in 
terms of packages, of components that operate together, jointly, simultaneously. In response, 
the cluster analysis of this present study demonstrates that, given the manifestation of the 
strategy formation and the degree of innovativeness variable, the beliefs and boundary con-
trol, together with an average emphasis on the diagnostic use of performance measures 
(Norms and Values Control cluster), are substitutes for the interactive and diagnostic control 
systems, together with an average use of beliefs and boundary control (Performance Measures 
Control cluster). In comparison, previous literature mostly concentrated on only a few of the 
LOC or did not address the issue of how the LOC are combined.  
Second, while previous literature was proliferous about the relationship between in-
tended strategies and MCS, the distinction between intended and emergent strategies and the 
relationship to different MCS components has been neglected for a long time (Langfield-
Smith, 2007). Marginson (2002) was the first to provide a longitudinal case study of the rela-
tion between the LOC and the type of strategy formation. My results provide a quantitative 
basis for his findings. Indeed, I can confirm the finding that beliefs and boundary systems are 
related to high innovativeness of the firm and thus to organizational change and to partially 
emerging strategies. Furthermore, I detected the simultaneous interactive and diagnostic use 
of different performance measures. It is possible, therefore, to support the finding that the use 
of key performance indicators may generate tension in innovative settings. In addition to the 
confirmative role of my results, I am able to describe the existence of categories on the basis 
of quantitative data. These categories encompass a cluster that deviates from those theoreti-
cally formulated in this paper, as it represents a combination of low reliance across all the 
four LOC that is associated with emergent strategies and low innovativeness. It seems that 
firms whose strategy formation process is driven mostly by the pressure of the environment 
130
 
 
 
are not able to translate these strategies into innovativeness and change, perhaps due to their 
overall low reliance on the LOC. 
Third, I contribute to the MCS-innovation stream of research by providing evidence of 
the combinations of the LOC that deliver the highest PD performance and the highest organi-
zational performance. Previous literature examined the performance effects of single levers, 
while I show how a package of different control systems and their joint use affects perfor-
mance. Furthermore, I take into consideration both a strategy and an environmental variable. 
Thus, practitioners are able to choose between the combinations of LOC the one that is best 
suited for their specific background. For example, firms with a high degree of innovativeness 
should generate intended as well as emergent strategies and particularly emphasize the beliefs 
and boundary systems in order to get the strategy implemented. In contrast, firms whose in-
novativeness is well below the average should try to move to a cluster with at least average 
innovativeness in order to achieve the highest possible performance. 
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